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The purpose of this thesis is to argue that the core of a monetary economy is a network of triangular 
contracts between banks, firms, workers and capital goods suppliers. Not only does this network give 
rise to the creation and valuation of money but it is the organising feature of modern economies, giving 
rise to both episodes of stability and crises. In constructing this argument I consider both orthodox and 
heterodox points of view. 
 
We analyse equilibrium models of money, and find that while money can exist in sequence economies 
with frictions, models of this type give no justification for its creation, valuation or holding for any 
significant duration, either theoretically or experimentally. Models that introduce dated goods and 
trading frictions to motivate the issue of risk-spreading ‘bundled’ debt are more promising for money 
creation, although they still cannot explain the the holding and valuation of money 
 
Using the concept of team-production of Alchian and Demsetz and that of ‘hostage-taking’ in contracts 
owing to Williamson, we demonstrate how the issue of a token of generalised purchasing power from a 
team-production contract can enhance output and consumption. This conclusion motivates an original 
monetary theory of production that integrates the insights of Post-Keynesian monetary theory and the 
triangular contracts of the Circulation Approach and expresses them in a way that shows consistent 
asset and liability matching through a balance sheet approach. The creation and valuation of money and 
the determination of interest are embedded within the central processes of this economy.  
 
The features of the monetary production economy we analyse are in contrast to the mainstream 
proposition that the economy as a whole is rendered coherent by the existence of a unique and stable 
equilibrium determined by the utility-maximisation of households and the profit maximisation of firms. 
Apart from their inability to describe the economy in aggregate, such models treat money as an 
afterthought that is in no way core to their conception.  
 
We set the triangular contracts within a rigorous stock-flow framework of the type developed by 
Godley and Lavoie and argue that the shifting of the level of impact of uncertainty and failed 
expectations induced by money leads to specific patterns of economic disruption. These patterns are 
independent of the specific behavioural characteristics of households and firms and so are robust to 
policy changes that leave the institutions of the monetary production economy intact. We briefly assess 
current monetary policy and alternatives in the light of these findings. 
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Chapter 1. Concepts 
 
1.1 Introduction 
1.1.1 Understanding Money 
Without understanding money, we cannot understand the workings of the 
modern economy, or hope to manage it to the benefit of society. This is contrary to 
much current economic theory, which either regards money as a commodity to be 
slotted into a Walrasian general equilibrium model, or which simply ignores its 
existence altogether as in modern ‘New Keynesian’ models exemplified by the work of 
Michael Woodford (2003). Such models relate the price level, economic activity and 
interest rates without the interposition of monetary quantities at all. 
Failure to understand the nature of the money on the part of economists and 
policymakers has allowed changes in the way the sector of the economy has developed 
to service its needs for finance that have been characterised as ‘financialisation’ (Palley 
2007, Stockhammer 2007). As this thesis is being completed, it has become 
increasingly clear that this process has been unsustainable and probably deeply harmful 
to the real economy of the production of welfare-enhancing real goods and services. 
1.1.2 The Features of Modern Money 
The most characteristic feature of the modern capitalist economy is its use of 
tokens of no intrinsic value to serve as means of exchange, means of payment and as a 
store of wealth. These tokens may take the form of paper notes or coins, but much more 
frequently today are simply patterns of electronic data. These tokens, or means of 
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rapidly transferring them or creating them in the form of debit and credit card 
technologies, are used in almost all transactions in the modern economy. 
In this thesis we identify the powers by which banks are able to issue these 
tokens of future consumable services and production; we identify why they become 
accepted by individual agents in the economy; how they subsequently circulate among 
agents, and how they acquire a specific value. These powers originate from a ‘team-
production’ contract that aims to harness labour, capital and entrepreneurial resources 
for the purpose of increasing the quantity and choice of consumption for the 
contractors. The purpose of the token issue is to facilitate the benefits of the contract, 
when time and uncertainty are factors. We must also account for the proliferation of 
different institutions today all of whose issued tokens are equally acceptable and of 
equal value and explain the role of money issued by the state, that takes the forms of 
bank reserves and cash, in this story. 
It will be apparent that the association of money with banks narrows the 
definition of money somewhat. We are focussing on bank credit-money because we 
believe that it has unique properties. We do not believe that these unique properties are 
shared by other financial assets. The unique property of bank money is that it is always 
generalised liability. No specific institution has ultimate responsibility for converting 
these liabilities into real goods and services, in contrast to all other financial assets such 
as private and government bonds, stocks and shares and derivatives of these assets. All 
of these latter assets have a monetary value that is derivative of the ability of their 
issuer to have bank credit-money available if and when the claim is exercised. It is true 
that the use of such assets as media of exchange, say between firms, can save the use of 
money in the short-term, but these transactions involve specific relationships between 
firms and their inputs and outputs. This has the effect of rendering these transactions 
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more akin to barter than monetary transactions. To the extent that such transactions will 
finally involve monetary settlement they represent shifting of monetary liability and 
reward. This means that it is possible to issue a bond and money on the same output. 
This should indicate that specific financial liabilities are not substitutes for the general 
financial liability of money (see Sproul 1998). The unique and fascinating feature of 
modern bank-credit money is that its acceptance and value depends on the monetised 
economic system as a whole, both the private and state sectors.1 
1.1.3 Monetary Production and the Triangular Contract 
This thesis delineates a Monetary Theory of Production that adopts the insights 
of Post-Keynesian monetary theory and those of the Circulation Approach and 
expresses it in a way that shows asset and liability matching through a balance-sheet 
approach. In doing so I analyse how the creation and valuation of money have their 
origin in ‘team-production’ contracts between firms, workers and/or capital goods 
suppliers. These contracts become ‘triangular’ with the involvement of credit-money 
issuing parties. 
An original proposition of this thesis is that the pattern of these triangular 
contracts and the accounting links between them is the organising principle in modern 
monetary economies. This is in contrast to the proposition of most modern theory that 
the economy is rendered coherent by the presence of a unique and stable equilibrium 
determined by the utility maximisation of households and the profit maximisation of 
firms. While the monetary institutions provide an underlying structure to economic 
activity the behaviour of firms and households within this structure remains almost 
impossible to aggregate because of the degree of interdependency of their activities 
                                                 
1
 The scope of the ‘monetised economic system’ discussed in this thesis is national, but we believe the 
same reasoning applies to single currency areas, and to the extent that different currencies are linked, to 
the global economic system. 
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(Colander 1996). This is compounded by the fact that the introduction of money, while 
it ‘lulls the disquietude’ of risk-averse individuals, cannot remove the effects of 
uncertainty, only transfer its effects to more systemic levels. We are left with a 
framework around which almost chaotic behaviour is likely to eddy, as a result of the 
constantly changing behaviour and interactions of individuals with each other at the 
microeconomic level and with events at the macroeconomic level. While it may be that 
new computational techniques will render tractable models of these interactions in the 
future, at present we can still draw some important conclusions from the basic 
framework  
We do this by setting the triangular contract within a rigorous stock-flow 
consistent framework of the type developed by Godley and Lavoie and others. In 
particular we demonstrate how inflation and persistent fluctuations in economic activity 
can arise from the systemic effects of the uncertainty that the team–production contract 
has propagated through the economic system. Given these explanations we analyse 
some possible remedies to deal with the effects of this generalised system uncertainty 
within the monetary framework revealed. 
Before we outline the structure of the thesis we will spend some time clarifying 
some of the key concepts involved in this work. 
1.2 Pluralism 
Apart from ‘Money’ and ‘Production’ the other critical word in this thesis title 
is ‘Pluralist’. This term is itself the subject of some debate, so we will take some time to 
discuss in what way our approach is pluralist. Pluralism has itself been subdivided into 
Structured Pluralism (Dow 2005), Critical Pluralism (Freeman and Kliman 2006) and 
Strategic Pluralism (Davis 2007).  
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Structured Pluralism is based on the idea that ‘schools of thought…represent the 
segmentation of open systems in a provisional, partial and incompletely specified way’ 
(Dow 2005, p2). These schools of thought are thought of as reflecting fundamental 
methodological differences. In particular  
orthodox economics is  unified by the positive heuristic 
to derive conclusions from the assumption that (atomistic) 
individuals optimise subject to constraints according to a 
particular notion of rationality, and to analyse in terms of 
equilibrium, in such a way as to be amenable to mathematical 
expression and even if only in principle empirical testing (Dow 
2005, p5). 
Heterodox economics, in its many guises, tends to oppose this approach in holding that 
since the real world is an open system2 with internal and external influences that cannot 
be encompassed within such a model. Thus an approach utilizing multiple arguments 
like the multiple strands of a rope may help us to build up knowledge of the social (and 
economic) system. Dow echoes Kuhn in pointing out that 
 just like orthodox economics, heterodox economics 
cannot claim superiority in any ultimate (non-paradigmatic) 
sense. We can produce arguments for its superiority, but it is 
not demonstrable in any absolute sense (Dow 2005, p7). 
The multiple methodologies of economics must be based on multiple modes of closure 
of their different models of the economy, all with different connections and lack of 
connections between different elements of the economy. Each closure is however 
provisional and should be accepted as such by practitioners of each methodology with 
willingness to change the ‘configuration of connectedness’ (Dow 2005, p10). 
‘Critical Pluralism’ as advocated by Freeman and Kliman is predicated on the 
idea that truth or progress towards it arises only if empirical reality is tested against a 
multiplicity of theoretical explanations of that reality. They reject the ‘working out of a 
                                                 
2
 Here the term ‘open system’ is used in the sense of a system where there are always elements internal 
and external to the system that cannot be accounted for and/or predicted (Lawson  1997). 
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single explanation within a single paradigm, attempting to demonstrate its superiority 
against both existing orthodoxy and alternative heterodoxies’ (Freeman and Kliman 
2006, p31). They argue that this ‘competition of schools’ will select, not for truth, but 
for political acceptance by the classes in society who fund it. The prescription is thus 
‘cross-paradigmatic engagement as the prime commitment of theoretical activity’ 
(Freeman and Kliman 2006, p46).  
In response to Freeman and Kliman, Davis (2007) accepts that a pluralism of 
diversity and schools tends to result in failure to engage with alternative views, but 
suggests that critical engagement cannot be imposed on economics. He advocates a 
‘strategic pluralism’ in which shared principles across schools are demonstrated.  
This thesis has much sympathy with the idea of Critical Pluralism; that actual 
engagement between different approaches is necessary to obtain a picture of the 
economy that allows for effective analysis and intervention. Dow is surely right that 
multiple approaches can be better than one, but this raises questions about the number 
of approaches that should be considered, and how to weight different approaches when 
they lead to conflicting conclusions. 
Freeman and Kliman give the only possible answer when they say that 
‘empirical reality’ is the criterion to judge economic theories, but this is by no means 
unproblematic. What empirical reality do we choose? How do we recognise it? And 
how do we know that reality today will match reality tomorrow?  
There is no value in an analysis of a problem that does not have the power to 
persuade, and where economics is concerned there is a serious methodological 
separation that has to be bridged. Here Strategic Pluralism has a part to play – but in 
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monetary economics the gulf seems so great it is difficult to know where to find 
common ground. 
Our approach tackles these issues by paring the problem down to fundamentals. 
These include the motivations that might have given rise to the creation of money; 
exchange for the neoclassical orthodoxy; production for the heterodox. We make no 
apology for insisting on this. Just taking a ‘dip into history’ and accepting given 
conditions at the start of an arbitrary period may save some time and effort, but it may 
well not give us all the information we need to understand how our monetary economy 
works. An explanation of a system that cannot account for how it started is an 
unsatisfactory one. We can also show that the link between money and production can 
in itself tell us most of what we need to know while side-stepping many of the 
arguments about specific behavioural functions and how these translate into aggregate 
macroeconomic tendencies. 
In doing this we attempt as far as possible to consider all concepts of money on 
their merits. Any omission or selectivity in assessing any particular one should be 
taken, not as evidence of explicit methodological bias, but of time constraints or of a 
failure to read more widely.3 We come to what is very much a heterodox conclusion 
however, and so we are at risk of a problem Sheila Dow recognizes for her own school 
of thought. 
Post-Keynesians should beware of conducting critiques 
of the orthodoxy in the orthodoxy’s own terms; there is a 
danger that the orthodoxy will persist in assuming that 
language and concepts are being used in the same way by all 
concerned (Dow 1993, p10). 
Since I am guilty in some ways of ignoring this good advice, as far as possible I 
wish to ameliorate the problem by discussing some further concepts critical to the 
                                                 
3
 Implicit bias cannot by its nature be avoided. The reader must assess whether, in his or her view, it 
invalidates what we have to say. 
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chapters that follow and try to make clear the sense in which they are being used in this 
work. These concepts are those of Equilibrium, Production and Welfare, and 
Uncertainty. I take the risk that Dow warns of, not because of innate recklessness, but 
because I believe that the mistaken assumptions of the orthodox analysis of the 
monetary economy are so far wrong and so damaging that they must be tackled head 
on, and some sort of commensurability established with an alternative view. 
1.3 Concepts of Uncertainty 
Critical to discussion of money is the concept of uncertainty. Given the pluralist 
nature of our investigation this requires us to tread a path through different concepts of 
uncertainty and how this might influence expectations of the outcome of a production 
contract. The Keynesian concept of uncertainty admits two elements; firstly a 
probability element (which may not be expressible numerically), and secondly a 
confidence element, corresponding to the weight of argument or evidence supporting 
that probability (Mizuhara 2002). This contrasts with the concept of subjective 
probability, derived from Ramsey (1931), that expresses strength of belief as betting 
odds over monetary values. This leads to the conception of ‘Expected Utility’ that is 
used in many orthodox economic models, where a menu of possible outcomes can each 
be given a numerical combination of probability and benefit.  
Considering the uncertainty associated with a contract, the risk of reneging on it 
might be calculated from various bits of evidence: 
1. Personalities of the contractors 
2. The difficulty of retrieving one’s own share of output after production is 
completed 
3. Past experience of such contracts 
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4. Cost-benefit of other party to reneging on the contract, particularly if 
further contracting is envisaged 
Each party to the contract will have the following choices: 
1. Deciding to go ahead with the project 
2. Deciding not to go ahead with the project 
3. Waiting for more information. 
If probabilities are non-numerical, as suggested by the Keynesian concept of 
probability, how is a potential contractor to decide between these options? There must 
be some way of ordering the possibilities if we are to choose in any form of rational 
way. 
Objects can be arranged in an order, which we can 
reasonably call one of degree or magnitude, without its being 
possible to conceive of a system of measurement of the 
differences between the individuals (McCann 2003, p44). 
Even if we assume that no evidence is available or the benefits of acting 
immediately outweigh the benefits of further information, if participants are risk-neutral 
and unbiased as to loss or gain it seems that the principle of indifference must apply in 
the sense that any decision is equally rational (Ramsey 1931). But it is also true to say 
that any decision is equally rational if all the available evidence points to a track record 
on the part of the contracting partner of exactly one half for completing or reneging on 
the contract. So in this sense it seems justified to say that what we are expressing is the 
overall belief that the evidence, and confidence in that evidence for contract reneging is 
or is not outweighed by the evidence and mechanism in place to force or incentivise 
completion of the contract. The common ground between the two concepts of 
probability in this case seems to be ‘that the degree of a belief is a causal property of it, 
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which we can express vaguely as the extent to which we are prepared to act on it’ 
(Ramsey 1931, p14).4 
For Keynes there is a propensity to act, that comes about from the rational 
calculation of probability, the state of confidence in the evidence giving rise to this 
calculation and even the personal characteristics of the decision maker (Mizuhara 2002, 
McCann 2003). If we include all of these in our uncertainty measurement then we could 
simply say that we are comparing the propensity to act with a particular assurance 
mechanism to that without it.  
Importantly, Keynesian uncertainty includes the possibility of fundamental 
uncertainty where ‘we just do not know’. Here it seems there can be no calculation of 
the best course of action, so that either no action is taken or if it is taken some degree of 
reversibility is required. The existence of some degree of this sort of uncertainty makes 
the long-term holding of general purchasing power attractive (the existence of positive 
‘liquidity preference’), and so may well be relevant to why money is created and held 
(Glickman 2003, Runde and Mizuhara 2003). Uncertainty of this nature is also likely to 
be source of expectations and valuation based on ‘convention’ (Keynes 1964[1936], 
Dow 2003). We will discuss the issue of uncertainty further as it becomes relevant in 
later chapters. 
1.4 Production 
This thesis is about a ‘Monetary Theory of Production’, or what might equally 
be termed a ‘Production Theory of Money’ since in the modern economy they are 
really two sides of the same coin (albeit two sides that may not match). But while we 
                                                 
4
 Keynes rejected the Principle of Indifference in his Treatise on Probability (Keynes (1973[1921]), on 
the grounds that it leads to contradictions when multiple choices are considered. We believe that when 
such choices are considered sequentially, this objection can be met. But this issue is not pursued further 
here. 
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are spending a lot of time discussing the nature of money it is important also to 
understand what we mean by production. 
Production is the process of bringing something into existence that did not exist 
before in exactly that form, usually by the application of human effort and ingenuity in 
combination with some pre-existing non-human object or objects (which may be 
natural resources or the outcome of some preceding production process).  
The output of production is ultimately demanded for the purpose of enhancing 
the life of an individual or organisation. Indeed it must do this to the extent that it 
subjectively justifies the giving up of something that the purchaser values. In a single 
firm model of the economy in which production is taking place, the ‘purchaser’ gives 
up their labour and/or their own resources to the production process and consumes the 
output of this process themselves. There is thus a very obvious subjective link between 
the value of labour or resources supplied and the output received. But in a monetary 
economy what is given up to receive output is purchasing power acquired from labour 
effort or resource supply elsewhere in time and/or space. The quantity of labour and 
resources that has gone into the production of this output, relative to own labour or 
resources expended cannot be known with certainty. 
We are interested in analysing the value of money in a more fundamental way 
than is expressed by a price level calculated from a weighted basket of commodities, in 
part because this assumes the nature of the monetary economy that we are seeking to 
explain. Keynes makes the point that  
Human effort and human consumption are the ultimate 
matters from which alone economic transactions are capable of 
deriving any significance; and all other forms of expenditure 
only acquire importance from their having some relationship, 
sooner or later, to the effort of producers or to the expenditure 
of consumers (Keynes (1971[1930], pp120-121), 
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and it is the individual balance between effort and consumption, both in quantity and 
quality that determines the behaviour of economic agents, as far as we can analyse it. 
Even then, how do we interpret changed attitudes to the output of the contract after a 
period of time has elapsed? Unfortunately in a multi-firm environment, where the 
reward for effort and the cost of consumption are translated into the form of generalised 
purchasing power we have to determine, not the relationship of physical effort to 
physical reward but of physical effort to monetary reward for households and 
individuals (and of monetary expenditure to physical reward in terms of existence and 
growth for firms). This adds another dimension to the problem. Non-monetary methods 
of determining the welfare value of output might, at the subjective level, include some 
form of democratic/consultative process or, at the objective level the use of some form 
of happiness measure.5 
Ultimately in our investigations we are less interested in measuring the benefit 
of production exactly, than in pointing out that satisfaction with the team-production 
contract as initially determined can change so as to mean that effective demand is out of 
step with the expected demand of the contract. It is the uncertainty about this that leads 
to the failed expectations we shall analyse in chapter 6.  
It is important to point out that the contribution of economic processes 
(exchange and production) to welfare is not to be measured in the total value of their 
outcome. The true measure of welfare is in the difference between the value of the 
inputs and the value of the outputs. Labour and resources that are not used in monetised 
economic processes still exist and are still available to their owners to provide potential 
welfare. For this reason we must be wary of equating the scope of the monetary 
economy (as measured by GDP, for example) with the contribution of economic 
                                                 
5See Oswald (1997), for example. 
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processes to human welfare. Given a social, rather than monetary definition of welfare, 
it is perfectly possible for expectations of the welfare-enhancing role of any production 
process to be simply wrong, and for the expenditure of effort and resources in an 
economic process, where reward is implicit rather than explicit to be detrimental to 
welfare rather than beneficial. 
We should note then that ‘production’ can include not only services that make 
the creation of goods and services more efficient, but also services that make their 
consumption more welfare enhancing. What is produced (output) need not be tangible; 
it includes all goods or services that may be demanded, including goods or services that 
enhance the production process. Where the buying and selling of assets serves to bring 
them into the hands of those who can maximise their efficient use in production of real 
goods this ‘speculative’ behaviour could be regarded as a form of production. Another 
important service in modern economies is one that can shift consumption in time to 
where it produces the greatest subjective welfare benefit. This is the role of household 
lending. 
1.5 Money and Equilibrium 
In this thesis we have been willing to consider models that rely on finding some 
form of equilibrium, where  
no decision-maker to the extent that his or her action 
has been appropriately captured in the model, has even the 
slightest motivation to change any plan or action. (Katzner 
2006, p126).  
This is on the basis that any proposed equilibrium condition is as likely to occur as the 
premises on which it is based are true, including the mechanism by which equilibrium 
is presumed to occur. Moreover, in the sense that any enduring observation or 
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institution must represent a balance of the forces that tend towards its disappearance, 
equilibrium is a feature of the real world. The questions that have to be asked are: 
1. What are the forces accounting for enduring features of the economy? 
2. How long are these forces likely to persist for? 
3. What happens when one or other of these forces change (which may or 
may not include some new ‘equilibrium’)? 
In contrast to orthodox, neoclassical economic model-building we recognise 
that the subsets of forces that taken together make up any apparent economic 
equilibrium are inevitably few in relation to the subsets of forces that are relevant to the 
economy as a whole, so that such an equilibrium is always the exceptional result of 
social and economic forces rather than the rule. This is particularly the case because 
predicting equilibria requiring a balance of human behaviours imply that  
all events (past, present and future) that may have a 
bearing on the equilibrium are assumed to be completely 
knowable at least probabilistically (Katzner 2006, p127). 
The default assumptions made in orthodox models of equilibrium in the goods, 
labour and money markets clearly fall into this category, and are hardly realistic in a 
world of continuous and pervasive change’ (Katzner 2006). A parallel distinction is 
between the logical time of equilibrium modelling and the historical time of alternative 
models, such as those of Post-Keynesian economists. Time is ‘historical’ in the sense 
that each moment in history is taken as unique, with fragmentary and variable 
knowledge of past events and unknowable (even probabilistically) future events. As a 
consequence behavioural variables cannot remain constant as planned behaviour 
continually changes. Thus a solution to such an economy is time-dependent and it 
cannot be assumed to be the solution in the next period, as parameters and structural 
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relations are expected to alter. This implies that such analysis does not allow formal 
prediction (Henry 2006). 
Although we will argue that a monetary economy cannot be in general 
equilibrium, nevertheless certain partial equilibrium concepts may be relevant to 
answering these questions and understanding the role of money in the economy. The 
continued issuing, existence and acceptance of money all imply equilibria, in that the 
forces existing that may tend to end these must be opposed by at least equal forces. And 
we know of several forces, on theoretical and empirical grounds, that can or at any rate 
come close to destroying the institution of money. These include, but are not limited to, 
loss of credibility in banks to maintain the convertibility of money, rapid changes in the 
value of money and shortages of money. So we must look for a balance of forces for 
and against the issuing or creation of money; that is to say someone must be made 
(ostensibly at any rate) better off by creating it and someone must be better off by 
accepting it. Moreover, there must be no overwhelming force suppressing its existence, 
which in a modern democracy is to say that there must be at least an apparent social 
benefit (or at least absence of disbenefit) to the existence of the institution of money. 
We will argue that the monetary institutions of a modern capitalist economy are 
the product of one of the enduring subsets of forces that give rise to conditions that can, 
at least in some senses, be regarded as an ‘equilibrium’. This is what makes the 
monetary system and its relationships to the real economy of consumption and 
production a potentially more fruitful framework from which to study economic forces 
and outcomes than others. 
1.6 The Use of Mathematics  
[T]o state a theory in terms of a formal model is…a 
matter of costs and benefits. The benefits are greater rigour, 
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more precision, demonstrable results. The costs are associated 
with the way in which formalising an argument can change its 
meaning (Chick and Dow 2001, p705). 
The problems associated with formalizing an argument in mathematical terms 
relate to the choice of axioms, the choice of method, the type of logic employed or how 
the mathematical model is ‘closed’, as well as how it connects (and does not connect) 
to the real world. To observe or theorise about regularities in real world events requires 
agents that can be isolated from forces outside the model and agents inside the system 
whose responses can be anticipated with reasonable consistency. Because economic 
agents are constantly acquiring new information and responding to existing information 
in new ways, and because the economic institutions and conventions with which they 
interact are constantly evolving, the extent to which such models are likely to be helpful 
is clearly limited. Perhaps the most important axiom that we use in our mathematical 
formulations in this thesis is that individuals, firms and governments will not 
knowingly act against their own interests. This need not assume perfect information or 
rational expectations. 
Our specific use of mathematical arguments in this thesis will be confined to the 
following: 
1. To indicate the relationships between monetary values where strict 
accounting is a part of the institutional reality we are analysing. 
2. To indicate, where ordinal comparisons may be possible, the 
implications of their different potential outcomes. 
3. To illustrate the logic employed in alternative models we analyse.  
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1.7 Outline of the argument of the thesis 
In the first four chapters of this thesis we examine concepts of money and its 
origin and valuation, and attempt to extract what is useful, coherent and consistent from 
these to construct an understanding of money that not only makes sense of what we 
observe in the modern economy, but of its nature provides a framework for 
understanding its successes and its failures and how to promote the former and avoid 
the latter. 
The fundamental questions we must answer are 
1. What is money? 
2. Where does it come from? 
3. How does it get or lose its value? (Ingham 2004) 
Until we can answer these we cannot argue that money is important, or explain what its 
importance is. 
We start in Chapter 2 by dealing with the approach to money taken within the 
orthodox realms of analysis of supply, demand and equilibrium. We show that there is 
little support for the theory that money arose from the desire for more efficient 
exchange, either from theoretical or experimental work. Models of money that use 
dated goods and frictions that arise in the context of these to motivate the issue of debt 
tokens, and how these might circulate, are rather more promising, although still some 
way from supplying what we regard as the interesting features of money. To try and get 
an idea for the essence of money as circulating debt, we construct a ‘team-
production/hostage’ model and consider its implications.  
Following on from our findings in the previous chapter, Chapter 3 considers the 
Monetary Theory of Production in two of its guises. Post-Keynesian monetary theory 
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and the Circulation Approach both emphasise the idea that money developed not as an 
aid to exchange, but as an essential for the production process. We compare and 
contrast these approaches and construct a coherent synthesis within a double-entry 
book-keeping framework that strictly matches financial assets and liabilities. Within 
this framework we analyse the issues of the role of the central bank, liquidity 
preference and the monetary flows of interest payments and profits. We emphasise the 
importance of ‘triangular relationships’ that create money at the same time as creating 
the conditions for its acceptance (Graziani 1989, 2003). 
Chapter 4 considers how money gets determinate value in terms of physical 
goods and services. What if anything likes behind the token? What is the backing of 
money, and is this backing of any real importance in the modern economy. We show 
that conventional valuation, legal tender status and valuation through taxation are 
inadequate guides to value. Using some arguments deployed in the ‘Real Bills’ 
controversy we argue that it is not just the acceptance of money that is determined in 
the triangular relationship explored in Chapter 3, but also its valuation as a money of 
account that can subsequently be expressed in transferable form.  In this chapter we 
also argue for a real basis for the rate of interest.  
Chapter 5 approaches the problems of a monetary economy from the 
macroeconomic perspective. How can we understand the patterns of production and 
consumption in the modern economy? We analyse some orthodox general equilibrium 
models of the monetary economy and find their treatment of money inconsistent and 
unhelpful. We review the evidence against the general equilibrium framework and find 
it in any case inadequate for providing a meaningful framework for analysis of a multi-
firm, multi-agent economy. We consider some heterodox macroeconomic models and 
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find that while these are less rigid in their modelling they are still too ambitiously 
determinate and over precise.  
In Chapter 6 we make the innovative claim that, on the basis of our preceding 
findings, the monetary economy should be analysed as a network of triangular 
relationships that create money, establish its acceptance and set its expected value. 
Much of this network is in the form of flows of monetary assets and liabilities linked by 
double-entry book-keeping. We argue that the linkage of these flows provides an 
alternative and more promising framework for analysing the modern monetary 
economy by establishing important parameters within which it must operate. In 
particular we show how this can be demonstrated using a Stock-Flow consistent (SFC) 
framework, but without presuming specific behavioural closure.  
We also make the claim that the triangular relationships at the core of an 
evolved monetary economy have significantly evolved away from their original role as 
team-production enablers. Their ability to create generalised purchasing power has 
separated the physical value of inputs and outputs, so that their relative value (and thus 
the benefits of production) are often difficult for agents to calculate. This leads to a 
strong likelihood that the expected monetary valuations of output determined in the 
triangular contracts are not realised. Using our Stock-Flow framework we analyse the 
menu of possible outcomes of such failed expectations. We briefly analyse policy 











The modern economic orthodoxy aims to base macroeconomic outcomes on the 
analysis of individual and global optimisation of welfare. This is no less true for 
questions about money. From the mainstream perspective, if a monetary economy is 
not fundamentally different from a non-monetary economy, then the modelling of 
monetary economies can be based on the Arrow-Debreu formalization of Walrasian 
general equilibrium. The maximum possible welfare, defined in terms of Pareto-
efficiency, is, given initial endowments, achieved by the free exchange of goods at 
multilaterally-determined relative prices with no excess demand or supply. This is only 
prevented by deficiency of information or foresight and/or external interference in the 
economic sphere. Notwithstanding the relevance of the general equilibrium model 
itself, money presents serious problems for this type of theorising.1 
It is certainly possible to envisage and set up a general equilibrium model in 
which some of the goods exchanged are contingent on time and on future states of the 
world, but unless all players are willing (or forced) to make decisions instantly, the 
process toward equilibrium may be indefinitely suspended.2 If a contingent purchase is 
a once and for all decision, then a purchaser may hold paper that ‘entitles’ them to this 
output, but it must also ‘force’ them to accept it when it is delivered. Money in a 
                                                 
1
 We will discuss some more intrinsic shortcomings of Walrasian general equilibrium in Chapter 5. 
2
 See Starr (1997) for an example of such a model. 
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monetary economy is clearly not like this; it represents an entitlement but not a 
contract, so there is the possibility that money may be held and not spent, and thus 
markets fail to clear.  
In this chapter we will survey the possibilities for money arising as an 
equilibrium solution to models of exchange and production with various frictions. We 
find that while pure exchange models may explain the use of a commodity money they 
cannot justify its creation and holding. On the other hand, models with dated goods that 
are demanded by agents other than their producers may serve to give rise to the creation 
of a token money, where the token records a specific debt obligation. These models’ 
‘bundling’ technologies can allow this form of money to circulate. We then generalise 
the insights of these latter models in a model of ‘team-production’ where we show the 
potential benefit of a ‘hostage’ in the form of generalised purchasing power being 
offered from one party to the contract to the other. 
2.2 Frictions in Exchange  
The comparison between a monetary economy and a 
frictionless barter economy serves no purpose…the only 
meaningful comparison is with a barter economy where 
transactions are costly because of the haggling involved (Visser 
1989, p2) 
Individual optimisation cannot explain the beneficial addition of money to a 
frictionless Walrasian market. Without communication or information costs all 
decisions can be made at the start of model time. Money, on the other hand, enables 
agents to demand goods without being certain of the quantities they will be able to sell 
and the prices at which they will sell, and to sell goods without knowing the quantities 
they wish to demand or the prices at which they will purchase them. But the holding of 
some goods purely for exchange, especially if these goods are only promises to deliver, 
is difficult to model in a self-contained time period. Why would agents risk holding 
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end-of-period balances of bank notes or book entries that are not destroyed in final 
exchange with goods? For money to be held only really makes sense in sequence 
economies, where new decisions and new transactions are made in every period. The 
value of money in a sequence economy results because of asymmetric information 
about endowments and the cost of making decisions in advance of actual events (Visser 
1989). 
In the next sections we will critically examine a series of approaches that 
attempt to establish equilibria in which money circulates as a medium of exchange in 
economies of sequential trades. The specific papers discussed are of course just a 
sample from a vast literature, but I believe their analyses are representative of the way 
this approach has progressed, and helps to show what is required in a theory that 
explains the existence and use of money.3 We start with the ‘random matching’ 
approach, assessing its theoretical merits as well as some evidence from experiments 
designed to mimic these models as closely as possible. We then go on to discuss an 
approach that involves communication and information frictions in sequence trading 
that give rise to circulating debt instruments. Finally in this section we consider a model 
where multilateral debt is created to counter limited commitment and resaleability 
issues. 
2.2.1 Kiyotaki and Wright and Commodity Money 
Kiyotaki and Wright attempt to derive ‘objects that become media of exchange 
[that] will be determined endogenously as part of the non-co-operative equilibrium’ 
(Kyotaki and Wright 1989, p928). They consciously allude to the classical and early 
neoclassical economists’ emphasis on money arising from exchange. They achieve an 
endogenous derivation of commodity and/or fiat money in a general equilibrium 
                                                 
3
 For more comprehensive consideration of equilibrium money models see Kiyotaki and Moore (2002) 
and Dalziel (2000). 
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matching model. Trade using media of exchange emerges in equilibrium. They 
emphasise the force behind the emergence of money as specialisation so that agents 
need not consume only what they produce.  
Period by period, agents who produce one of a particular good but demand 
another, are matched randomly in pairs and must decide whether or not to trade 
bilaterally. Agents use individually optimal (maximising expected discounted utility 
from consumption net of production and storage costs) sequential strategies, based on 
rational expectations of others’ strategies and a stochastic matching distribution. Trade 
always entails a one-for-one swap of inventories (so the valuation of money versus 
goods is fixed). Kiyotaki and Wright find steady-state equilibria in the form of sets of 
trading strategies satisfying maximisation and rational expectations for trade. When a 
commodity is accepted in trade not to be consumed or used in production but to 
facilitate further trade it can be regarded as a medium of exchange in the form of a 
commodity money. Certain parameters produce an equilibrium where agents will 
always exchange a lower storage-cost commodity for a higher-storage cost commodity 
unless the latter is their own consumption good. Others involve some agents trading 
one good for another which has a higher storage cost but a higher probability of being 
accepted for trade in subsequent periods, and so is more ‘marketable’. Kiyotaki and 
Wright characterise this as ‘an example of an object being used as a medium of 
exchange in spite of the fact that it is dominated in rate of return by another object’ 
(Kiyotaki and Wright 1989, p938). This is of course a notable feature of the use of 
money. 
It is clear however that. although there are equilibria in which the use of media 
of exchange in their model can be sustained, there is no explanation for the first use of 
money. 
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A critical factor in determining if an object can serve as 
a medium of exchange is whether or not agents believe that it 
will (Kiyotaki and Wright 1989, p928). 
 So if they don’t, it won’t. 
2.2.2 Kiyotaki and Wright and Fiat Money 
In the 1989 paper Kiyotaki and Wright also consider the possibility of a fiat 
money, where a medium of exchange has no intrinsic value. They introduce a fixed 
quantity of a good 0 which is of no benefit in production. The exchange price of good 0 
with other goods is fixed, and only one good of any type can be held at any one time. 
Kiyotaki and Wright show that there are equilibria where good 0 does not circulate and 
equilibria where it does, so long as agents believe that it will be accepted in the future. 
Kiyotaki and Wright admit that in their model, this ultimately depends at least partially 
on ‘faith’, and indeed they suggest that ‘this is a property that a good theory of money 
ought to have’ (Kiyotaki and Wright 1989, p943). They suggest that good 0 might be a 
fiat money created by the government and that this enables the purchase of real 
commodities with intrinsically worthless and unbacked paper. Because using fiat 
money reduces inefficient storage of real commodities it can improve welfare as long as 
there is not too great a replacement of real goods. Again they do not explain beyond 
‘faith’ how this money might come to be accepted. 
In a further paper, Kiyotaki and Wright (1993) go on to model fiat money 
specifically. Again the value of their ‘money’ is fixed since all of one agent’s holding 
of money must be spent to purchase one real commodity. Some agents are endowed 
with real commodities; some with money. No trader accepts a good he cannot consume 
because this does not increase his chances of trading, but if the probability of obtaining 
his good for money is high enough he will be persuaded to accept money. In this model 
there are three possible equilibria; a pure monetary equilibrium, a non-monetary 
equilibrium and a mixed monetary equilibrium. Kiyotaki and Wright show that all 
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agents are strictly better off in the pure monetary equilibrium, and they also find that an 
increase in money in the pure-money equilibrium encourages specialisation because 
producers can more easily market their output. As specialisation increases barter 
becomes more difficult, further increasing the acceptability of money.  
Before considering experimental studies that have examined the plausibility of 
Kiyotaki and Wright’s models, we will consider their models on theoretical grounds. 
Firstly, while equilibria exist in the models, there is no explanation as to how they 
might be reached. Even Kiyotaki and Wright expect ‘faith’ to be required before money 
can be used successfully and even this faith requires faith from others to avoid it being 
cruelly dashed. While a social benefit may exist if everyone uses money; if it is not of 
benefit to the first user he/she will not use it, and so no-one will use it. Secondly, 
money is not given its value within the model. Kiyotaki and Wright’s money has a 
fixed, pre-determined value of one consumption unit. This assumes a common cost of 
production and utility for all commodities in exchange; not a very realistic assumption. 
For fiat money the issue is even more problematic. The initial receiver of this 
money may be persuaded that it will be accepted in exchange for goods at some later 
date, but if he is to accept it for some quantity of goods he holds he must have some 
idea of its relative value in terms of other goods. Since each transaction involving 
money, including the first, only involves one good, there is no way of establishing 
relative money values of goods.  
2.2.3 Experimental Studies 
Duffy and Ochs (1999, 2002) have carried out experimental studies to 
determine whether search-theoretic theories of money can be implemented in a real-
world experiment. In their 1999 paper they attempt to determine whether the finding of 
Kiyotaki and Wright’s 1989 commodity money model that agents will pursue 
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‘speculative’ strategies is psychologically plausible. Here a good with a higher storage 
cost is accepted in exchange for one with a lower storage cost on the basis that by doing 
so a trader will have a shorter wait before being able to trade for his/her consumption 
good. These ‘speculative’ beliefs are self-fulfilling in the sense that the more agents 
there are in the economy that hold such beliefs, the more true it becomes for those 
agents. 
A ‘fundamental’ strategy, also self-fulfilling under certain parameters, implies 
that the choice of a medium of exchange is based purely on storage cost. As Duffy and 
Ochs (1999) point out, the question remains as to which equilibrium is likely to be 
achieved and how it is achieved when equilibrium beliefs cannot be present at the 
beginning of the exchange process. To this end, Duffy and Ochs implement the 
Kiyotaki and Wright model by observing real subjects’ behaviour in the environment 
specified by it.  
Duffy and Ochs’ laboratory version of the model introduces a random stopping 
rule so that there is a constant 0.1 probability of the game ending from one round to the 
next. This implements a discount factor of 0.9 and is intended to mimic the effect of an 
infinitely lived population as specified in the Kiyotaki and Wright model. Information 
about the historical average distribution of goods by player type in the current game is 
updated at the end of each trading round and conveyed to each player so that, as 
envisaged in the Kiyotaki and Wright model, this was common knowledge.  
In set-ups conforming to Kiyotaki and Wright’s 1989 model, increasing the 
utility of consumption did not have the theoretically expected effect of increasing the 
incidence of ‘speculative’ strategies used by some players, but did have the counter-
theoretical effect of increased offer frequencies by other players. In other cases there 
were a higher number of players playing speculative strategies when the 
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parameterisation leads to this being a possible equilibrium (although co-existing with a 
fundamental equilibrium), but far from the extent where 100% of players are doing so; 
thus no speculative equilibrium obtained. 
Duffy and Ochs summarise their findings as indicating that there was 
dominance of fundamental strategies based on storage costs, regardless of conditions. 
They suggest that ‘At the individual level, behaviour reflected a response to differences 
in past pay-offs…but did not reflect any differences in response to marketability 
conditions…’(Duffy and Ochs 1999, p873). 
The same researchers sought to extend their investigation to fiat money on the 
basis that ‘An object becomes a medium of exchange because people have formed a 
(rational) expectation that it will continue to serve as a medium of exchange and this 
expectation need not be supported by any property of the object other than the social 
convention that has emerged for its use in the past’ (Duffy and Ochs 2002, p638). They 
add to the previously-described experiment an object that occupies storage space and is 
in fixed supply but has no consumption value for anyone. Duffy and Ochs find that 
when the token object has zero storage cost it is widely used as a medium of exchange. 
But it is not universally accepted and other goods are also used as media of exchange. 
Even if it is costly it will be accepted in trade, although with less frequency than 
predicted by Kiyotaki and Wright and sensitive to the supply of the valueless good, but 
not to the acceptability of the traded and intrinsically-valued good. 
We can make sense of this by observing that under certain parameters the risk 
of being left holding the token at the end of the game and the cost of storing it are 
outweighed by the advantage of easier exchange. Given the risk of the game ending 
while in possession of a non-valued token, this requires a good acceptance rate from 
other players. The model assumes that some goods have intrinsic value to some players, 
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but have zero value for the other players. In the game there is no disadvantage to being 
left at the end of the game holding a good that can be consumed by nobody, compared 
to being left holding a good that can be consumed only by someone else. In the real 
world of course, most goods can be consumed (with varying levels of utility) by most 
people, and even if production of goods has ceased, exchange remains possible. In the 
light of this there is little in Duffy and Ochs’ findings that contradicts the objections to 
Kiyotaki and Wright-type matching models we made earlier. The fundamental problem 
with these models is their lack of explanation for money to be initially accepted and 
valued. 
2.3 Dated Goods and Frictions 
2.3.1 Andolfatti and Nosal: Spatial Separation and Information Failure 
We now come to consider equilibrium models where agents wish to trade with 
each other, but some form of restriction prevents them doing so directly. Potential gains 
to trade cannot be exploited without the issue of promises to deliver goods in the future, 
that is to say they issue debt. In one type of model this restriction is based on intrinsic 
features of the traders or their environment. An example of such a model is that of 
Andolfatto and Nosal (2003). A second type of model, explored by Kiyotaki and Moore 
(2000, 2003) has a similar structure, but here the restrictions to direct trade are limited 
commitment and problems of resaleability of promises of goods. These models are an 
advance in that they introduce frictions specific to dated goods, and so find a role for 
historical time. 
In Andolfatto and Nosal’s model there is spatial separation between producing 
agents so that there is a limited communication between them, and no direct sale of 
promises of output is possible. Efficiency is achieved by having a private security serve 
as a monetary instrument; that is promises of output by one agent circulate as a general 
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means of payment because it is evidence of the promise made by the initial agent. An 
intermediary can then mitigate incentive problems by issuing low-risk claims while 
serving as a delegated monitor. Whereas agents with unknown histories require some 
tangible object to facilitate trade, agents with known histories, banks, issue ‘inside 
money’ to agents with unknown histories. As shown by Kiyotaki and Wright’s model, 
once this exists it can improve welfare. Demandable debt instruments are backed by the 
collateral obtained in the issuance of money loans (Andolfatti and Nosal 2003).  
Agents gain from trading ‘projects’ with each other, but information about the 
risk of failure of a project cannot be obtained without a costly audit. They take 
securities, including an option to audit, in exchange for a liability of the intermediary 
promising output of the type the agents desire when it is produced. The role of the 
intermediary is, in effect, simply to pool risk where the outcome of contracts is 
uncertain. 
2.3.2 Kiyotaki and Moore: Limited Commitment and Saleability 
Kiyotaki and Moore (2002, 2003) argue that there can be no use for money 
when full commitment can be given to allocate all future production. So they derive the 
use of ‘money’ in an equilibrium framework from its ability to lubricate the transfer of 
resources when there is a limit to the ability of agents to commit to future transfers of 
real resources. Claiming that ‘inside money can be defined very broadly as any 
privately-issued long-term paper that is held by a number of agents in succession’, they 
suggest that paper issued to guarantee promised output and that is held ‘not for its 
maturity value, but for its exchange value’ is thus money (Kiyotaki and Moore 2003, 
p1). They introduce dated goods and thus bring irreversibility into the model, although 
time is discrete and there is no uncertainty. Agents start projects every 3 days, 
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completing them 2 days later. There are three sets of agents – each set starting on the 
same days. 
Because agents starting new projects need to raise funds by selling claims to 
output, they issue paper that matures in two days time. But an agent completing a 
project wishes to lend only overnight until their next project starts. The equilibrium 
market solution of an efficient exchange of dated goods is ruled out by limited 
commitment, so that agents can only pledge a fraction of their current output and none 
of their future output. What happens is that A issues paper maturing at t+2 and sells it 
to B in exchange for goods; the next day B resells A’s paper to C in exchange for 
goods, and the following day A redeems his paper by giving goods to C. Thus A’s 
paper circulates, acting as inside money.  
The circulation of A’s paper comes about because agent A can make a 
multilateral commitment that can substitute for the limited commitment power of 
another agent. But they identify a problem of limited re-saleability in a way analogous 
to Andolfatto and Nosal’s limited information, and this limits multilateral commitment, 
because either there is an incentive to re-sell claims against ‘lemons’, it takes time to 
verify the authenticity of paper or the initial creditor has more leverage than subsequent 
creditors. Kiyotaki and Moore suggest a form of ‘bundling’ of A’s projects to 
counteract these problems. In different ways then, Andolfatto and Nosal and Kiyotaki 
and Moore model why paper promising the future output of an agents production 
should be issued, why it should circulate, and why its circulation can be enhanced by 
the spreading of the production base on which it is issued, through the aggregation of 
debts. These insights do go some way to suggest a rationale for the existence and nature 
of money. In the next section we will generalise these ideas in terms of money as a 
production credit. 
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2.4 Money and Production Credit 
2.4.1 Motivation for Money’s Acceptance 
We have argued that in pure exchange models, while an equilibrium may exist 
in which money is accepted by all parties and so circulates, and this equilibrium by 
enhancing exchange can improve collective welfare, there remains an intractable 
problem as to how such an equilibrium can arise in the first place. Although all may be 
aware of a social benefit from the widespread use of money this will not be enough to 
outweigh a perceived non-negligible risk of holding money that is not going to be 
accepted in exchange by others. In real time, there must be a first user of any money. 
Before they can use it they must accept it, but before they will accept it they must be 
assured that it can be used; that is to say they must believe that other agents will accept 
it in exchange. What grounds might exist for an assumption that money will be 
accepted by others? These might include: 
1. Knowing that others already believe that others will accept it. 
2. Knowing that sanctions are in place for those not accepting it. 
3. Knowing that others are aware of individual benefits from accepting 
money. 
The first is the conventional reason for acceptance and is as tenuous as it 
appears. The experimental evidence of Duffy and Ochs, discussed in the previous 
section, shows the fragility of intrinsically worthless ‘fiat’ money The practical and 
stable use of such money seems improbable, and as Goldberg (2004) points out it is 
doubtful if such money has ever in fact existed despite persistent myths to the contrary. 
The second suggests a legal reason, such as legal tender or taxation laws. The possible 
importance of these we discuss in Chapter 4. In the rest of this chapter we are going to 
consider the third reason. 
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Money and Production 
Dissatisfaction with models of money arising from exchange leads us to 
consider a strong intuition that the existence and value of money are inextricably bound 
up with production. This intuition springs from the following line of thought, the basis 
of which has also been suggested by Tobin (1992, p774) and Kiyotaki and Moore 
(2001, p3): if all production in a monetary economy were for some reason to cease, 
with no hope of its being restarted, once all remaining efficient exchanges are 
completed and all stocks used up, no further exchange would take place. Anyone left 
holding money by the last transaction before this point would be in possession of 
something completely worthless as a store of value and consequently also as a means of 
exchange. In fact as it is known that production is to cease, no-one would accept 
money. Since no-one will accept money in the last transaction, they will not be willing 
to accept it in the last-but-one transaction, and so it will not be acceptable in the 
transaction prior to this, and so on by backward induction to the point at which the 
cessation of production becomes anticipated. It follows that the same process is relevant 
when any reduction in production is anticipated, with a corresponding reduction in the 
value of money occurring rather than a complete cessation of its acceptance. The 
converse - a rise in the value of money when an increase in production is anticipated - 
can also be predicted. In this way the perceived value of money can be linked to future 
expectations of production capacity and the expected utility value of production output. 
Moreover, it seems unlikely that the causality between money and production is 
unidirectional. It is difficult to see how our advanced modern economy could have 
come into existence without it; certainly before the development of advanced 
information and communication technology. 
The models of Andolfatto and Nosal and of Kiyotaki and Moore seem to hint at 
the link between money and production; the value of their ‘money’ arising because they 
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are promises to provide goods in the future. But their models are quite limited and 
artificial. More generally, a monetary theory of production arises from the idea that 
some form of token, representing recompense for labour or capital goods supplied for 
the purposes of production, is required to bridge the gap in time between the start of 
production when labour and goods must first be applied to the production process, and 
the end when output can be offered for sale. At the simplest level one firm can be 
imagined to exist, producing one consumption good from one capital good and one 
worker. The worker and the capital goods firm each receive tokens entitling them to a 
claim on the firm’s output. There then arises the problem of why the token issued 
amounts to much more than a promise issued by the consumer goods firm that the 
employee and the capital goods firm will receive their share of the firm’s output. The 
token is no more valuable than the consumer goods firm and its economic and 
production environment are reliable. Moreover the token issued will have limited 
liquidity, depending as it does on the demand for the specific good manufactured by the 
firm. Only those individuals who wish to purchase the firm’s output, or are confident of 
finding an agent that does to barter with, will value it in exchange. How does the 
multilateral set-up, given the existing frictions and/or communication problems, get 
started? 
2.4.2 Team Production 
In this section, we start with the benefit to co-operative production. The concept 
of team production is described by Alchian and Demsetz (1983) as being production 
where the output is not a sum of separable outputs of each member of the team. 
Formally: if there are two agents i and j whose inputs are Xi and Yj respectively, then 
their team production Z is characterised by a production function where 
2 / 0i jZ X Y∂ ∂ ∂ ≠ . (2.1) 
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Intuitively we can say that a higher quantity level of input Yj may result in a greater 
impact from any increase in the quantity of input Xi. There is thus a production 
technique where i and j can pool their resources to produce a greater output than they 
could each using their own resources alone.  
Team production will be used if it yields an output 
enough larger than the sum of separable production of Z to 
cover the costs of organising and disciplining team members 
(Alchian and Demsetz 1983, p779).  
An example would be where the owner A of capital resources k can pool these 
with the labour effort l of individual B in a way that produces output of greater value 
than the sum of their separate resources or the utility they can obtain from them. To 
operationalise this example we can suppose that A represents a capital-owning firm and 
that B represents a group of employees represented by a single union, or a separate firm 
supplying capital goods.  
We assume utility to be monotonic in both the initial resources that A and B 
own (k and l respectively) and in y, the output from team production. Thus if 
( ) ( )A AU y U k>  then y k> , and if ( ) ( )B BU y U l>  then y l>  . We assume the simplest 
possible team production function: 
y kl= . (2.2) 
Since for this function 2 / 1i jZ X Y∂ ∂ ∂ = , it fulfils Alchian and Demsetz’s criterion. 
Whether or not team production now takes place will depend on the allocation of output 
between the parties. Assuming there is zero cost to setting up the contract, and 
assuming that fairness is not an issue the criteria for benefit for A, then if sA , sB;  sA + sB 
= 1, are the shares of output allocated to the labour suppliers and the firm respectively, 
the joint criteria for contracting are 
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and 
Bs kl l> . (2.4) 
We can combine these to form an aggregate contracting condition: 
Equation 2.5 can be simplified to indicate the input relationship required for contracting 







2.4.3 Use of a ‘Hostage’ to Offset the Risk of Contract Failure 
We assume that the form of production and the ratio of inputs is such that 
equation 2.5 holds. Contracting is potentially beneficial to both parties, depending on 
the output allocation. Firstly we consider the situation where there is no likelihood of 
expropriation; perhaps A and B are members of the same family. In this case the firm 
will utilize the potential of team production. Where the suppliers of labour are not 
related to the owner of the firm they may fear expropriation of their share of output 
(which by the nature of the production process which takes place in a factory owned by 
the capital owner B remains in his/her control until sold). Here we make use of a simple 
‘hostage-taking’ model of Williamson (1983) to demonstrate how credit-money will 
resolve the problem.  
Williamson considers a contracting situation and points out that there is a 
difficulty where the inputs are specific and there is a delay between their application 
and the receipt of output, such that one party accords a subjective probability v to the 
As kl k> . (2.3) 
kl l k> + . (2.5) 
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risk of expropriation.4 He seeks solutions that will achieve the efficiency result outlined 
above, which in our case is that team production is chosen. Williamson suggests two 
possible contracting mechanisms 
1. Labour is supplied and suppliers are offered a share of output w . 
2. The firm offers wˆ on the basis of a completed contract but offers a 
‘hostage’ of value hα , 0 1α≤ ≤ , to the employee/supplier before 
production commences. The firm loses wealth valued at h if it reneges 
on the contract. 
In the first mechanism, for the supplier of labour or capital goods to benefit 
requires 








In the family situation, v = 0, so this reverts to  
ls kl w l= > . (2.9) 
and the contract goes ahead as long as equations 2.4 and 2.6 also hold. If there is a 
positive risk of appropriation then a higher w  is required to compensate the labour 
supplier for the uncertainty of the outcome of the contract  
For the firm, the criteria for contracting now becomes 
                                                 
4
 In the light of our discussion of uncertainty in Chapter 1 we should consider v as the propensity to act 
where this is translated subjectively into a level of anticipated utility. We can show that in the presence of 
an uncertainty calculation a certain course of action would be ‘rational’; in the sense of following the 
results of a calculation translated into an ordinal value. What we cannot show is that this will happen, 
only that given a particular mode of calculating it is a plausible course of action. It seems not 
unreasonable that in the negotiation of a production contract, this mode of calculating might be 
predominant. 
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For a positive risk of expropriation v, this is a more stringent condition than that of  
equation 2.6 with the result that a contract that was previously of benefit may no longer 
be so, the firm does not go ahead with team production, and so both parties lose the 
potential benefits. 
For the employee/supplier to enter the contract under the second mechanism 
requires 
ˆ (1 )w v v h lα− − >  (2.12) 


















and this simplifies to 
ˆls kl w l= > , (2.15) 
which is equivalent to the conditions 2.3 and 2.9. This means that the firm and the 
supplier will get benefit from any use of potential team production and so it will go 
ahead. From equation (2.13) we can see that any reduction in the value h of the 
‘hostage’, or its value to the suppliers hα  will increase the wage the firm must pay, 
reducing the chance that team production goes ahead.  
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Williamson makes reference to the fact that the efficient conditions h = l and α 
= 1 would particularly be realised with the hostage taking the form of generalised 
purchasing power, and indeed this is the approach we shall take in further analysis of 
this model. But we are taking the situation back a little from where Williamson sees it. 
If a monetary economy is already in existence (and so the valuations are monetary 
ones), the uncertainties of team production relate to the realization or otherwise of 
monetary demand). But we are imagining a pre-monetary economy in which all initial 
valuations are based on the utility obtaining from different real goods. What can the 
firm use before any real goods are produced? 
In the previous section of this chapter the models of Kiyotaki and Moore and 
Andolfatto and Nosal explained how the paper of firms or individuals would not 
necessarily be resaleable without some form of ‘bundling’ of the risk of default. We 
propose a third party that can ensure that generalised purchasing power is available for 
the firms to give to their employees/suppliers. It has the power to enforce the firm to 
make good on their promises and backing for the purchasing power they issue even if 
the firm should fail to produce as contracted. 
By issuing purchasing power as its own liability while creating a liability on 
behalf of the firm in the form of a loan, commercial banks can fulfil the role of 
providing the ‘hostage’ in the form of money. This then allows the efficient outcome of 
team production. Moreover, money’s liquidity and generalised acceptance means that it 
is valued by employees/suppliers more than a ‘hostage’ in the form of real goods would 
be. This has the effect of increasing α in equation (2.13) with the effect that the firm 
can lower wˆ , thus increasing its profit by the margin of the ‘liquidity premium’ offered 
by money.5 The role of h here also points up the fact that the production and lending 
                                                 
5
 The benefit for the firm is of course at least partially offset by the payment of interest. 
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process involves valuation by the firm and its employees and suppliers about how the 
values in real goods of wˆ  are converted to the monetary value hα . The issue of how 
the money is valued will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 4. We might also 
regard the ‘hostage’ as playing the role of increasing the Keynesian ‘weight of 
evidence’ in favour of the probability of completion of the contract.6  
2.4.4 Further Issues Raised by the ‘Hostage’ Model 
Williamson goes on to discuss certain issues relating to a ‘hostage’ type 
contract, and some of these are relevant to the money contract we have been discussing. 
There is the problem that the employee/supplier may end up with the upper hand, and 
already having access to generalised purchasing power, may shirk in some way. A 
solution to this problem might be for the firm to issue a ‘hostage’ whose α is less than 
1. Although this means the hostage may be of little value to the employee/supplier its 
offer acts as a screening mechanism as its expropriation would result in a significant 
loss to the firm. In the initial early monetary case we have described where money is 
primarily a claim to a specific firm’s goods, then this is true in the sense that the firm 
stands to be bankrupted if it cannot repay its loan, whereas the expropriation of 
purchasing power has limited value to the suppliers/employees if the firms output does 
not materialise as a result of their shirking/non-delivery. Once the monetary economy 
becomes established, however, the shirking is increasingly a problem to the firm rather 
than the supplier – who can utilise his/her purchasing power even if the firm’s output is 
delayed or absent. This may explain why in a modern monetary economy payment to 
employees and suppliers is usually made after some labour or capital goods have 
already been supplied. 
                                                 
6
 See the discussion of uncertainty and probability in Section 1.3.  
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The problem of unforeseen contingencies means that even the ‘hostage’ contract 
may still be incomplete, and some scope for renegotiation which does not obviously 
give one party the advantage over the other may be required. Here the banks play a role 
in their enforcement of the repayment of loans by firms and their support for money as 
universal purchasing power. 
2.5 Conclusion 
The very existence of money is evidence of some form of disequilibrium in the 
real economy, since once such an equilibrium were to be established there could be no 
further transactions that were not already perfectly predicted (or at least their 
probability not perfectly covered by insurance), and therefore there would be no reason 
to  value and hold money. 
For Kiyotaki and Wright agents accept a commodity or token they cannot 
consume in exchange for goods, because they are at least as likely to meet another 
agent who will exchange for this as for their production good. But the calculation only 
holds if all start doing this at the same time. Anonymous matching in exchange is 
therefore not likely to account for the origin of money, although it does show how once 
money exists and is valued, it is likely to be used for exchange. What is more, there is 
no explanation in these models for the valuation of money. The experimental studies of 
Duffy and Ochs tend to confirm these problems for the theory. 
The models of Andolfatto and Nosal and of Kiyotaki and Moore show agents 
accepting in exchange for goods a promise to supply a good they do not wish to 
consume, because they cannot at any time exchange directly their own production good 
for goods they do wish to consume. The issue of claims to dated output does seem to be 
able to account for the creation of transferable credit, but there is a problem of its 
general circulation. A certain level of trust and a certain frequency of meeting is 
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required with those who do ultimately wish the traded-for-exchange commodity 
(whether as the commodity itself or a promise to supply it), and both of these sets of 
authors recognise this and address it by modelling some form of ‘bundling’ of promises 
to reduce the perceived risk to those accepting them.  
We have generalised the arguments for the role of circulating debt where there 
is the dated supply of goods in our team production/hostage model. We have shown 
that for self-interested agents able to order the uncertainty surrounding a contract under 
different costs for the other contracting partner, it is plausible for them to use a form of 
token that represents a promise to supply a portion of output. We have also argued from 
this model that where the token is managed in a way analogous with the ‘bundling’ of 
the debt circulation models cited above, this can enhance its use.  
Our model shows the individual motivations and a potential mechanism by 
which intrinsically worthless tokens may become acceptable means of exchange when 
they are guaranteed claims to future output. Once the initial agreement to pay the 
banker for his enforcement services is made, the motivation for accepting these tokens 
thereafter is a purely individual one. If it is known that there is a mechanism in place 
that will force firms to give up part of their output in exchange for tokens, these tokens 
will have value to each individual quite apart from their ‘public good’ benefits of 
enhanced exchange. No collective agreement or convention is required to establish the 
acceptance or valuation of money in this case. Moreover, by ensuring a due share in the 
increased output of team production an improved use of available resources is enabled 
that allows the production of goods that would not otherwise have been achieved. The 
existence of money can increase output as a whole. 
The strength of the model is not in the logical certainty of the described 
outcome, but in its plausibility given an average combination of human suspicion and 
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willingness to co-operate for mutual advantage. Of course the model delineated is very 
different from a modern economy. There is initially only one productive ‘firm’, only 
one ‘bank’ and no bank deposits, and no government sector or central bank. 
Outstanding issues are how this might translate to the real monetary economy, with its 
existing institutions, and why generally there is one money with a value against all 













In the previous chapter we have discussed the attempts that have been made to 
explain theoretically how money and its valuation can arise in an equilibrium in which 
all goods (endowed or produced) are ultimately consumed. We have seen how agents 
can use debt instruments to overcome co-ordination and/or communication problems, 
and how the circulation of these can be enhanced when these instruments are bundled 
together to diversify the risks of non-fulfillment.  
The team production and ‘hostage-taking’ model of the previous chapter 
demonstrated some key points. Firstly, we have the problem of uncertainty over a 
bilateral contract for production. Even the apparent willingness of both parties to co-
operate may not be enough where the labour or resources have to be provided some 
time before production is completed. Secondly, the uncertainty problem can be 
significantly alleviated if some guarantee can be given for the credit contract and the 
default risk is spread by the issue of tokens of generalised purchasing power. Thirdly, 
once the tokens representing a claim on production exist, they can indeed serve as an 
aid to efficient exchange when more commodities become available. Finally, by serving 
as a means of exchange and provided there is an expectation of them retaining their 
value, these tokens are automatically a store of wealth if held. 
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We described the intuition that there is a strong link between production and 
money. We now want to explain how real world institutions relate to our generalised 
model. Within two particular schools of economics which firmly place themselves in 
opposition to the neoclassical mainstream, it is accepted that the existence and value of 
money are inextricably bound up with production and that its subsequent role in 
exchange is secondary to this aspect. Post-Keynesian (PK) monetary theory and the 
Circulation Approach (CA)1 both stress the importance of initial finance in starting the 
production process; circuit theorists in particular emphasising that this finance is 
required to hire the labour required to manufacture both consumer and capital goods 
(see Graziani 2003, p69 and Rossi 2003, p343). Both schools trace their conception of 
money from Keynes who, when he was working on the General Theory was seeking a 
‘monetary theory of production’ where money was one of the ‘operative factors’ and 
‘played a part of its own’ (Keynes 1973a, pp408-409).  
We will outline Post-Keynesian monetary theory and the Circulation 
Approaches separately and in some detail before discussing attempts that have been 
made to integrate the two approaches on the basis of their considerable common ground 
and complementary views of money and production. Using the compatible features of 
PK monetary theory and the CA we go on to characterise the monetary flows of a 
modern economy using a rigorous balance-sheet approach in the spirit of Rossi (2003, 
2006). We examine the roles of Commercial Bank Deposit Money (CBDM), Central 
Bank Deposit Money (SBDM) Deposit Holding, Liquidity Preference, Interest and the 
Central Bank in these flows. 
We then discuss an area that is particularly controversial for the type of 
approach we are analysing. The acquisition by firms of monetary profits is particularly 
                                                 
1
 In this thesis we shall consider the ‘Circulation Approach’ and the ‘Theory of the Monetary Circuit’ to 
be synonymous, but see the comments in section 3.3. 
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problematic from the point of view of the strict ‘monetary circuit’ of the CA. The final 
section summarises the chapter and suggests an answer to which way the causal arrow 
runs between money and production. Is it from money to production; from production 
to money; or both directions equally? 
3.2 Post-Keynesian Money 
The Post-Keynesian (PK) school of economics rejects the mainstream 
interpretation of Keynes’s ideas in the General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money (Keynes 1964[1936]). This interpretation takes the form of the ISLM construct, 
in which the interest rate adjusts to ensure simultaneous equilibrium in both the market 
for real goods and the money market. Moreover, the apparent assumption in the 
General Theory of a fixed supply of money is also rejected, in favour of money’s 
‘endogeneity’ to the demands of the real economy that appears in Keynes’ writings 
both before and after.  
[For Keynes], capitalism was seen to operate in a 
credit-money economy permeated with uncertainty…Historical 
conditions and historical time take precedence over mechanical 
equilibrium models operating over logical time’ (Rousseas 
1992, p12) 
The central claim of the Post-Keynesian school that determines its approach to 
money as that of ‘non-ergodicity’. This is the view that ‘due to the permanent evolution 
of the economic environment reliable information upon which to base prediction is 
simply not available’ (Fontana 2000, p30). Moreover, because the making of a decision 
may alter the environment in which that decision is taken, such a decision is effectively 
irreversible. The consequence is a tendency by both consumers and firms to postpone 
decisions by holding money. In the Post-Keynesian view the nature of money means 
that firms cannot manufacture additional liquidity at will when the demand for it 
increases (there is a near-zero elasticity of supply), nor does an increase in the price of 
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money (the interest rate) caused by an increase in the demand for liquidity result in an 
increased demand for some other asset with a high elasticity of production (there is a 
near-zero elasticity of substitution). The implication of this is that the demand for 
money is much more likely to persist than that for other goods, and it is likely to be 
held as a store of value despite a poor financial rate of return.  
Another important role for money emphasised by Post-Keynesians is the fact 
that the existence of money means that nominal contracts can be made, such as wage 
settlements, as a way of minimising the impact of uncertainty for individuals. The basic 
three tenets of the Post-Keynesian view of money are thus: 
1. The pervasiveness of uncertainty as distinct from calculable risk. 
2. The historical time within which production and all other economic events take 
place in an irreversible fashion. 
3. The existence of a credit-money economy of forward contracts in which the 
money supply has initially a zero cost of production (Rousseas 1992, p13). 
The importance of the first tenet for money is that the impossibility of 
calculating risk across a series of possible outcomes means that sometimes the 
propensity to act (derived from subjective probability and the weight of evidence 
favouring that probability) is very low or completely absent.2 In this case money serves 
to defer decisions and avoid commitments at minimum cost. Our team 
production/hostage model in Chapter 2 has shown how the creation of money can help 
to compensate for commitment problems in production but the same is true as it 
circulates from hand to hand. At any time a holder of money can delay a purchase 
because he/she feels that the ‘weight of evidence’ is less than adequate to decide on 
                                                 
2
 See discussion of uncertainty in Chapter 1. 
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expenditure or investment of the purchasing power represented by that money. The 
effect of the creation of money in the face of uncertainty, as in the case of our model, is 
a forward contract that must determine in advance (if firms are to recoup their monetary 
outlays, and thus restore their asset-liability positions) future sales prices as well 
(Rousseas 1992). 
The second tenet means that real commitments in the form of using labour and 
goods in production or in exchange are not reversible without cost (if at all), and so the 
loss of value from the delay in utilizing real goods that is entailed by holding money 
and failing to initiate production may be the lesser of evils, if there is a prospect of 
addition to the weight of evidence leading to a greater propensity to act in the future. 
The third tenet, ‘the endogeneity of money’, requires more extensive discussion. 
In terms of our model in Chapter 2 we saw how a ‘hostage’ could increase the ‘weight 
of evidence’ in favour of the completion of a contract. Yet we specifically envisaged a 
situation where a firm had no surplus resources which they could offer as a ‘hostage’. 
In this case the firm had to mobilize their potential output by contracting with a bank  
who could enforce the creation and allocation of this output. This enforcement contract, 
is marked by a token standing for the potential output to be transferred. Because this 
token stands for the delivery of the good rather than the good itself, it need not be 
converted into the real output of the firm immediately or at all. Thus the token has a 
‘liquidity value’ over and above its value in terms of the real output of the firm. This 
liquidity is increased if the token is validated for the output of more than one firm, by 
virtue of multiple contracts between the bank and different firms; one form of the 
‘bundling’ of Chapter 2. The liquidity of these tokens, and their representation of real 
goods, combined with the absence of any need for them to have intrinsic value (paper 
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will do as well as gold as long as forgery is difficult), makes them conform to money as 
it exists in a modern capitalist economy. As this money enters the economy, 
[i]t is not so much the demand for money that takes 
primacy, but the flow of credit-money to the industrial sector 
that is of critical importance, in analysing a capitalist system 
(Rousseas 1992, p48). 
Thus it is primarily changes in economic activity that determine the demand for 
bank loans and the creation of money. The credit-money created in the contract is in the 
nature of a financial asset to the worker/capital goods supplier and a liability to its 
issuer. This means that the minimum economic environment must include: 
1. The existence of legally enforceable contractual agreements. 
2. The existence of a clearing mechanism for the various tokens issued – 
either a single money-issuing authority, or an over-arching ‘meta-
authority’. 
3. The requirement that the monetary and financial system have the 
‘confidence’ of economic agents (Moore 1988, p20-1). 
This may lead to the existence of the institution of a ‘central bank’ which reckons the 
value of the commitments issued by separate sub-authorities (the commercial banks) by 
a common yardstick to fulfil condition 2, and offers additional tokens of value to the 
commercial banks to ensure that their assumption of the uncertainty of contracts and the 
additional uncertainty derived from the existence of money itself is not so great as to 
threaten confidence in the commercial bank network. The latter ‘lender of last resort’ 
function fulfils condition 3, and it is perhaps natural that the same power behind the 
central bank, the authority of the state, should establish the legal and regulatory 
framework required to fulfil condition 1. 
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All this preceding is often implicit in Post-Keynesian analysis, with the prime 
focus on the relationship between the ‘authority’ of the central bank and the ‘sub-
authorities’ of the commercial banks. This perhaps stems from the root of much of the 
Post-Keynesian literature in the counter-response to the monetarist arguments of the 
1960s and 1970s. This aimed to combat arguments for a money stock that could 
realistically be held constant by the central bank, and that therefore might enter as an 
exogenous variable in the activity of the real economy (at least in the short run).  
The conventional explanation is that by open-market 
sales or purchases the central bank is able to reduce or increase 
the high-powered base at its initiative….The fundamental 
point, however, is that the high-powered base is no longer 
rigidly tied to any exogenous gold stock. Central banks always 
possess the ability to increase the base, so as to support any 
increased nominal volume of bank intermediation. But they in 
general do not have the same ability to reduce the base and 
with it restrict the nominal volume of bank intermediation. 
There is thus an important asymmetry in the ability of central 
banks to initiate changes in the base (Moore 1988, p15. Italics 
in original.). 
The argument is that firstly the central bank is limited in its ability to deny its 
funds (base money) when banks require it to satisfy fellow banks’ or their customers’ 
demands, without putting trust in the banking system as a whole at risk. Secondly, to 
the extent that the central bank does exact a price, in the form of the interest rate 
charged on ‘last-resort’ lending or in incurring regulatory displeasure (so-called ‘frown 
costs’) in the modern financial environment commercial banks are able to seek 
alternatives. These alternatives include issuing marketable certificates of deposit and 
acquiring deposits issued abroad denominated in central bank currency (such as so-
called ‘Eurodollars’). 
Important corollaries follow from Post-Keynesian monetary theory: 
1. Supply and demand for money are not separable 
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2. Whatever the accounting correspondence between saving and 
investment flows, when banks create credit they issue the borrower with 
deposits, and so no deferral of present consumption is required. 
3. Effective demand originates from the holding of money. If agents keep 
holding it rather than spending it on consumption or investment goods, 
then effective demand is reduced and unemployment is the likely result. 
4. The endogeneity of money, and its credit-led creation, means that the 
deficit-spending required for the growth of aggregate demand becomes 
possible. 
Thus for Post-Keynesians money is ‘endogenous’, in the sense that it enters the 
economy during normal economic processes. It is certainly not, as in the equilibrium 
models of the previous chapter, an exogenous variable in a model of exchange. 
Endogenous money is created as assets are produced and financed and destroyed as 
positions are liquidated. The consequence of this is that loans make deposits, deposits 
make reserves and money demand induces money supply. Any shortfall in reserves is 
made up from borrowing central bank money from other banks or the central bank.  To 
substantiate the reality of this view, Pollin quotes a US central banker as saying: ‘In the 
real world banks extend credit, creating deposits in the process, and look for reserves 
later’ (Pollin 1996, p495). 
If the demand for money is the only driver of money supply, and is always fully 
accommodated, there can be no excess demand or supply of money. There is no way of 
injecting unwanted money into the system, since the creation of money always requires 
two parties (a lender and a debtor) to enter into commitments. Profit-seeking behaviour 
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and entrepreneurship by both firms and banks ensure that the demand of credit-worthy 
borrowers is met.  
3.2.1 Horizontalists and Verticalists 
Within the general view described above there have been important differences. 
In particular there has been debate between those arguing that in general the central 
bank accommodates all demands for reserves and so imposes no quantity constraint on 
the issue of money; and those who argue that while the issue of money is primarily 
driven by the demand for loans, the central bank has some powers to restrict this, with 
the consequence that banks are constantly looking for alternative sources of reserves. 
 Pollin (1996) characterises the debate as being about how banks find the 
additional reserves. He states the Horizontalist or accommodative view as being that of 
the necessity of central banks to accommodate the needs of commercial banks for 
reserves. If they did not, the viability of the financial structure and thus the economy 
would be threatened. The central banks provide these reserves via open-market 
purchases of securities or by lending at the current discount rate. In this way they can 
influence the cost, but not the quantity of reserves. The opposing structuralist view is 
characterised by the argument that, because discount window borrowing is not a perfect 
substitute for open market operations, the central bank can use the latter to place some 
restraints on the reserves of commercial banks, but this restriction, while it exists, is 
considerably weakened by the ability of banks to find other sources of reserves on the 
money markets. Pollin argues that there is strong econometric evidence for money’s 
endogeneity and for the structuralist view in particular in the form of the testimony of 
central banks and in Granger-Sims causality tests showing the link between deposits 
and reserves and loans and deposits. He finds a significant upward trend in the 
loan/reserve ratios of banks as a result of liability management by commercial banks 
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and relatively weak substitutability between borrowed and non-borrowed reserves. He 
finds that causality testing between central bank and market interest rates indicates 
substantial interaction between them and evidence that in any case other factors carry 
the predominant explanatory power in explaining interest rate movements. Pollin makes 
the point, however, that the differences in emphasis are less important than the fact that 
both approaches make a significant break with orthodoxy in assuming that the quantity 
of credit money is fundamentally demand-determined. Moore (1988) also finds 
econometric evidence for causality from lending to monetary aggregates and from 
monetary aggregates to the monetary base. 
Nell (1996), Fontana (2000) and Rochon (2003) all argue that Post-Keynesian 
monetary theory has not, however, fully specified the nature of money or how it is 
created, being more concerned with its functions and effects once in existence. For this 
in the context of production we now turn to the Circulation Approach. 
3.3 Money in the Circulation Approach 
The Circulation Approach (CA) or Theory of the Monetary Circuit can be 
regarded as the ‘smallest common denominator’ of a diversity of sources, and not as a 
comprehensive theory (Deleplace and Nell 1996, p10). It is a line of economic thought 
that explicitly links private sector production with the creation of money, giving much 
less initial emphasis than PK theory to the interaction between the commercial banks 
and the central bank.3 Money is thus primarily considered in its role as a means of 
payment and is identified with the flow of payments performed over a period of time. 
The stock of money is no longer a given parameter, being dependent on the balance of 
monetary flows. 
                                                 
3
 This is particularly true for the Chartalist wing of Post-Keynesians, who trace the origin of modern 
money fully back to the state (Wray 2003). 
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Graziani (2003, p1) traces the history of this approach back to Wicksell, and 
identifies Schmitt, Parguez, Lavoie as recent expositors of the theory.4 But the first full 
acount of the CA in English was probably given by Graziani himself (Graziani 1989). 
Over the decade and a half since there has been an increasing literature in English 
dicussing the details and implications of the CA: see for example Bossone (2000, 
2001), Deleplace and Nell (1996), and Graziani (2003) again. 
The circuitist approach makes it clear from the outset that money is a token: 
[A]n economy using one single commodity, for 
instance gold, as a general intermediary of exchange and as a 
unit of measurement of prices…still falls within the category of 
a barter economy since the commodity money is privately 
produced along with all other commodities…A true monetary 
economy necessarily makes use of a token money (Graziani 
2003, pp58-9). 
This is in contrast to a Wicksellian credit economy where commodities are 
exchanged against simple promises of payment (IOUs) accepted by each agent on the 
basis of mutual confidence. The circuit approach defines a true monetary economy as 
one where bilateral credit, while it may act as a means of exchange, does not when 
exchanged cancel the debt that gave rise to the promise to pay. Were this not the case, 
then buyers would be exchanging a promise to pay for real goods, giving them a 
potential seignorage privilege should they fail to fulfil this promise. Such a possibility 
should not be part of a true monetary economy. A true monetary economy is thus one 
where: 
1. Money is a token 
2. The use of money involves a final payment 
3. The use of money should give no seignorage privilege to any agent 
(Graziani 2003, p60). 
                                                 
4
 See for example Schmitt (1996), Parguez (1996) and Lavoie (1996). 
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To satisfy these conditions payments must go through a third party (such as a bank). 
Once payment has been made using credit issued by a bank, no debt remains between 
the agents, only between the purchaser and his/her bank. In this way final payment is 
made without any seignorage advantage to any agent. The same principles apply to 
commercial banks. If they are to make mutual payments to settle discrepancies between 
credit issued by them and deposits made with them, they too must do so by making 
final payments that do not entail seignorage privileges. Thus there is a role for a central 
bank to intermediate payments between commercial banks. 
There is thus a natural association, as noted by Keynes in the Treatise on Money 
(see Keynes 1930[1971], pp163-165) between the production process on one side and 
the creation, circulation and utilisation of money on the other (Fontana 2000). In the 
circulation view the generation of the flow of money results from negotiations between 
banks and firms, rigorously regarded as separate entities, on the credit-money market. 
This in contrast to the idea of a stock of money balances which is held by savers as a 
result of their portfolio choices on the financial market. 
Proponents of the Circulation Approach insist that money is primarily an 
outcome of the production process which cannot take place, because of time and 
uncertainty, without an issue of credit that allows firms to pay the wages and for the 
purchase of capital goods before production is completed. The determination of the 
level of economic activity is thus the product of a ‘triangular’ negotiation over credit 
between commercial banks and firms (Graziani 2003, p61). Wage-earners spend the 
wages thus received and these expenditures return to the firms in payment for their 
produced goods, or for securities offered by the firms. On receipt of these expenditures 
the firms can repay the banks, in which case the money is destroyed, and the monetary 
circuit is complete. The circuit can be divided into two phases, that of ‘Initial Finance’, 
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which is the bank credit supplied at the cost of a short-term interest rate, and ‘Final 
Finance’ which is the return of money to firms following sales of production and/or 
sales of securities to individuals. If consumer goods firms can capture all of the 
expenditure arising from their borrowing, then at the end of the production process they 
will be solvent without any further intervention (although at the cost of paying a return 
to securities issued), but if money is held up in the form of hoarded cash or bank 
deposits, or destroyed in the purchase of government securities from the central bank, 
banks may have to roll over credit into the next production period.  
Money is issued primarily as a flow of endogenous credit, and only secondarily 
forms money balances as a consequence of portfolio decisions, uncertainty or contracts. 
Money is endogenous as a consequence of its creation in the process of production and 
irrespective of the willingness of central banks to accommodate any increase in the 
demand for money with the required increase in reserves, although reserves may play a 
role in determining banks’ lending behaviour. 
Since the advance of money facilitated by bank-credit to firms is essential to 
allow firms to distribute income as production begins, the integration of money in the 
economic system occurs as output is specified, and not subsequently as in the exchange 
economies of general equilibrium models or as presumably is the case for the 
Andolfatto and Nosal and Kiyotaki and Moore models of Chapter 2. The circuit 
approach starts with money as purchasing power, treating it only secondarily as a stock 
of wealth.  
The circuit also implies that, even if the costs of production in the current period 
were the same as those incurred in the last period, firms cannot use present proceeds 
from the past sale of commodities. This implies that, even although the real economy 
involves many simultaneous and overlapping circuits, loans never lead to more than a 
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temporary increase in the money stock. The fact that production processes run 
continuously need not imply that the pattern of circulation will work differently.  
Processes take time; production starts at the point 
where the raw material is acquired and set up for processing, 
and finishes when the good is turned over to be marketed. 
There is still a definite sequence to the operation, and this 
sequence defines the relation of the process to other processes 
(Nell 1996, p289). 
The quantity of money as a stock, subsequent to its creation, depends on 
household liquidity preference. If there is a persistent positive level of uncertainty and 
no growth a steady-state may exist with constant output and a constant issue of loans 
and money. It follows that a certain level of lending is rolled over each period by banks 
to account for a constant level of deposit holding by wage-earners. 
The main features of the monetary circuit that will be most important to our 
subsequent analysis are 
1. Money is in the nature of credit money and in modern times is represented 
by bank credit. 
2. Credit money is created whenever an agent spends money granted to him 
by a bank and is destroyed whenever a bank credit is repaid. 
3. Money, being produced and introduced into the market by means of 
negotiations between banks and firms, is an endogenous variable. 
4. A complete theoretical analysis has to explain the whole itinerary followed 
by money, starting with the moment credit is granted, going through the 
circulation of money in the market, and reaching the final repayment of the 
initial bank loan. Money being created by the banking sector and being 
extinguished when it goes back to the same sector, its existence and 
operation can be described as a circuit (Graziani, 2003, p25-26). 
In descriptive terms, a firm seeking to produce output in a time-consuming 
process, must obtain the credit it requires to pay wages and to purchase capital goods 
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from a bank before production can start. Once this output is produced, it is sold for 
money in the market, and if the sales revenue of the firm is equal to its expenditure, 
then the loan can be repaid in full and the circuit completed. Under strict conditions, 
namely that there is one firm producing consumption goods; that the sole expenditure 
of capital goods firms consists of wages and that all wages are spent on consumption in 
the same ‘circuit’ in which they are received, then the matching of firms’ revenue and 
expenditure is guaranteed and all loans issued in one circuit are repaid in the same 
circuit. Thus no credit or money exists longer than one circuit period. Within the circuit 
however, the demand of firms for the return of the titles to their credit gives value in 
exchange between those receiving these titles in wages and others with goods and 
services to exchange.  
The circuit explains the acceptability of money and its value as being directly a 
consequence of the final destination that is implicit in the contract of its issuance. The 
credit issued by the banks to firms becomes acceptable as a means of exchange to 
individuals because the issue of credit to firms involves an implicit contract that 
guarantees that money will be demanded in exchange for output by a firm using it as 
expenditure. A central bank can be brought into the picture subsequently, because the 
triangular money-creating contract need not only be one of commercial banks, firms 
and wage-earners to create Commercial Bank Deposit Money (CBDM). It can also be 
one of the central bank and two commercial banks when banks borrow from the central 
bank to create, or the central bank, the government and a private agent when the 
government makes a payment. The latter two contracts create Central Bank Deposit 
Money (SBDM) (Graziani 2003). For the CA, however, private sector triangular 
contracts are autonomous, and being responsible for the creation of the vast majority of 
money in a modern economy, should be the main focus of analysis.  
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3.4 Integrating the Post-Keynesian and Circuitist 
Approaches  
3.4.1 Intellectual Convergence 
Recent years have seen attempts to integrate the Post-Keynesian and Circuitist 
views of money on the part of, for example, Deleplace and Nell (1986), Fontana (2000) 
and Rochon (2003). Both approaches are to be distinguished from mainstream theory 
by putting the problems of money at the centre of economic analysis, with money being 
both endogenous to real economic activity and central to problems of effective demand 
and crisis (Deleplace and Nell 1996). 
The common thread running through both Post-Keynesian monetary theory and 
the Circulation Approach is that production, employment and investment cannot be 
understood or controlled apart from the monetary system. As we have demonstrated in 
our team production/hostage model in Chapter 2, money can allow more efficient joint 
production to take place where otherwise it would not, by increasing the propensity to 
act in the face of uncertainty. And it does so in two ways, one of which has far-reaching 
consequences that are not wholly positive. While it almost certainly has not arisen and 
is unlikely to arise in exchange, as we also argued in Chapter 2, its creation is 
encouraged because, by enabling diffuse exchange throughout the economy, it gives 
point to specialised production where the number of inputs is at least as great as the 
number of outputs. So it is important to state that money’s role in exchange is important 
as a reason for its subsequent circulation, and thus its liquidity premium, even although 
it cannot be created without production.  
Both approaches see money as primarily endogenous to the production process, 
being created for the purpose of production. In this process it must be created along 
with debt, and it is this debt that provides its backing and ensures liabilities and assets 
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match up for all economic agents. We will return to this idea in Chapter 4. Rochon 
(2003) distinguishes between the ‘institutional’ endogeneity that Post-Keynesians 
emphasise in their discussion of the relationship between commercial and central 
banks, and the Circuitists’ focus on the relationships that exist in the process of 
production. These latter relationships are irrespective of specific institutions, and result 
in the liabilities of banks being recognised as means of payment. Whereas Post-
Keynesians in part view money as a stock of value with demand and supply functions 
mediated by a price in the form of the interest rate, the circuitist approach is that credit 
and money are always flows that respond first and foremost to the needs of the 
economy to reproduce itself and grow. ‘[E]ven if we envisage a world of perfect 
certainty, firms and the state would still need access to bank credit’ (Rochon 2003, 
p127), so that although uncertainty can explain why money remains in the economy 
unspent, it does not explain its existence. 
Both Post-Keynesian monetary theory and the Circulation Approach deal with 
credit-money as being required because of the time taken for production. They do not 
assume the joint movement of prices and quantities; demand and supply of credit are 
independent. They see the economy in a continual process of adjustment, without 
equilibrium as a significant concept, since the economy is path-dependent. 
Consumption patterns, organisation of production and ways of market-adjustment are 
changing, along with the level of activity. The quantity of money in circulation is the 
result of endogenous, purposeful actions by particular agents rather than an exogenous 
stock. It is not dependent on the supply of some commodity such as gold; it has no 
independent supply and demand schedules and is not determined by a policy decision 
by the central bank.  
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Both PK and CA see an asymmetry between firms and households. Households 
must generally accept wages and prices given by firms. This arises particularly as a 
consequence of the access to credit. The purpose of firms in the capitalist economy is to 
make monetary profit – individuals only get purchasing power to the extent that they 
participate in the monetary economy.5 Investment by firms is autonomous and 
unconstrained by saving. Feedback of effective demand may mean firms opt to settle at 
neither maximum capacity, nor the full-employment level of activity. 
Both approaches attempt realistic characterization of the monetary economy 
with institutions and technology influencing actions and their ordering. Uncertainty is 
regarded as inescapable, although the Post-Keynesian emphasis is on the uncertainty 
that exists because the consequences of decisions extend forward in time and the 
Circulation emphasis is on the lack of co-ordination between multiple credit-induced 
circuits (Deleplace and Nell 1996, p29). 
Thus PK and CA share the view that: 
1. The supply of money is endogenously created by banks through their 
normal lending activities 
2. Banks have to remain solvent and make profits 
3. Central banks are lenders of last resort, supplying liquidity on demand 
4. The central bank interest rate is controlled by open market sales and 
purchases of government securities and by setting a discount rate for 
lending central bank currency to commercial banks (Deleplace and Nell 
1996, p22). 
                                                 
5
 Even though consumer loans exist, accessing them generally depends on having an income from a firm. 




There are some important different emphases of the two approaches. For Post-
Keynesian monetary theory money is a credit, a financial asset and a link between 
present and future, so portfolio analysis is important, particularly in the light of 
uncertainty leading to the holding of money and the consequences of this for economic 
activity and employment (Deleplace and Nell 1996). Moreover, the financial asset that 
counts as money may be contingent upon legal tender laws or which commodity has the 
greatest liquidity. The Circulation Approach, however, sees money as fundamentally 
different from other financial assets, being a means of the circulation of real goods 
because of its generalised purchasing power. In this view, while it is in circulation it is 
not acting as an asset. In regard to the nature of money, this latter approach is the one 
we have adopted. The law cannot prescribe currency or its derivative commercial bank 
issued deposits as a means of payment in all circumstances, although it can be made 
attractive by insisting that it must be used to pay taxes.  
There is a tendency in Post-Keynesian theory to continue to see money in terms 
of demand and supply; with an ongoing debate over the nature of the supply curve. The 
idea of a supply curve is redundant in the Circulation Approach because money 
creation arises from a joint decision by banks and firms to enter into a credit contract 
(Deleplace and Nell 1996). This is what makes money endogenous, with the direction 
of causality from lending to central bank reserves as a consequence of this (Rochon 
2003). Derivative assets such as Certificates of Deposit (CDs) and Eurodollars are not 
therefore the source of banks’ flexibility in expanding liquidity. They do not represent 
general purchasing power. For circuitists credit and money can always be created given 
a viable production plan proposed by a firm. This also means that there is no question 
of ‘alternative uses’ for commercial bank money, although to a limited extent there may 
alternative uses of reserves, where these are limited. The role of the central bank is thus 
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not to set the money supply, but to act as a ‘clearing house’ for interbank transactions, 
and to act as the financial arm of the state’ (Rochon 2003, p135). In this role it sets an 
exogenous interest rate according to the economic objectives of the government such as 
controlling expected inflation or achieving a desired level of output. 
Another distinction between PK monetary theory and the CA is that for the 
latter each circuit is sequential in time – the closing conditions of one circuit 
influencing the opening conditions of the next. There can never be an equilibrium (even 
an unemployment equilibrium). 
3.5 The Balance Sheet Approach to Monetary Flows 
We will now adopt a synthesis of the Post-Keynesian and Circulation 
Approaches to characterise a modern monetary economy. We will outline the creation 
of money in the process of issuing credit, particularly but not necessarily associated 
with production; the consequence of credit repayments being held up by holding of 
deposits and the role of the central bank and its money in allowing interbank settlement 
and the effect that an operational requirement for this money has on the banks and their 
clients We also detail the role of commercial non-money financial assets and the 
problems raised by the monetary nature of the returns to banks and firms in the form of 
interest and profits respectively. We will demonstrate the consistency of this approach 
by showing the various transactions using balance sheets for the sectors involved in 
which the matching of assets and liabilities is made explicit at all times (see Rossi 
2006). 
3.5.1  The Creation of and Destruction of Claims to Deferred Consumption 
Production initially involves the organisation of resources (natural and 
manufactured capital goods) and labour, including that of entrepreneurs, into firms, 
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which are non-physical entities created for the purpose of carrying out production 
where this is anticipated to benefit those involved in its creation. As we have shown 
with our team production/hostage (TP/H) model in Chapter 2, this process involves a 
current sacrifice by wage-earners (treating labour and leisure as two aspects of the same 
good: wage-earners’ time) and/or capital suppliers, with the expectation of consumption 
of an overall greater utility value at a later date. To be accepted by all parties the 
contract involved in the setting up of the production firm must benefit one or more 
parties without being to the detriment of any.6  
As the TP/H model demonstrated, a problem of trust between the firm and 
suppliers may exist such that the risk of default on the contract appears to one or both 
of them to be greater than the benefit that will accrue. Thus there may be an advantage 
in the presence of a mechanism that guarantees to both parties that the deferred 
consumption they have been promised will be received at the end of the production 
period. This may be achieved by the distribution by the firm to the workers of tokens 
representing claims to deferred consumption that are guaranteed by a third party (the 
bank). If this claim is in a form which the bank will subsequently accept in repayment 
of any debt (including the one just incurred) at any time, then it is likely to be accepted 
by other firms for current consumption goods and also in exchange between individuals 
for previously produced goods. The latter is enabled where there is a reasonable 
expectation of subsequent trading for current production goods with some other 
producer who has a debt to this bank. In this way the tokens become a more or less 
universally accepted means of payment. These generalised claims, which we refer to 
here as Commercial Bank Deposit Money (CBDM) have been introduced into the 
economy to serve the purpose for the following reasons: 
                                                 
6To put this in neoclassical language, the contract must be ‘Pareto-improving’. 
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1. Their value is backed by the neutral and powerful bank. 
2. They are more divisible than real goods. 
3. They are easier to hold than real goods, being small and non-perishable. 
The claims have further value in that they can be held when the best choice of, 
and timing of, expenditure is uncertain enough to reduce the ‘propensity to act’ to zero, 
and so in this way it also serves as a store of value over time. The acceptability of these 
production claims is unlike that of a commodity money, in that it ultimately depends 
not on the desire of another trading party for some specific good, but on the presence 
throughout the economy of a significant number of producers who need to acquire 
again the tokens they have distributed, so as to repay their debts to the banker. Money 
and the conditions for its subsequent acceptance are thus created within the triangular 
relationship between banks, firms and the suppliers of capital and labour (Graziani 
2003). 
Loan Issue,Wage Payments and Production 
Taking the production sector as a whole, including both consumer and capital 
goods, labour can for argument be regarded as the only production expense. Figure 3.1 
shows the balance sheet changes accompanying the issue of a £100 loan from Bank A, 
which is here representative of the entire banking sector, to Firm F (representative of 
the whole Consumer Goods firms sector) for the purpose of paying wages for a 
production process.7 Absent here are capital goods, profits and interest on the loan; we 
shall consider all of these as we develop the model. At Time 0 we assume the bank and 
the firm to have zero assets and zero liabilities. At Time 1 Bank A creates 
                                                 
7
 The correspondence between these illustrative balance sheets and what a commercial bank might itself 
produce is not clear. Given that formal balance sheets are published only intermittently, and the notional 
quality of shareholders’ funds, the creation of loans and matching deposits can easily by presented as 
reallocations of assets and liabilities rather than as increases. 
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simultaneously a loan asset for itself and a deposit liability in the name of Firm F to the 
value of £100. These are matched on the Firm’s balance sheet, where the loan is a 
liability and the deposit an asset. The firm can now pay employed households (H) with 
the deposits and commence production. At Time 2, wages have been paid by Firm 1 
and production is complete, but output remains unsold, replacing the deposit asset. The 
expected value of the production goods depends (explicitly or implicitly) on the 
contract struck between the bank, the firm and the workers, and will be anticipated to at 
least cover the wage bill and interest costs. The actual monetary value will depend on 
the effective demand present from consumers at the time the production process is 
completed. Uncertainty and the production time-lag mean that expected value of output 
and its realised value need not be the same so this is indicated by a question mark on 
the firm’s balance sheet. We will discuss the significance of this for a developed 
monetary economy in Chapter 6. Meanwhile the wage deposit has been transferred to 
the H accounts held by Bank A. 
The Nature of Production Loans 
Even when firms appear to pay wages out of receipts, those receipts would not 
have been obtained without the labour previously employed. If this labour required the 
payment of wages prior to output being produced, a previous loan was required, and if 
receipts are transferred directly to wages this has the effect of rolling over the loan. The 
rolling over of such a loan is in effect indistinguishable from the taking of a new loan 
for the next tranche of wages. And while a steady state exists, there is no practical 
difference. 
 In reality, of course, production loans have varying maturity, and they may take 
shorter or longer time periods to create the output they initiate. But given this period the 
size of a loan must always be sufficient to create enough purchasing power to 
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compensate labour for loss of leisure (or loss of their labour for their own purposes) for 
the period until the loan is repaid from output sold in exchange for deferred 
consumption claims. The cost of deferring equivalent value consumption is shared by 
all those who hold the claims issued until the time of the loan repayment. (In a real 
economy this cost is diffused widely as claims issued for one loan are used to repay a 
pre-existing loan, but the cost exists, even if it is largely if not completely offset by the 
greater acceptability, measured by a liquidity premium, of these general claims.) The 
purpose of all such loans is therefore to create or increase production over a shorter or 
longer period. The sharing of these benefits and burdens is what makes the triangular 
contract of credit-money creation possible. 
The Features of Banks 
The bank has the following features: 
1. The ability to issue guaranteed claims to deferred consumption  
2. If he/she acts as a guarantor and processor of many such deferred 
consumption transactions, he/she is in a position to issue guarantees of 
consumption that are effectively non-specific as to the consumption to 
which they are ultimately a claim. This non-specificity makes these 
guarantees more attractive than the deferred consumption that any single 
producer can offer. Note, however, that uncertainty has not been fully 
eliminated, but it has been transferred from the future output of an 
individual producer to that of the value to the holder of all future output 
and so all future possible consumption taken together.  
3. As the guarantor and processor of many such deferred consumption 
transactions, often involving the same parties on different occasions, a 
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bank has privileged access to information about the likelihood of default 
by these parties and so plays a key role in determining whether 
production claims are issued and when the loans backing them are 
terminated. 
The bank is likely to demand compensation for administering the issuing of 
tokens and for bearing the risk they have relieved from the contracting parties. This 
compensation for banks is generally in the form of interest payments proportional to the 
nominal value of tokens issued. The expectation is that the banker will aim to balance 
his/her interest income, his/her administration costs and the risk of default by producers 
(which will incur some sort of penalty for the banker failing to fulfil his/her part of the 
contract) so as to maximise bank income. This poses a problem for a picture of the 
monetary economy that takes the Circulation Approach seriously; a problem we will 
return to in a subsequent section. 
Sales and Loan Repayment  
Time 0 in Figure 3.2 is equivalent to Time 3 in Figure 3.1. When production is 
complete, it is sold to the workers, now in the role of consumers, in exchange for the 
deposits they have received as wages. This is shown at Time 1. The deposit with Bank 
A in the worker/consumers’ name becomes once more a deposit in Firm 1’s name. If 
the firm receives again all the tokens distributed as its workers purchase all of its output 
it can repay all of its production loan to the bank. At Time 2, the loan is repaid and all 
deposits (liabilities of that bank) are eliminated along with the bank’s loan asset. This is 
the sense in which money is ‘destroyed’ according to the Circuit Approach. Thus the 
liabilities and assets of the banking system as a whole are kept in balance, and here 
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indeed returns to zero once the loan is repaid. The only final consequence of the  
process is the real one that workers have exchanged labour for consumption.8  
Summarising the Role of Production Debt 
The issue of the loan by Bank A, although apparently nothing more than the 
manipulation of balance sheets, has had significant real consequences, enabling new 
production and consumption, and the temporary lowering of transaction costs for the 
period that the claims were in circulation. How can something so insubstantial give rise 
to such significant consequences? It is because the claim issued by Bank A in the form 
of CBDM for labour services for the Firm, and subsequently to the Firm’s output for H 
comes with an implicit guarantee. The nature of this guarantee is that the Firm will 
carry out its production, and will then exchange it for the CBDM issued whoever 
presents it to them. The firm honours this guarantee because it requires this money to 
repay its debt. The bank will endeavour to ensure that it does so because failure to 
repay the debt and the loss of that asset leaves the bank with an unmatched liability, in 
the shape of a deposit to the value of the loan issue.  
3.5.2 Deposit Holding, Bond Sales and Final Finance 
The simple circuit from bank to firm to worker/consumers and back to the firm 
for repayment of the full debt is not of course the whole story. Once money has entered 
the economy and is valued because it is demanded by firms for the purpose of repaying 
their debts, the existence of uncertainty and time-lags means that the effective demand 
implied in the initial triangular production contract may no longer be present.9 Thus H 
may opt to defer their purchases of firms’ production and continue to hold deposits with 
                                                 
8
 Where the original loan-issuing bank is different from that holding the firm’s current deposits, the asset-
liability positions of the individual banks are kept in balance by a transfer of central bank money. See 
discussion in the next section. 
9
 The various reasons why this might happen; the ways in which it might happen and the macroeconomic 
consequences of it happening are discussed in Chapter 6. 
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Bank A (Graziani 2003). We can see the consequence of this in Figure 3.3 at Time 0. 
Firm F, instead of having returned to a state of zero assets and liabilities, still has part 
of its loan liability matched on the asset side by unsold production output.  Firms are 
thus prevented from repaying their loans as they might have anticipated.  
There are various possible financial consequences of firms’ inability to pay their 
loans. Figure 3.3 also shows how firms can recoup the funds they require by issuing 
securities directly to H. At Time 1 H exchange their secure, but non-earning money 
deposits for these riskier, but (presumably) higher earning bonds. They are riskier than 
deposits because they will only be repaid (with a concomitant transfer of deposits from 
Firm F to H) if and when Firm F does manage to sell its remaining output. At Time 2 
the firm can now repay the balance of its loan. For the firm, if they succeed in raising 
enough funds in this way to repay their bank debt, then there is no restriction to their 
acquiring lending for the next production cycle. It is important to realise that this is a 
simple process of financial intermediation, where pre-existing money is transferred 
from the individual who needs less liquidity to the firm that needs more. Here, unlike 
the issue of production loans, there is no creation of new CBDM.  
Features of Bonds 
To the extent that consumption goods firms are making profits, the share of 
income that households do not choose to spend on the acquisition of consumption 
goods reduces the profits of consumption goods firms accordingly (Parguez 1996). In 
Graziani’s (2003, p114) description of the process, banks and firms compete for 
financial savings of households. Firms are offering high-yield securities to offset the 
liquidity benefits of holding cash or deposits. These securities are usually of longer-
term than bank loans, and may be bundled by financial intermediaries to tailor the 
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specific liquidity and risk and return needs of firms and households respectively. The 
firms’ incentive to issue securities will depend on: 
1. The interest rate spread between securities and bank loans, 
2. The impact of failure to repay bank loans on the availability of future borrowing 
facilities. 
The securities offered may take the form of bonds (fixed-interest long-term loan 
contracts), or shares (contracts to share in profits, usually with control rights attached). 
Sales of commodities and securities taken together cannot exceed total wage payments. 
When interest is paid on bonds this monetary flow comes back to firms when spent on 
commodities, and so this does not count as a cost to firms (Graziani 2003). But it 
should be noted, however, that the extra commodities sold in this way must be 
produced by firms and if this is done at no additional cost it can only be by further 
reducing the purchasing power of wages by increasing the firms’ mark-up on prices of 
consumer goods. Otherwise it would seem that firms could offer an unlimited return on 
securities to the extent that the convenience of holding money would be outweighed by 
this return. In summary, at the end of the production period, the liquid balances existing 
immediately after the initial bank loans have been made are reduced by an amount of 
expenditure by households in the goods market plus the amount of securities they 
purchase.  
Consequences of Failure to Obtain Final Finance 
If the firm does not succeed in selling enough securities to offset households’ 
non-consumption of output, then it is dependent on the bank’s subsequent decision. If 
the bank agrees to roll over the outstanding loan, and is willing to issue a further loan, 
then the firm can produce again. The level of subsequent production will depend on the 
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size of the total loan the bank is now willing to countenance. The firm must also now 
pay interest both on the part of the previous loan that they have been unable to repay 
and the new loan. Alternatively the bank may be unwilling to extend a further loan. If 
the firm is then unable to sell its outstanding output within whatever time the bank 
determines then loan default will be considered to have taken place. 
Liquid balances held by single agents are not generally connected to finance for 
production or investment; the role of final finance being solely ease firms in paying off 
their bank debt within a single circuit. The sale of securities is one way in which 
investment can be financed, but this can only be true where either firms have already 
acquired bank loans to pay for capital goods or wage-earners hold money they have 
acquired from another source than wages Graziani (2003, p71). Graziani describes 
profits of firms as ‘forced saving’. By putting the two together he can say that all 
investment leads automatically to the saving that ‘funds’ it. This agrees with the view 
of Moore (2004) who dismisses both the ‘neoclassical view’ that interest rates adjust to 
equilibrate saving and investment, or the ‘Keynesian view’ that incomes do. He argues 
that saving is simply the accounting record of investment, and so if there were no 
measurement errors they would always be identical. Saving can thus in no way be a 
cause of investment. Only in the case where all saving and investment are undertaken 
by identical units can aggregate saving and investment be both volitional and identical. 
Investment in a monetary economy is thus never limited by an ‘insufficiency’ of 
saving. The only financial limit to investment is excess money holding, since this will 
reduce firms’ profits, increase their borrowing costs and impact upon their ability to 
repay bank loans. 
If firms offer securities for sale at too high a rate of interest, they may actually 
divert funds from consumption; which would be to their disadvantage. This implies that 
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there is an optimal interest rate for firms to offer given a specific interest rate on bank 
loans and a known cost of loan default. 
3.5.3 Liquidity Preference and the Determination of Interest Rates  
A critical determinant of the flow of money into and out of deposits is the issue 
of ‘liquidity preference’: the extent to which an economic agent balances their assets 
between return and their ease of immediate exchange without significant loss. Keynes 
presented the liquidity preference theory of interest rates in the General Theory 
(Keynes 1964[1936]) and this was subsequently interpreted as explaining the demand 
for money. Bibow (2006) refers to Keynes’s emphasis on the separation between the 
decision to spend or not to spend, and whether to hold wealth in the form of money or 
some other asset. It is the latter that is primarily affected by the rate of interest. Rates of  
interest, while determinants of effective demand, are determined exogenously with 
respect to income generation; so there is no supply and demand for credit in the way 
there is for goods and services.  
As long as there exists a viable production process, credit can be issued at the 
cost of evaluating, recording and absorbing the risk of default, all of which are 
exogenous to demand. The marginal propensity to consume is affected by tax changes, 
changing income and changes in the value of capital, and 
the assumption of radical uncertainty of the environment dear 
to Post-Keynesians does not mean that agents do not make 
decisions (Monvoison and Pastoret 2003, p27). 
If there are real constraints on the supply of credit they are primarily in the 
shortage of material and human inputs to production, or a lack of demand for planned 
output. The latter dependence on employment ensures that the actual quantity of credit 
issued is to some extent indeterminate. There is no guarantee that an increased desire to 
save on the part of households will necessarily result in reduced interest rates unless a 
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shift from deposit-holding to holding firms’ securities outweighs firms’ desire to supply 
securities to households. 
Following Keynes then, changes in the rate of interest are determined by the 
desire of households and firms to acquire liquidity and the banks’ willingness to tie up 
liquid reserves in supporting the holding of deposit liabilities in exchange for 
potentially risky loan assets. But there is no equilibrium rate of interest derived from 
the real rate of return.  
There is particular uncertainty in investment decisions; especially surrounding 
the expected return (marginal efficiency of capital) and the future interest rate.  Holding 
money is one way of guarding against an uncertain future, by keeping a relatively stable 
stock of wealth to hand. But increased desire to hold money that is not offset for a 
greater desire to hold commercial securities, will increase firms’ need for credit. 
Uncertain expectations mean that there is no stable and unique liquidity preference 
schedule. Keynes’ liquidity preference theory of interest was the 
…interplay of the terms on which the public desires to 
become more or less liquid and those on which the banking 
system is ready to become more or less illiquid (Keynes 1973b, 
p219). 
Productivity and thrift are not real anchors of the rate of interest. The beliefs of 
financial market participants and the beliefs and policies of the authorities are important 
factors. We believe that the desire for initial finance alone explains the demand for 
credit, and is the basis for money creation. The other motives for holding money 
provide no explanation for money creation and the production process.  
Money demand for the finance motive and for liquidity 
preference covers quite separate cases. The former concerns 
firms’ demand for credit from banks and falls within the sphere 
of production. The latter relates to the demands for liquidity 
(cash holdings) and for public securities, and is bound up with 
the financial sphere of the economy (Monvoison and Pastoret 
2003, p35). 
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3.5.4 Banks’ Liquidity Preference 
Banks’ quantity of lending is primarily determined by the state of their reserves 
(with liability management rendering this more flexible), but the forms of lending 
(whether loans, bonds etc) are up to them. Their reserves are required to meet demands 
of deposit-holders for cash, but in modern monetary economies perhaps more important 
is the quality and quantity of capital available to offset any loan defaults.10 The level of 
risk they are prepared to take in terms of illiquidity and insolvency are opposed to the 
profit motive and concern for their reputation. In the behaviour of banking system there 
is likely to be an element of self-reinforcement, in that loans from one bank shift 
reserves to another. 
Where the banks lend for the purchase of securities or even purchase these 
themselves, and when a large part of the private sector is keen to sell securities, then 
this results in a rise in the price of securities (a fall in interest rates) and an increase in 
the quantity of deposits held. There is an important role here for a Central Bank, of 
which we will say more in the next section.  
Banks liquidity preference behaviour is determined by the uncertainty they face, 
and aims to minimize the risk of: 
1. A liquidity crisis due to a large demand for cash by depositors or 
settlement with other banks – since liabilities are highly liquid compared 
to assets. (Securities are more liquid than loans in this regard, but their 
value can fluctuate.)  
2. Profit/loss arising as liabilities exceed assets – because of excess bad 
loans or the loss of value of other assets. 
                                                 
10
 Thus the increasing emphasis on Capital Requirements in banking regulation. 
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A rise in a bank’s liquidity preference is likely to lead to the rationing of credit 
as they limit their exposure to illiquid loans in contrast to more liquid assets. This may 
occur either because the interest rate high enough to compensate the banks’ assessment 
of uncertainty over loans exceeds the firms’ ability to provide an interest rate stream 
(See section 3.5.6), or there is such ‘fundamental uncertainty’ that the bank simply does 
not wish to lend at all, and so credit is rationed.  
3.5.5 The Role of the Central Bank 
In the modern state, the government has a monopoly on physical force and so it 
is natural that the government should provide the final backing to contracts through the 
legal system. Moreover, the government can use physical force on its own account to 
enforce its own purchasing and debt-collecting activity, in which State or Central Bank 
Deposit Money (SBDM) is created, circulates and is destroyed. The Chartalists even 
regard money as entirely a creature of the state and argue that the state uses its coercive 
powers to force the acceptance of tokens in exchange for the goods and services that it 
requires to carry out its functions (Wray 1996, Tymoigne and Wray 2006). By 
accepting these tokens when taxes fall due, the state acquires the power to establish 
them as a unit of account and gives them the status of a means of payment.11 By 
insisting on credit payments of taxes taking place in central bank money, the central 
bank forces the other banks to hold deposits with the central bank, these deposits being 
increased when the government makes a credit payment to one of their deposit-holders 
and decreased when a deposit-holder makes a tax payment in credit money. Transfers 
of credit money between banks can then occur via their deposits at the central bank, 
                                                 
11
 The Chartalists see the whole monetary system as imposed by the state. In my view the state is 
responsible for the imposition of central bank money and ultimately responsible for enforcing the 
contracts involved in commercial bank loans, but the use of tokens of these loans in general exchange is a 
voluntary act arising from their superior liquidity to any other means of exchange. 
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allowing them to settle asset-liability discrepancies that arise as deposit-holders transfer 
CBDM between each other. 
The Outward Path of SBDM 
The central bank issues deposits to pay firms and individuals for goods and 
services including labour. Individuals and firms can pay the credit money received from 
the central bank into deposits with the commercial banks. These liabilities for the 
commercial banks are matched by increases in the deposits the commercial banks hold 
with the central bank when they present this credit issue to the central bank. Thus there 
is an increase in both the liabilities and assets of the commercial banks. Given reserve 
requirements either imposed by the central bank or required to avoid costly overdrafts, 
the commercial banks then have the option of drawing down their increased central 
bank deposits and converting them into central bank notes, if required, or more 
profitable forms of assets such as government bonds or loans. In many modern 
economies, there is no imposed reserve requirement, and so the nature of the assets held 
by commercial banks to offset their liabilities depends on their own assessment of their 
likely need to have central bank money available for the cash demands of their 
depositors and for their own transactions. This means that while there is clearly a 
relationship between the creation of loans (and thus the flow of CBDM into the 
economy) and the cost of access to reserves for commercial banks, it is by no means 
likely to be a mechanical and easily predictable one.  
In our balance sheet example we have taken the case of Firm F at Time 0 in 
Figure 3.4, where it holds unsold output and still has an outstanding loan of £50. We 
assume that the state purchases this output using SBDM at the price required to exactly 
cover Firm F’s outstanding loan to commercial Bank A.  At Time 1 the SBDM deposits 
now form assets of Bank A, while there is an equivalent CBDM deposit forming a 
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liability for Bank A and an asset for Firm F. This now allows Firm F to repay its loan to 
Bank A. At Time 2 Bank A is left with an SBDM deposit that matches the CBDM 
liability of the H deposit holding. While the SBDM deposit is clearly a more secure 
asset than the loan to Firm F, and can be converted into cash as demanded by Bank A’s 
depositors, it is also a lower-earning one and so there is incentive for Bank A to use 
part of its SBDM deposit to purchase higher-earning assets. 
The Inward Path of SBDM 
When tax bills become due, individuals and firms pay these from deposits with 
the commercial banks. Deposits held by the commercial banks are decreased by the 
amount of the tax bill, as are the deposits of the commercial banks held by the central 
bank. In this way both the liabilities and the assets of the commercial banks are 
decreased. If the commercial banks guarantee to exchange state money (as cash or 
deposits) on a one for one basis then the value in terms of real goods and services of 
both commercial bank and central bank money will be identical, although individuals 
can only transact in cash or CBDM, and banks must complete all their transactions in 
SBDM. 
In a democracy, the power of the state to issue money to make purchases and 
demand the payment of taxes must stem from the agreement of the population at large 
that this system is working to their overall advantage. For this to be the case the deferral 
of consumption that is represented by their acceptance from the government of central 
bank money and associated tax payment must be compensated for by the additional 
future consumption that the actions of government, thus funded, will provide. In this 
way the justification for the creation of money by government transactions is exactly 
analogous to that for the creation of money by private transactions; except that while 
such transactions in the private sector depend on a potential bilateral benefits, in the 
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public sector they depend on perceived overall social improvement. We will discuss 
this issue further in Chapter 4.12 
Reserve Ratios and Transfers 
Because of SBDM the importance of quantities of deposits depends on how 
they arrive on banks’ balance sheets. If due to loans they have created their 
deposit/reserve ratio is reduced; if due to loans created by other banks their 
deposit/reserve ratio is increased, since the arrival of these deposits is accompanied by 
transfer of reserves from the issuing bank. 
[T]he rate at which the bank can, with safety, actively 
create deposits by lending and investing has to be in a proper 
relation to the rate at which it is passively creating them against 
the receipt of liquid resources from its deposits. For the latter 
increase the banks’ reserves…whereas the former diminish the 
reserves… (Keynes 1971[1930], p22). 
If all banks expand credit together the strength of the banking system depends 
on the central bank issuing enough SBDM to keep reserve ratios at ‘prudential’ levels. 
If there is a compulsory reserve ratio for commercial banks of SBDM deposits to total 
assets, the credit potential of the banking system as a whole depends on this ratio, the 
quantity of SBDM, the compulsory reserve ratio and the preference of the public for 
cash versus deposits (Graziani 2003, p88). If there is no compulsory reserve ratio and 
the public do not generally require cash, banks can expand credit to the point that their 
perceived risk of default outweighs their interest income. Note that this risk of default is 
now made a financial risk, rather than a ‘real’ one. The consequence of a loan default is 
that when the loan asset is ‘written off’ from the balance sheet there must be a 
compensating reduction in the liability side, as illustrated in Figure 3.5. At Time 0, a 
firm has an outstanding loan liability and unsold production. If it is unable to sell this 
                                                 
12
 Central bank money also moves into and out of the private sector as a consequence of Treasury Bond 
sales and repurchases and of loans to commercial banks at the discount window, but the balance sheet 
implications are essentially the same as described in this section. 
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production it may default on the loan. The bank must remove both the loan asset and 
the equivalent value from the asset side of its balance sheet (Time 1). This is effected 
by a reduction in shareholders capital and shows up as a charge against the current 
profit and loss account. The extent to which this process reabsorbs purchasing power 
depends on the valuation of the banks capital. 
Should the transfer to other banks of SBDM have the effect of reducing these 
below the compulsory or prudent level (according to the prevailing regime) the 
commercial bank must thus acquire additional SBDM by the sale of government bonds, 
thus losing the return on these, or by borrowing from the central bank at the prevailing 
base rate. 
The amount of reserves at the disposal of a single bank depends on the total 
amount of reserves created by the central bank and on the fraction of those reserves 
obtained by that bank – thus creating competition for depositing customers of other 
commercial banks, as they bring transfers of SBDM with them. The reserve 
requirement for a bank is of course lower when that bank has a greater share of the 
market for deposits, since a greater proportion of deposit transfers will be between 
customers of that same bank and so will require no SBDM settlement. 
Monetary Policy and the Central Bank 
Given that the main form of money circulating in the economy is that created by 
the commercial banks from their lending, it is clear that at best the control of the central 
bank over the money supply can be an indirect one.  
[T]he central bank cannot ordinarily control the 
quantity of money. Any attempt to do so succeeds only in 
temporarily disrupting the smooth workings of the system until 
the dormant credit money system can be activated (Mehrling 
1996, p331). 
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While it is true that the central bank could control the quantity of SBDM issued, 
the very performance of its regulatory and enforcement role (and deposit insurance) 
tends to reduce the practical need for banks to maintain high reserve ratios, and even if 
it did seek to restrict supplying its money to commercial banks desiring it, the 
immediate effect is not to reduce the purchasing power of wage-earners, but to restrict 
the production activities of firms. Modern central banks mainly operate by establishing 
a rate of interest to stabilise the system of notes and bank deposits, while making loans 
and accepting deposits at that rate as the lender of last resort (Nell 1996). Nor is the 
central bank limited to providing reserves to prevent a crisis but is an integral part of 
the monetary circuit (Rochon 1999). The central bank exogenously sets the real and 
nominal rate of interest over which other interest rates are a mark up.  Even this limited 
role can be damaging: 
Central bankers…believe that the consistency of the 
credit network requires the perfect stability of the value of 
money… Stabilising money prices of goods should protect 
wealth-holders against losses of purchasing power: money 
values of firms would thus rise; this increase in real wealth 
could support a sound increase in investment…The central 
bank’s own thriftiness thus sustains the rentier 
economy…where the generation of wealth is not dependent on 
investment expenditures (Parguez 1996, p183). 
We will return to these issues in Chapter 6. 
Summarising the Role of the Central Bank 
It should be clear from the above analysis that the collective institutions of 
government and the central bank play a huge and largely autonomous role in the 
shaping of monetary transactions. The main features of this role are: 
1. Provision of the legal framework that supports commercial banks in enforcing 
repayment of loans, thus ensuring that the CBDM arising from loan contracts is 
valued. 
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2. Provision of central bank money by which transactions between banks and 
between individuals or banks and the state can be settled in monetary terms. 
This potentially enhances efficiency and competition in the commercial banking 
sector. 
3. The autonomous ability of the government to make purchases of goods and 
services for collective use, by the issue of central bank money. The commercial 
banks match this with their own issued money (CBDM) through adjustment of 
their balance sheets. There are various reasons why the government chooses to 
acquire the goods and services it requires in this way rather than simply by 
confiscation (which it has the physical power to do). Firstly there is the issue of 
equity. The resources government requires to fulfil its delegated functions may 
not be held equally by all. By issuing its money in exchange for goods and 
services, and then selectively confiscating this money in the form of taxation, 
the government can redistribute the burden of providing its resources. Secondly, 
for this system to be effective it of course essential that the money the central 
bank issues on behalf of the government is accepted. This is achieved by the 
requirement that almost all individuals (including firms) have some tax liability, 
and by the fact that central bank money and commercial bank money (itself 
demanded for loan repayment) is always interchangeable at a rate of one to one.  
4. By ensuring a demand for its own money for the payment of taxes and the 
settlement of interbank transactions and by taking advantage of the demand of 
individuals for the portability and liquidity of cash by monopolising its 
production, the government may hope to influence the quantity of CBDM 
issued. This is generally performed by setting prices (interest rates) for the 
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central bank’s purchase and re-purchase of high-grade financial assets (open-
market operations), and for the last-resort lending of central bank reserve 
money. This latter ‘lender of last-resort’ function together with regulations 
governing acceptable asset risk composition for commercial banks also gives 
the central bank a role in ensuring that commercial banks remain solvent and 
capable of allowing individuals access to their deposits at all times. 
3.5.6 Interest Payments by Firms 
We have suggested that the banker will expect compensation for the 
organisational and physical effort involved in his part in enforcing the repayment of the 
loan issued to initiate the circuit, along with the ultimate risk of default. Yet, as various 
writers have pointed out, the account of the Monetary Circuit given so far leaves no 
room for the payment of interest in monetary form (Bossone 2001, Schmitt 1996, 
Graziani 1989). As we have described it all of the money issued in the production loan 
contract is spent as wages and then exchanged for production, held as deposits or used 
to purchase bonds. There is no additional money with which to pay interest. There is no 
such barrier to the bank being paid in kind, since as long as the additional utility arising 
from the production process exceeds the compensation the bank requires there will still 
be a benefit to be divided between the other agents in the production process. But on 
the face of it there is no way of converting this additional output into money, since the 
firm cannot acquire more money from sales than it pays its workers. Since the only 
money existing in the market is the money that banks have lent to the firms they can 
only repay in money the principal and are unable to pay interest. They must therefore 
transfer part of their product to banks. Some circuitists such as Bossone (2001) and 
Schmitt (1996) regard the interest problem as insoluble. The interest must be paid from 
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money sales from workers, and so there must always be a repayment shortfall at the end 
of each circuit. 
There is, however, an alternative solution to the interest problem, once it is 
understood that production and the monetary transactions that it involves do not (as 
indeed they cannot) occur instantaneously. The final destination of banks’ net income is 
the payment of wages and dividends and to invest in fixed capital (Graziani 2003). 
Thus directly or indirectly this money eventually returns to production firms. If there is 
a positive time interval between issuing of the initial loan and the payment of the final 
wage and/or a positive time-interval between the first instalment of sales receipts and 
the last of any particular circuit, then a firm can pay interest to the bank in the form of 
money, receive it once more in money, use it again to pay its suppliers, and so use it to 
repay its loan in the usual way. Of course the bank or those to whom it transfers its 
interest payments may opt not to spend this money, which will leave a repayment 
shortfall for the firm, in the same way as money-holding by consumers.  
The final effect of the dual passage through the firm of interest payments is in 
fact exactly the same as if there had been simply a transfer of goods in kind from the 
firm to the bank as compensation for loan provision. 
Firms must either sell part of their output and/or 
physical assets to the banks, or ask for extension in the form of 
new loans’ (Seccareccia 1996, p411). 
 In the case of loan extensions firms become increasingly indebted to the 
banking system. In an economy with multiple consumer-goods firms, however, the 
interpolation of additional transactions means that the final recipients of goods 
purchased with money paid as interest will not generally be households employed by 
the firm that paid it. But the principle of the procedure is unaltered. In the final analysis, 
the payment of interest represents a transfer of real goods away from wage-earners. 
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There is an issue of timing; if extra money is not to be required, then interest payments 
must be recycled back to firms within the production period. 
We show the flow of interest payments in Figure 3.6.  At Time 0, a £100 loan 
has been paid and this money is seen as a deposit belonging to Firm F. At Time 1, an 
interest payment of £10 is due, and is transferred to Bank A. Bank A can simply 
represent this as a transfer from the firm’s deposits to households deposits where in this 
case the households are employees of the bank. When these households spend to 
purchase goods from Firm F, the process is reversed and the balance sheet position at 
Time 2 reverts to that at Time 0.13 
3.6 The Nature and Role of Profits 
One of the fundamental issues in linking monetary flows with the real economy 
is the issue of profit – the excess of firms’ revenue over their costs. In the era of 
corporations with widely dispersed ownership, the term profits is not necessarily a 
helpful one. It requires careful definition. Dividends are paid out as part of a ‘quasi-
contractual’ obligation to the household sector, at the discretion of the executive of 
firms. Their macroeconomic importance is in terms of distribution, not activity level. 
What is left as ‘retained earnings’ represents the firms’ discretionary cash flow for 
investment and growth of the national productive base (Eichner 1987, p545). It is this 
discretionary fund that we are mainly interested in for the economic analysis of the 
firms sector.  
‘Profits’ play an important role in the firms sector of the economy. They are 
generally regarded as the barometer of a successful and socially useful business. 
                                                 
13
 To avoid complication we have not in this diagram accounted for the fact that some production must 
have taken place, and therefore households employed by the firm have also received deposit transfers. 
This causes no additional problems as long as all wage payment is not made instantaneously. 
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Presumably this is partly a view of the ability of the firm to produce desired output. 
Economically the importance of profits is that they allow firms a certain discretion in 
their future path. The additional resources acquired allow the firm to choose and 
purchase capital goods to enhance its future production as it sees fit. Assuming a 
knowledge advantage of the firm as it operates day-to-day in its own market, this 
should represent an efficient use of society’s scarce resources. There is a conflict here 
with the strict neoclassical view that all resources excess to immediate consumption 
needs are available on a perfect ‘capital market’ ensuring their direction to where they 
will produce the greatest return. In this case, the retained earnings part of corporate 
profits would be of no significance as the direct use of saved financial capital would 
have a direct cost exactly equal to the opportunity cost of using retained earnings. This 
assumption allows neoclassical models to assume an identity between the savings of 
households and the economy’s capital resources for investment and growth. This is an 
assumption with uncertain theoretical foundation:  
… [W]hat is being talked about is not a market for 
capital – the term connotes the set of markets in which 
investment goods industry sell their output – but rather a 
market for capital funds, or long-term credit….Once one begins 
to think in terms of a capital funds market rather than a ‘capital 
market,’ one must recognise that what firms must pay to obtain 
funds through that market is not the same as the return that can 
be earned by supplying it with funds. (Eichner 1987, p495) 
This difference between the cost of finance and its return is because the established 
firm can earn quasi-rents from its intimate knowledge of its own technology and market 
position.  
The automatic equation of household saving with the source of investment in 
firms’ capital base in neoclassical models would appear to derive from the traditional 
picture of the sole trader whose income from his trading or manufacture is the excess of 
revenue over costs, and so in this sense is the same as his ‘profits’. Any expenditure 
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from this income devoted to building up his business would be directly at the expense 
of his potential income, and so it is quite correct that for such traders as a whole, their 
level of investment in their business is dependent on their saving. Even in this case 
unconsumed income might be held as gold in vaults rather than being invested in the 
business, so it cannot be said that saving and investment are equal in any finite time 
period. 
In modern economies, with a clear distinction between the corporate and wage-
earner sectors, the saving of wage-earners diminishes current consumption without 
leading automatically to increased physical capital. The holding of deposits may, at the 
margin, allow the issue of more loans by banks if they are short of reserves, but the 
deposits themselves cannot be used by the corporate sector. Other destinations for 
household saving include; government securities, where the money simply goes to 
reduce the deficit between government spending and taxation with no impact on 
productive capital; and the purchase of corporate bonds and shares which occurs mainly 
in secondary markets so that only the initial purchase price is available to firms.14 
According to monetary circuit theorists the main part of the motivation for the issue of 
corporate securities is actually to make up for the shortfall in loan repayment left by the 
holding of deposits by wage-earners. Funding of new investment for firms is mainly 
from retained profits. 
3.6.1 Profits in a Monetary Theory of Production 
If our balance sheet view of the monetary economy is the correct one, then we 
are faced with a puzzle in explaining the ability of firms in aggregate to earn profits. In 
the model of monetary flows described up to now, the most in monetary receipts that 
                                                 
14
 Although functioning bond and stock markets are of benefit to firms in that they enable efficient 
trading of such securities and so may raise the value of new issues. 
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any firm or aggregation of firms can earn in any production period or complete set of 
production periods is that quantity which they have borrowed and subsequently 
expended on wages and/or capital goods. It seems that under these circumstances the 
firm cannot earn a monetary surplus. But does the inability to earn a monetary surplus 
also imply the inability to earn a profit?  
Firms employ workers and pay them money wages. In 
spending their money wages, workers gain access to a fraction 
of the output, the size of that fraction varying according to the 
price they pay for goods in markets. Symmetrically, firms earn 
profits formed by the surplus of the price received for the 
goods sold over the wage-bill the firms paid out, allowing them 
and their backers to appropriate the complementary part of the 
output (Gnos 2005, p2). 
In fact many proponents of the monetary circuit approach treat profit as 
additional real wealth acquired by firms, and it is not clear that this implies a monetary 
surplus.  
If we consider firms as a whole, their only external 
purchase is labour force. All other exchanges being external 
transactions, no further monetary payment is required. Only at 
the end of the production process firms buy capital goods to be 
used in the following period (Graziani 1989, p4). 
Any addition to real wealth for a firm must involve pricing labour and capital 
inputs at lower than its output.15 It does not necessarily follow that these price 
differentials are without the consent of wage-earners and capital goods suppliers. If 
they want to reap the social benefits of entrepreneurship and the risk-bearing services of 
the banks, then they have to accept the diversion of some part of output to reward at 
least the opportunity costs of those providing them. In this case the portion of real 
output retained by firms (or their owners) and banks is simply the economic profit 
required to keep them operating.  
                                                 
15
 There is thus the necessity for the firms sector as a whole to enjoy market power. 
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This leaves open the question of how it is possible for firms to purchase capital 
goods for money (as happens in a modern monetary economy). It can only be possible 
if there are both goods that are produced by the labour of wage-earners but not 
purchased by them, and firms have access to money to purchase them with. The pricing 
of goods above their wage costs (mark-up pricing) or the holding of money in the form 
of deposits by wage-earners will result in the first of these conditions, but not the 
second, since this money does not return to firms. To obtain the money to purchase 
goods additional to those purchased by consumers, firms must apparently undertake 
further borrowing without having repaid their original loan in full; a situation that if 
repeated will result in ever-increasing debt levels for firms.  
Following from the assumption that the only expenditure of firms in aggregate 
is wages, and following the model of Kalecki in which consumption is determined as a 
residual of firms’ investment (capital goods purchases) decisions, Graziani regards as 
the profit of firms the value of capital goods obtained in the way described above.  
[The] basic assumption [of neoclassical theory is] of an 
economic equilibrium determined by individual choices, with 
the consequent acceptance of the principle of consumers’ 
sovereignty. In the circuit approach it is rather producers’ 
sovereignty which prevails. (Graziani 1989, p13) 
In an economy where only firms can borrow, any money received by firms must 
have been borrowed by firms. Thus in any period that includes both the issue and 
repayment of the loans that give rise to all money used in transactions considered, 
nominal expenditure must equal nominal receipts. Under these assumptions it is 
therefore not possible for firms as a whole to make a monetary surplus.  
Yet capital is required to increase future output and is purchased from capital 
goods firms. Because of the nature of capital goods and the long-term consequences of 
their purchase they are undertaken in quite a different way from the purchase of labour 
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and intermediate goods. These goods are characterised by their long planning phase, 
production to order, indivisibility (there is no point in building part of a new factory) 
and the fact that their purchase is funded for the most part from retained profits. Thus 
we can make the alternative assumption that their purchase is not part of the cycle in 
which their funding is obtained, and so retained profits are seen as a monetary surplus 
at the end of the current production cycle. 
The picture is complicated by the fact that capital goods firms too wish to 
expand, and indeed they must do if the growth rate of the consumer goods sector and 
the economy is to increase. So, in this case, capital goods firms too must accumulate a 
monetary surplus. What are the possible solutions? 
3.6.2 The Overlapping Time-periods Explanation of Profits 
Gnos rejects the Kaleckian explanation of Graziani.  
One can rightly suppose that firms borrow money from 
the banks and spend in advance the profits they expect to make. 
But this is not sufficient to solve the problem under discussion: 
being anticipated, the formation of profits is not explained but 
presupposed. (Gnos 2003, p333) 
His explanation of the profits of firms (both real and nominal) is that they can arise 
because production processes overlap each other, although he does allow the possibility 
that ‘…although profits are gained from sales firms can spend them in advance thanks 
to bank loans.’ (Gnos 2003, p335) The implication must be that in the real world we 
can never go back to the beginning of each series of transactions, and so that at any 
arbitrary point in time we will find firms already in possession of funds from previous 
circuits over and above that which they require to pay their wage bill. But as we have 
already argued, it should be a test of any candidate theory of money that it is able to 
explain the coming into being of money, and we cannot do that for the money that 
appears as profits. A further objection to Gnos’s explanation is that it cannot account 
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for how any given level of aggregate profits can increase over any observed period. In 
fact the only way they can do so if they are the only recipients of bank loans is to 
borrow the funds they require to purchase capital goods from other firms.  
3.6.3 The Graziani Model of Profits 
Graziani (1989, 2003) insists on a clear distinction between the financing of 
production and the financing of investment. Firms’ initial finance for production must 
cover all the labour and capital costs of their plans, whether their production is of 
consumer or capital goods. Once all payments have been made this finance returns to 
firms via the commodity or financial markets and so is destroyed as firms repay their 
initial debt to the banks. As it returns this money is transformed into the ‘final finance’ 
that allows firms to repay their debts, irrespective as to whether the final finance has 
been obtained from the sale of commodities or of securities. 
Investment is only financed by the sale of newly produced capital goods. This 
can occur in two ways: either by the direct exchange of capital goods among firms, 
which they purchase with their production profits; or indirectly by the sale of securities 
to savers on the financial market. In this way investment always finds its final finance 
in saving.  
The resulting distribution of income is based on the ‘Keynes-Kalecki’ principle, 
by which firms are monopolists in the market for consumer goods. As a consequence 
they can set their own profit margin and determine the distribution of income between 
wages and profits. Prices of consumer goods are set at the level that ensures that the 
quantity of these goods demanded are equal to the amount firms wish to produce and 
sell. While wage earners can spend no more in aggregate than the total wage bill, the 
expenditure of firms is only limited by the amount of bank credit they can obtain. We 
must adopt a model of the firms sector in which rather than viewing it as an integrated 
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entity, there are multiple firms exchanging capital goods among themselves. Wage 
earners do not consume all of their income but save some of their income in the form of 
securities. 
Graziani states his assumptions as follows: 
If we consider firms as a whole, their only external 
purchase is labour force. All other exchanges being internal 
transactions, no further monetary payment is required. Only at 
the end of the production process firms buy capital goods to be 
used in the following period. (Graziani 1989, p4) 
This ‘wage postulate’ we assume to be partially true in the sense that we can 
regard the consumer goods and intermediate goods sectors as an integrated unit where 
with in the production cycle all costs end up as wages for workers within the combined 
sector. If only the money used to pay the wage-bill is considered, any monetary loss 
incurred by a single firm must be balanced by an identical profit earned by some other 
firm. Thus firms as a whole don’t make losses or profits.  
Graziani (2003) describes his model in formal terms as follows. There is a 
single product used both for consumption and as the capital used in production. 
Aggregate supply is given by 
X Npi= , (3.1) 
where X is the total production output of both consumption and capital goods, pi is the 
average productivity of labour and N is total employment. Aggregate real demand Y is 
given by 
Y C I= + , (3.2) 
where C is aggregate real consumption of wage-earners, and I is aggregate real 
investment. Since  
( )C c wN iB= + , (3.3) 
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where c is the propensity to consume of wage earners, w the money wage rate, i the 
percentage yield on securities (bonds and equities), and B the nominal amount 
outstanding of securities issued by firms; and I is given by  
I b Nppi= , (3.4) 
where b is the fraction of aggregate product firms decide to acquire as capital, and p is 
the market price of production. 
Given an equilibrium between demand and supply, 
( )Np c wN iB b Nppi pi= + + , (3.5) 




 = + −   . (3.6) 
Since the term in square brackets represents the total monetary cost of production 
(wages plus interest costs per unit of product), the factor /(1 )c b−  represents the ratio 
of receipts to expenditure. This shows how, by having the power to set the price of 
goods, the firms sector as a whole can acquire for itself a proportion of output. Profits 
are thus totally independent of the abilities or performance of entrepreneurs. Profits are 
only due to the fact that firms as buyers with unlimited purchasing power are able to 
acquire the share of real product satisfying their production and investment plans. This 
shows that money prices do not depend on the quantity of money, but on the 
propensities to save and invest and on the level of money costs (wages and interest on 
securities) (Graziani 2003). 






and real consumption is 
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(1 )b pi− . (3.8) 
Thus both depend on the average productivity of labour and the share of total output 
firms wish to acquire for their own use (investment). 
The rate of return on expenditure r is given by the ratio of the monetary surplus 



























So we see how this depends on the level of money prices, but not on the interest rate for 
securities. As the firms aim to extract more output their rate of return increases. Thus 
the limit to firms’ rate of return is not an economic one, but a socio-political one of how 
much they can enforce a lowering of workers’ real wage and consumption. 
For the vast majority of firms, the acquisition of a portion of their own output is 
of no benefit in increasing their own future output. Not only do firms generally need to 
exchange these ‘surplus’ goods with other firms for the most part the goods they wish 
to acquire themselves are of a particular nature. These ‘capital goods’ are manufactured 
for the most part by a particular sector of firms; the ‘capital goods’ sector. Parguez 
(2004, pp 264-266) accounts for the acquisition of capital goods by the firms sector 
similarly to Graziani, although he gives more emphasis to the role of banks in insisting 
on a particular real rate of return that the firms must adhere to this follows from the 
nature of firms, which exist to grow capital, and thus must make money profits. Firms 
borrow from the banks in two tranches or ‘rounds’; one for the payment of wages 
which workers can exchange for a pre-determined output of consumption goods, thus 
allowing the firms to extinguish this debt, and one for the purchase of additional output 
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of capital goods by the firms themselves. This allows capital goods firms to repay their 
debt, and leaves firms holding an additional amount of real wealth in the form of new 
capital goods. 
Borrowing for Investment 
Most circuitist writers do take the view that capital goods too are purchased 
with borrowed funds.  
In order to buy finished goods, firms need finance as 
much as they need finance for paying the wage bill in the 
labour market.’ (Graziani 2003, p99) 
Once the capital goods purchases are made, loans can be repaid by the sector as a 
whole. This is the source of firms ‘purchasing power which is in principle unlimited.’ 
(Graziani 2003, p100). Aggregate profits are predetermined by investment 
expenditures, and firms as a whole receive as profits the amount of money all of them 
have individually borrowed from banks as credit to carry out their bids on the future as 
they are embodied in their acquisition of equipment goods (Parguez 1996). The nature 
of the payment system in a modern monetary economy requires that initial bank finance 
must go toward the purchases of all types of production, both of consumption and of 
capital goods (Seccareccia 1996). The discrepancy between the consumer and capital 
goods sectors in their ability to earn a monetary surplus in the circuit means that 
The only satisfactory solution must be one in which 
bank loans to firms are extended so as to include the money 
profits to be realised in both sectors. (Seccareccia 1996, p407) 
(Our italics.) 
3.6.4 The Statistical Evidence for a Monetary Surplus 
There is a variety of empirical evidence that confirms that internally-generated 
monetary surplus is of prime importance for firms’ investment. First we must examine 
how such surplus is calculated. For the UK national accounts, gross operating surplus 
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for the non-financial corporate sector is derived by adding subsidies received and 
subtracting the compensation of employees and taxes payable on production from value 
added by the sector.16 Since it is clear that subsidies, employees’ compensation, taxes 
and property income involve monetary transfers, we can restrict further analysis to the 
elements of value added. Value added is determined in the national accounts by 
subtracting the value of intermediate consumption from output. Since the value of 
intermediate consumption is determined from annual purchases inquiries we can see 
this too is a monetary transfer. Output includes sales of own production, changes in 
inventories and work in progress, output not sold on the market17 and output retained by 
firms for their own final use. It is only in the latter three categories that any doubt arises 
as to whether monetary transfers have taken place. In the case of inventories, the 
national accounts specifically exclude gains from appreciating prices of inventories by 
calculating their value not on historic cost, but on replacement cost at the time they are 
used or sold. Thus we are left with the conclusion that only within the categories of 
output not sold on the market and output for own final use will we find ‘profits’ of 
firms that are not matched by monetary transfers.  
We also find that in the UK and the US, total discretionary wealth frequently 
exceeds total spending on investment. For 2004 the internal funds18 of US non-farm, 
non-financial corporations amounted to $940.9 billion, whereas capital expenditures 
were only $861.0 billion.19 For the same year the gross disposable income20 for the UK 
                                                 
16
 According to UK National Accounts Concepts, Sources and Methods (Office for National Statistics 
1998). 
17
 Includes sales to units within the same enterprise and payments to employees in kind. 
18
 Profits + capital consumption allowance – taxes and dividends  
19
 Federal Reserve Board 2005, Z1 release, table F102 
20
 Gross operating surplus + property income – interest, dividends, taxes and transfers 
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private non-financial corporations sector was £123.8 billion, but gross fixed capital 
formation only £100.3 billion.21  
In 2003, the most recent year for which these figures are available, market 
output for the UK economy was £1,723.6 million (84% of total output), output for own 
final use £79.3 million (4% of total output and mainly produced by the household 
sector) and other non-market output calculated at £259.0 million (13% of total output 
and mainly produced by the government sector). The nature of non-market output 
means that for corporations it is more or less matched by costs that are subtracted from 
profits, but own final use must be balanced by an entry for fixed capital formation as 
corporations have no final consumption. Thus if we subtract output for final use from 
gross disposable incomes for non-financial corporations we have a measure of their 
monetary surplus. For 2003 this gives a monetary surplus of £108.1 billion. We are left 
with the conclusion that the non-financial corporate sector, at any rate, does indeed 
realise a monetary surplus at some time before purchases of capital goods are made in 
each period, which means that the funds to do so may have been held over from the 
previous period or may circulate more than once. This is not to say that the total 
monetary surplus of any period is necessarily held in money form at any time. 
Moreover, it is an empirical fact (Corbett and Jenkinson 1997) that firms do not 
generally spend their profits in the same period as they acquire them, and they may 
indeed accumulate funds for several periods before making a major investment. 
3.6.5 The Dual Circulation Explanation 
The best explanation of monetary profit is that money is recycled to be spent on 
capital goods in the period between its receipt by firms and its use by the latter to pay 
                                                 
21
 National Statistics 2005, National Accounts, tables K1 and K2 
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off their debt to the banks. In theory this is possible, because any money spent by firms 
on goods purchased from other firms returns to the firms sector via wages of the 
employees of capital goods firms and so is available to repay debts. This a similar 
solution to that of interest payments. In the real economy, however, there is bound to be 
a delay in the return to firms of the money they have spent on capital goods, and so in 
effect they are extending the period of their bank borrowing – which is precisely 
equivalent to taking out a new loan of the same quantity. 
If we follow Parguez (2004), Renaud (2000), Seccareccia (1996) and Nell 
(2004) and divide firms into consumer goods and capital goods firms, then it is possible 
to account for the profits of consumer goods firms from the wage bill of capital goods 
firms. We can show this formally as follows. If the money borrowed by the consumer 
sector is Mc and this is equal to the wages of the consumer sector Wc, then assuming no 
saving on the part of wage-earners, then the total receipts of the consumer sector are Wc 
+ mcpi , where 
m
cpi  is the monetary surplus earned by the consumer goods sector. The 
capital goods sector borrows Ml, and pays this out in wages Wl. Again assuming no 
saving, these wages are spent on consumer goods, thus forming part of receipts for the 
consumer goods firms. Thus  
 c c c lW W Wpi+ = + , (3.10) 
and so 
 c lWpi = . (3.11) 
This can account for the profits of the consumer sector in theory, although there 
remains an issue of timing; given the nature of capital goods as described above, how 
can capital goods firms start their production process before the consumer goods sector 
has realised a monetary surplus? The profits of the capital goods sector remain in any 
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case completely unaccounted for. If consumer goods firms’ profits pic are spent on 
capital goods then it is clear that the capital goods firms can repay their borrowed wage 
bill.  
To understand the role played by lending or a flow of money from a particular 
source, we must understand that we are dealing with a monetary economy i.e.: an 
economy where virtually all transactions of significance are carried out using money, 
and so for those transactions to take place money must be in the hands of the purchaser 
of a real good immediately preceding that purchase. This only makes sense if 
transactions are considered sequentially in the way that the monetary circuit approach 
does. The real economy consists of overlapping transactions and circuits which have 
started at different times, so it may seem unhelpful to isolate individual circuits. But 
unless we do this it is difficult to analyse how the flow of money – where it comes form 
and where it goes - affects the economy.  
An account of why money is held does not explain how 
money is used. An account of the demand by individual agents 
for (real) cash balances (the average demand over a period) 
tells us nothing about the sources and destinations of inflows or 
about their regularity. The approach assumes that balances are 
attributable to individual decisions, based on preferences, and 
does not consider the way agents interact with each other as 
they carry out their duties according to their institutional roles. 
(Nell 2004, p174-5) 
In particular, the problem of accounting for the flow of a particular sum of 
money arises each time there is an increase in the firm’s financial input that is 
converted into an additional profit. While we can account for a greater than one for one 
productive increase by a firm’s position on an increasing returns portion of its 
production function, no such explanation can suffice to account for an incremental 
increase in monetary profit.  
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Nell explains the two-sector solution as follows. The first sector is that of the 
equipment sector, the second that of the consumer sector. This recognizes that 
ultimately, the overwhelming expense of the productive sector as a whole is spent on 
labour; even that of the mining and extractive sector. In the case of two sectors, it can 
be postulated that the consumer goods sector earns its profits in the form of the wages 
paid to the employees of the equipment sector, since these must be paid to the 
consumer sector to acquire the means of support. Thus the consumer sector borrows to 
pay its wage bill, but can pay for its supply of equipment goods with the money 
received in payment from the workers of the equipment goods sector. The problem is 
thus solved arithmetically, since the initial finance borrowed by the capital goods sector 
to pay its wage bill passes through both sectors before returning to the equipment goods 
sector to allow it to repay its debt. Even this leaves the equipment goods sector without 
profit, so that no increase in the production of equipment can take place. The solution to 
the problem is that the capital goods sector is further subdivided so that each 
subdivision provides the profit for another until we reach the machine tools sector (Nell 
2004).  
A problem with this approach may be that in the real economy it is sometimes 
difficult to distinguish ‘capital goods’ and ‘consumer goods’ firms. Construction firms 
may build dwelling houses and factories; food manufacturers may supply supermarkets 
and plant canteens. Because of this the sequence of production is not as clear-cut as 
Nell suggests. Because of this we cannot be sure that money can always complete the 
double (or greater) circulation necessary to ensure that the consumer goods firms have 
their monetary surplus when their wage-bill loans come due. Thirdly Nell’s conception 
of the machine tools sector that ‘makes its own capital goods’ seems somewhat far-
fetched. It is unlikely that machine tools firms actually build their own factories! A 
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more plausible explanation is that consumer firms pay more than cost price to capital 
goods firms, so as to share the recycling of money across both consumer and capital 
goods sectors. 
We illustrate the dual circulation solution to profit flows in Figure 3.7. At Time 
0, a £100 loan has been paid to consumer goods firm F1, and a £10 loan to capital 
goods firm F2. A Time 1, it is assumed that the capital goods firm has paid out to its 
employees the full value of the loan. This shows up as an addition to the household 
deposits of Bank A. At Time 2, if Firm F1 has produced enough goods, then these 
households can purchase consumer goods transferring their deposits to those of Firm 
F1. At Time 3, Firm F1 uses this revenue to purchase capital goods when Firm F2 has 
finished their manufacture. At Time 4 Firm F1 has completed its output and sold the 
rest to its own employees. This allows both firms to repay all of their loans at Time 5.  
3.6.6 Other sources of cash surplus for firms 
Firms may have a cash surplus that fluctuates irrespective of profit flows. 
Circuit theorists in general ignore borrowing for speculative purposes and borrowing 
for consumption (including housing consumption) by wage-earners (Fontana 2000). 
However as we argued in Chapter 1, there is a potential real gain from such borrowing, 
so that it can fit into the triangular relationship. Clearly the uncertainty involved in 
speculation and the long timescale and discounting effects in the case of consumption 
lending mean that the expected income to repay such loans is even more fragile than 
that for production loans. And when speculative loans are being used to purchase 
existing assets rather than new ones, there is a strong risk of speculative bubbles 
developing, as values spiral upwards (Dow 1993). We will come back to this issue in 
the context of expectational failure in Chapter 6. Speculative borrowing and 
consumption borrowing are also important because they provide a source of additional 
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money receipts for firms, increasing their chances of making a money surplus. Other 
possible sources are zero sum transfers, so that other firms have cash deficits and so 
have persisting debt or enter bankruptcy or foreign currency earnings. 
3.7  Conclusion 
In this chapter we have looked at theories of money that have explicitly linked 
production and the creation of money in a comprehensive view of the system of 
monetary stocks and flows. The Post-Keynesian (PK) school emphasises the role of 
money in dealing with historical time and the uncertainty of the real economy. Changes 
in real economic activity determine the demand for bank loans and this drives the 
creation of credit-money. The main focus of PK monetary analysis is on the 
relationship between commercial banks and the central bank. Money is ‘endogenous’ 
because the central bank must generally respond to requests for base money to back the 
lending of commercial banks. There is some sense that the issue of ‘liquidity 
preference’, and how agents adjust their monetary balances may sometimes be in 
tension with this view. 
The Circulation Approach on the other hand, starts its analysis from a 
‘triangular relationship’ between banks, firms and suppliers of labour and resources to 
firms for production. The banks issue credit-money as payment from the firms to their 
suppliers. It is then, very specifically, the sale of the firms’ production for the money 
issued that allows firms to repay their debts and remain solvent. The analyses of 
deposit-holding and the role of the central bank are secondary to this ‘circuit’.  
Despite these different emphases, the PK and CA approaches are generally 
compatible in that they both see money creation as endogenous to the activity of the 
real economy  and particularly to the production activity of firms. They both emphasise 
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the importance of money in relation to time and uncertainty as irremovable features of 
the real economy. 
[M]oney endogeneity…is part and parcel of the 
production process…credit precedes production, while money 
is created in the process of production, as the entrepreneur 
draws down his or her bank account to pay wages or to 
purchase other raw materials (Rochon 1999, p5).  
Since initial finance generally comes from the creation of bank credit22, which 
in turn is associated with the formation of bank deposits, the connection between 
production and money is established. 
As long as banks are satisfied that they have an adequate probability of 
repayment and of receiving full interest payments (what is adequate will depend on 
their own profitability targets), they will issue loans on demand.  
[W]ith a contract in hand for delivery of goods in the 
future a business firm can obtain a loan…[The] advantage of 
relying on banks to provide business firms with working capital 
is that the amount of funds in circulation is a response to the 
level of economic activity’ (Eichner 1989, p809-810).  
Perhaps the most significant distinction between the two approaches lie in the stricter 
implicit definition of money in the CA. Since a bank is always involved in the 
triangular relationship, only banks can create money. There is also a difference in 
emphasis in terms of the interest rate. Whereas there is considerable Post-Keynesian 
emphasis on liquidity preference, the main focus of  the CA analysis is on the interest 
rate charged by banks for loans (Graziani 2003).  
In the rest of the chapter we analysed each aspect of monetary issues and flows 
using balance sheets, in which all financial elements consisted both of a liability and an 
asset, in contrast to the real asset of production. We showed how money issues and 
                                                 
22
 The initial finance (or a portion of it) for one firm in one circuit may have been saved from a previous 
circuit, but this is offset by the additional loan now required by the firm whose loan in that circuit created 
the money saved. 
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flows could at all times be matched by assets representing real production in progress 
or guarantees by the state.23 The links this creates to the features of these real agents in 
the system were described in detail.  
The issues of how monetary interest and profit flows can be accounted for in a 
system that respects of the monetary circuit were analysed and we showed that these 
could be consistently introduced as subsidiary monetary flows with in the aggregate 
circuit. The significance this has for income distribution was analysed according to the 
arguments of Graziani (2003) showing that by adjusting the sale price of their output 
firms can acquire a variable proportion of output. This analysis makes it clear that the 
limit to the acquisition by firms of a larger proportion of output by firms is not 
financial, but socioeconomic. 
At the beginning of this chapter we asked in which direction causation runs 
between money and production. It seems that the path from production to money is at 
least as important as the opposite direction. While production might be feasible without 
initial finance, and thus without giving rise to bank deposits; the acceptance of money 
in its modern form could not exist without its link to production. In the following 
chapter we will go beyond questions about the acceptance of money to analyse its 
specific valuation. We have argued that money gets its acceptability from production, 




                                                 
23
 We will argue in the next chapter that these guarantees can be seen to represent a form of ‘state 
production’. 
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Figure 3.1 Loan Issue 
 
Time 0 
         
Bank A     Firm F    
Liabilities Assets  Liabilities Assets 
Deposits (H) 0 Loans 0  Loans 0 Cash 0 
Deposits (F) 0 B of E Deposits   0  Capital 0 Deposits (A) 0 
Capital  0      Production 0 
         
         
         
Total 0  0 
 





Bank A     Firm F    
Liabilities Assets  Liabilities Assets 
Deposits (H) 0 Loans 100  Loans 100 Cash 0 
Deposits (F) 100 B of E Deposits   0  Capital  0 Deposits (A) 100 
Capital  0      Production 0 
         
         
         
Total 100  100 
 




Bank A     Firm F    
Liabilities Assets  Liabilities Assets 
Deposits (H) 100 Loans 100  Loans 100 Cash 0 
Deposits (F) 0 B of E Deposits   0  Capital  0 Deposits (A) 0 
Capital  0      Production (?) 
         
         
         
Total 100  100 
 
Total 100  (?) 
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Figure 3.2 Loan Repayment 
 
Time 0 
         
Bank A     Firm F    
Liabilities Assets  Liabilities Assets 
Deposits (H) 100 Loans 100  Loans 100 Cash 0 
Deposits (F) 0 B of E Deposits   0  Capital  0 Deposits (A) 0 
Capital  0      Production (?) 
         
         
         
Total 100  100 
 




Bank A     Firm F    
Liabilities Assets  Liabilities Assets 
Deposits (H) 0 Loans 100  Loans 100 Cash 0 
Deposits (F) 100 B of E Deposits   0  Capital  0 Deposits (A) 100 
Capital  0      Production 0 
         
         
         
Total 100  100 
 




Bank A     Firm F    
Liabilities Assets  Liabilities Assets 
Deposits (H) 0 Loans 0  Loans 0 Cash 0 
Deposits (F) 0 B of E Deposits   0  Capital  0 Deposits (A) 0 
Capital  0      Production 0 
         
         
         
Total 0  0 
 
Total 0  0 
 
 
Money and Production – A Pluralist Approach 
106 
Figure 3.3 Deposit Holding and Bond Sale by Firms 
 
Time 0 
         
Bank A     Firm F    
Liabilities Assets  Liabilities Assets 
Deposits (H) 50 Loans 50  Loans 50 Cash 0 
Deposits (F) 0 B of E Deposits   0  Bonds 0 Deposits (A) 0 
Capital  0    Capital 0 Production ? 
         
         
         
Total 50  50 
 




Bank A     Firm F    
Liabilities Assets  Liabilities Assets 
Deposits (H) 0 Loans 50  Loans 50 Cash 0 
Deposits (F) 50 B of E Deposits   0  Bonds 50 Deposits (A) 50 
Capital  0    Capital  0 Production (?) 
         
         
         
Total 50  50 
 




Bank A     Firm F    
Liabilities Assets  Liabilities Assets 
Deposits (H) 0 Loans 0  Loans 0 Cash 0 
Deposits (F) 0 B of E Deposits   0  Bonds 50 Deposits (A) 0 
Capital  0    Capital  0 Production (?) 
         
         
         
Total 0  0 
 
Total 50  (?) 
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Figure 3.4 Creation of Central Bank Money 
 
Time 0 
         
Bank A     Firm F    
Liabilities Assets  Liabilities Assets 
Deposits (H) 50 Loans 50  Loans 50 Cash 0 
Deposits (F) 0 B of E Deposits   0  Capital 0 Deposits (A) 0 
Capital 0      Production (?) 
         
         
         
Total 50  50 
 





Bank A     Firm F    
Liabilities Assets  Liabilities Assets 
Deposits (H) 50 Loans 50  Loans 50 Cash 0 
Deposits (F) 50 B of E Deposits   50  Capital 0 Deposits (A) 50 
Capital 0      Production 0 
         
         
         
Total 100  100 
 




Bank A     Firm F    
Liabilities Assets  Liabilities Assets 
Deposits (H) 50 Loans 0  Loans 0 Cash 0 
Deposits (F) 0 B of E Deposits   50  Capital 0 Deposits (A) 0 
Capital 0      Production 0 
         
         
         
Total 50  50 
 
Total 0  0 




Figure 3.5 Consequence of Loan Default 
 
Time 0 
         
Bank A     Firm F    
Liabilities Assets  Liabilities Assets 
Deposits (H) 50 Loans 50  Loans 50 Cash 0 
Deposits (F) 0 B of E Deposits   60  Capital  0 Deposits (A) 0 
Capital  60      Production (?) 
         
         
         
Total 110  110 
 




Bank A     Firm F    
Liabilities Assets  Liabilities Assets 
Deposits (H) 50 Loans 0  Loans 50 Cash 0 
Deposits (F) 0 Corporate Bonds 0  Bonds 0 Deposits (A) 0 
Capital  10 Treasury Bonds 60  Capital  0 Production (?) 
  Equities 0      
  Cash 0      
  B of E Deposits   0      
Total 60  60 
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Figure 3.6 Interest Payment and Circulation 
 
Time 0 
         
Bank A     Firm F    
Liabilities Assets  Liabilities Assets 
Deposits (H) 0 Loans 100  Loans 100 Cash 0 
Deposits (F) 100 B of E Deposits   0  Capital 0 Deposits (A) 100 
Capital 0      Production 0 
         
         
         
Total 100  100 
 





Bank A     Firm F    
Liabilities Assets  Liabilities Assets 
Deposits (H) 10 Loans 100  Loans 100 Cash 0 
Deposits (F) 90 B of E Deposits   0  Capital 0 Deposits (A) 90 
Capital 0    Bonds 0 Production (?) 
         
         
         
Total 100  100 
 




Bank A     Firm F    
Liabilities Assets  Liabilities Assets 
Deposits (H) 0 Loans 100  Loans 100 Cash 0 
Deposits (F) 100 B of E Deposits   0  Capital 0 Deposits (A) 100 
Capital 0    Bonds 0 Production  (?) 
         
         
         
Total 100  100 
 
Total 100  (?) 
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Figure 3.7 Profits 
 
Time 0 
Bank A     Firm F1     Firm F2    
Liabilities Assets  Liabilities Assets  Liabilities Assets 
Deposits (H) 0 Loans (F1) 100  Loans 100 Cash 0  Loans 10 Cash 0 
Deposits (F1) 100 Loans (F2) 10  Capital 0 Deposits (A) 100  Capital 0 Deposits (A) 10 
Deposits (F2) 10 B of E Deposits   0    Production 0    Production 0 
Capital 0             
              
              
Total 110  110 
 
Total 100  100 
 





Bank A     Firm F1     Firm F2    
Liabilities Assets  Liabilities Assets  Liabilities Assets 
Deposits (H) 10 Loans (F1) 100  Loans 100 Cash 0  Loans 10 Cash 0 
Deposits (F1) 0 Loans (F2) 10  Capital 0 Deposits (A) 100  Capital 0 Deposits (A) 0 
Deposits (F2) 100 B of E Deposits   0    Production (?)    Production (?) 
Capital 0             
              
              
Total 110  110 
 
Total 100  (?) 
 




Bank A     Firm F1     Firm F2    
Liabilities Assets  Liabilities Assets  Liabilities Assets 
Deposits (H) 0 Loans (F1) 100  Loans 100 Cash 0  Loans 10 Cash 0 
Deposits (F1) 110 Loans (F2) 10  Capital 10 Deposits (A) 110  Capital 0 Deposits (A) 0 
Deposits (F2) 0 B of E Deposits   0    Production ?    Production ? 
Capital 0             
              
              
Total 110  110 
 
Total 110  (?) 
 
Total 10  (?) 
 




Bank A     Firm F1     Firm F2    
Liabilities Assets  Liabilities Assets  Liabilities Assets 
Deposits (H) 100 Loans (F1) 100  Loans 100 Cash 0  Loans 10 Cash 0 
Deposits (F1) 0 Loans (F2) 10  Capital 0 Deposits (A) 0  Capital 0 Deposits (A) 10 
Deposits (F2) 0 B of E Deposits   0    Production (?)      
Capital 0             
              
              
Total 110  110 
 
Total 100  (?) 
 




Bank A     Firm F1     Firm F2    
Liabilities Assets  Liabilities Assets  Liabilities Assets 
Deposits (H) 0 Loans (F1) 100  Loans 100 Cash 0  Loans 10 Cash 0 
Deposits (F1) 100 Loans (F2) 10  Capital 0 Deposits (A) 100  Capital 0 Deposits (A) 10 
Deposits (F2) 10 B of E Deposits   0           
Capital 0             
              
              
Total 110  110 
 
Total 0  100 
 




Bank A     Firm F1     Firm F2    
Liabilities Assets  Liabilities Assets  Liabilities Assets 
Deposits (H) 0 Loans (F1) 0  Loans 0 Cash 0  Loans 0 Cash 0 
Deposits (F1) 0 Loans (F2) 0  Capital 0 Deposits (A) 0  Capital 0 Deposits (A) 0 
Deposits (F2) 0 B of E Deposits   0           
Capital 0             
              
              
Total 0  0 
 
Total 0  0 
 







Chapter 4. The Valuation of Money 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters we have described a monetary theory of production in 
which tokens of debt are accepted in a triangular contractual and institutional 
arrangement. This evolves to allow production to take place when this involves a time 
delay and thus a degree of uncertainty between the input of labour and/or capital goods 
and the availability of outputs. We have shown how these arrangements and their 
corollaries in the payment of monetary interest and the earning of monetary profits can 
have real consequences for the transfer of goods and services, while the tokens issued 
add no net value in themselves since financial assets are always matched by financial 
liabilities. 
We pointed out, in terms of an equilibrium model in Chapter 2, and a balance-
sheet approach in Chapter 3 that the acceptability of the debt token issued could be 
significantly increased if its circulation was enabled by some form of ‘bundling’ of debt 
tokens so that they were no longer dependent on the output of any particular firm. In 
other words their acceptability and circulation were enhanced because these tokens 
represented general purchasing power. This required either that all tokens be issued by 
a single commercial bank or that all banks were linked through a central bank by the 
use of a ‘base’ money, in which form commercial banks could net out discrepancies 
between inflows and outflows of each others’ issued money. 
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Our balance sheet description was deficient however. For simplicity of 
illustration it only showed one bank and one firm. In this case, although we showed 
balance sheets using monetary values, we could equally well have used real outputs of 
the single firm. Thus we had no need to explain how the numerical value of money 
relates to quantities of real goods and services when this relationship must encompass 
all households, all firms, all banks and the state and central bank in a modern economy. 
This omission we now intend to rectify. 
We will argue that convention and legal tender laws are not adequate to explain 
the particular value that a money holds, and use the arguments of the ‘Real Bills’ 
debate to support our contention that real physical value is the most appropriate 
measure of the value of money. We will briefly examine an unusual view of money’s 
valuation, owing to Heinsohn and Steiger (2006), that suggests that the value of money 
is backed by ‘burdened’ pre-existing property. We reject the idea that this is of 
importance in valuing money, primarily because it does not explain how new 
production is valued. We also reject the ‘Chartalist’ view that money’s value is always 
given by the state’s demand for it as taxation, because this is to confuse acceptability 
with valuation. In any case, this doesn’t tally with the fact that such a small proportion 
of money in a modern economy is state-issued. Our argument is that the true valuation 
of money is to be found in the creation of a money of account in the triangular 
production contract. 
4.2 ‘Fiat’ Money 
‘Fiat money’ is an object that has no intrinsic value and 
is not convertible into anything. Acceptance of such money is 
entirely discretionary and based exclusively on the expectation 
that others would accept it too even although no one else is 
forced to accept it (Goldberg 2005, p957).  
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The first task is to exclude the possibility that there is no such relationship; that 
money does no represent a true claim to anything of value. If this were so, then its value 
is based exclusively on the expectation that others would accept it for some quantity of 
goods. These others have no other basis for valuing it either and so on. We have argued 
against such a faith-based reason for the acceptance of money in Chapter 2 and it seems 
even more self-evident that the valuation of money falls at the same hurdles of failing 
to get started, and of failing to get restarted should any crisis of faith occur. That there 
have been such crises, and that money’s valuation has been resurrected is evident. 
Examples would include Germany in the 1930s, Russia in the 1990s and Argentina in 
the 2000s. 
As it turns out the claims of such money actually existing, even without the 
limited status of legal tender, are based on misapprehensions. Goldberg reviews the 
empirical evidence and convincingly shows that this can be discounted. He finds that 
all of the apparent examples given of such moneys had considerable physical, legal or 
cultural value. An example of this is the story of the Stone Money of Yap, which has 
been quoted by several economists, including Keynes (1971[1930]). Goldberg reports 
that the stones were unique and had been transported from distant islands, being found 
by the islanders to have a high aesthetic value as well as religious significance. They 
were also acceptable for tax payments to the island chiefs and the German colonial 
regime and for other special payments at wedding festivals and funerals (Goldberg 
2005, p 960). There is also doubt about a famous story concerning a lost stone, the 
verbal claim to which was alleged to have retained purchasing power. Other apparent 
examples of ‘fiat money’, such as the wampum shells used by Native Americans, 
actually had some intrinsic valuation of the items used, or they were not in fact used as 
media of exchange (Goldberg 2005). 
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Whereas Goldberg argues that fiat money has not existed, Sproul (1998) argues 
that fiat money cannot exist since the whole value of fiat money is seignorage, and 
seniorage must always be driven to zero as rival bankers compete away the profits they 
make from issuing credits. To be valued, fiat money must be limited in supply.  But if 
there is a benefit to issuing money in terms of seniorage this must be competed away by 
rival private banks. 
4.2.1 Legal Tender 
It has been suggested that ‘legal tender’ laws ensure that money is accepted, but 
legal tender laws in modern democracies apply only to contracts that have been 
previously specified in the relevant currency.  
All Federal Reserve notes and US coins are legal 
tender for all dollar-denominated obligations, including debts 
and taxes. This means that contractual creditors, all tax 
authorities and all courts (federal, state and local) cannot reject 
a payment made in these objects. Almost all banks (national 
banks and members of the Federal Reserve system) must 
accept all Federal Reserve notes in all transactions. Anyone 
else can reject these notes and coins in any other transaction 
(Goldberg 2008a, p33). 
This implies that were there to be any doubt about the acceptability and value of 
this currency, it is unlikely that such a contract would exist in the first place.  
4.3 ‘Real Bills’ 
A strong series of arguments supporting our contention that production must be 
the source of valuation is to be found in the debate over the importance of real bills in 
maintaining the value of money. These arguments are often displayed against the 
quantity theory. The ‘real bills doctrine’ (RBD) holds that money issued in exchange 
for sufficient security (traditionally short-term commercial bills, but in general any 
reasonably secure financial asset) will not cause inflation (Sproul 1998). The issue is 
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whether it is simply the absolute quantity of money in the economy that is important, or 
whether it is the relationship between money issue and the creation of ‘real bills’, that 
determines the behaviour of the real economy. Under the RBD, if the issue of credit-
money is backed by such assets then the value of money is not affected. In opposition 
to this, the quantity theory suggests that an increase in the quantity of money is always 
likely to be inflationary, unless matched by an equivalent overall increase in economic 
activity. 
This raises the following questions: 
Why does the Federal Reserve (and every other central 
bank) bother to hold gold and financial securities if the dollar 
(and other currencies) does not get its value from backing?  
How could fiat money ever come into circulation in the first 
place?  Why issue dollars through an expensive central bank 
instead of just printing them and spending them? (Sproul 1998, 
p9). 
The answer is that it is this backing that gives money its acceptability and valuation, 
and that without considering this, the quantity of money on its own tells us nothing. The 
acceptability and value of derivative monies depend in turn on their own backing rather 
than on absolute convertibility. No money can be issued without backing, and the value 
of money issued by banks depends only on its ratio of assets to liabilities (Sproul 1998).  
While so-called ‘fiat’ money is inconvertible into gold or other real assets it is in fact 
nonetheless backed. 
Economists have been too quick to accept the idea that 
what we call ‘fiat money’ is actually unbacked, since it is 
possible for money to be inconvertible yet still backed (Sproul 
1998, p2).  
Central banks (and presumably commercial banks also) hold assets against the money 
they issue and no money is ever issued except in exchange for valuable assets.  
Chapter 4 – The Valuation of Money 
117 
To illustrate the importance of backing over convertibility Sproul (1998) 
describes a bank that has issued 100 credits (each equivalent to 1oz. of gold) after 
taking 100oz of gold on deposit. He claims that if this bank then issued 100 credits in 
exchange for IOUs with a current market rate of 100oz of gold, since there are now 200 
credits with a claim to assets worth 200oz of gold each credit is still worth 1oz. of gold 
– and this process could continue indefinitely without altering the value of the issued 
credits - as long as credits are only issued to those who offer resources with the 
appropriate value. Thus if we have a £100,000 deposit with the Royal Bank of 
Scotland, it is backed by assets that the bank holds; for example: commercial paper, 
loan portfolios, foreign currency, central bank reserves and cash.  But we cannot go to 
the Royal Bank of Scotland and demand that they convert our deposit into any of these 
assets automatically, except for intrinsically worthless banknotes.  
While all this is true, there must surely be some sort of indirect convertibility 
across the balance sheet. There must be some connection between what is providing the 
backing for money and what money is ultimately convertible into. In Sproul’s example 
it seems that a credit for gold does not have exactly equal value to gold itself unless 
either: 
1. Gold can be obtained from the bank issuing the credit at any time; or 
2. Gold can be obtained from some other source on presentation of the 
credit. 
Gold is a real substance and its demand depends (at least in part) on individuals’ 
demand for its intrinsic qualities. This distinguishes it from circulating credits for gold 
that cannot be converted into it. Given a balance between those that value gold for its 
intrinsic properties, and those that value it only in exchange it may be that these credits 
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have some average value, but this average value will not hold at all times. Prices 
denominated in these credits may vary from transaction to transaction since they are not 
money prices, but are relative prices between gold and the goods and services 
exchanged. 
Another issue to be considered when looking at the pure ‘Real Bills’ doctrine is 
that the securities backing money issue have to be claims that are going to be exercised 
in a relevant time-frame, such that it is a realistic option for holders of money to 
purchase what it is a claim on. This is particularly relevant when we consider household 
and speculative lending. In the former case, when money is issued it is ultimately on the 
basis of a claim on future household labour; in the latter case it is a claim on some asset 
that is expected to have a greater real value in the future than it does now. Neither of 
these claims are exercisable within the normal transactions of households and firms, so 
unless there is a matching increase in deposit holding, inflation may well be the result. 
Apart from these caveats, there are two main lines of argument that have been 
used against the RBD. One is a historical argument based on its purported role in 
propagating the effects of the Great Depression; the other that it leads to dynamic 
instability of prices. 
4.3.1 The Real Bills Doctrine and the Great Depression 
Timberlake (2007) believes that the adherence of the leadership of the Federal 
Reserve to the RBD between 1929 and 1933 led to at least some of the problems of the 
Great Depression, as the negative aspects of this doctrine led to the discouragement of 
money issued on the basis of the long term loans, mortgages, government bonds and, in 
particular, speculative loans. It seems that this unwillingness to extend credits spread 
from speculative lending to what would normally be considered as eligible real bills. It 
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is claimed that it was this reluctance rather than adherence to the gold standard1 that 
was responsible for the ‘Great Contraction’ of 1930. But can a gold standard really be a 
final arbiter of monetary value? 
The Role of a Gold Standard 
Bernanke (1995) summarises a monetary gold standard using the following 
equation: 
1 ( 1/ ) ( / ) ( / )M M BASE BASE RES RES GOLD PGOLD QGOLD= × × × × , (4.1) 
where  M1 = Quantity of Bank Deposits and Currency in circulation, 
 BASE = Quantity of Currency and Reserve Deposits, 
 RES = Central Bank Reserves of Foreign Currency and Gold, 
 GOLD = Official Value of Gold Reserves of Central Bank, 
 PGOLD = Official Legally-Fixed domestic-currency price of gold, 
 QGOLD = Physical Quantity of Fine Gold in Central Bank Vaults. 
The M1/BASE ratio is the Money Multiplier, which is a decreasing function of the 
currency-deposit ratio chosen by the public and the reserve-deposit ratio chosen by 
commercial banks. This ratio was around four in the Great Depression era, and is in the 
modern era usually greater than 20. The BASE/RES ratio is the inverse of the gold 
backing ratio, which has usually been set as a statutory maximum. It was usually 
greater than one because central banks could also hold domestic assets against base 
money. RES/GOLD is the ratio of international reserves to gold. Foreign exchange 
(convertible into gold with foreign central banks) is also counted as reserves, so this 
                                                 
1
 The gold standard has been indicted as a major cause of the Great Contraction by Bernanke (1995) and 
Eichengreen (1992), among others. 
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ratio is also greater then one. This analysis makes it clear that the gold standard has 
never implied 100% gold backing for money in circulation. 
Bernanke argues that the effect of the gold standard is in fact mediated through 
demand for currency by domestic money-holders and by foreign-exchange 
requirements as goods are imported from abroad. Fears of bank default and devaluation 
of currencies lead to falls in the M1/BASE and RES/GOLD ratios as individuals 
demand more secure assets. A gold standard in this situation is actually compatible with 
multiple values of the money supply, depending in the level of confidence in the 
banking and foreign exchange systems.  
Something like a ‘Real Bills’ regime, would in this case give some guidance to 
how the central bank and the commercial banks should expand BASE/RES and 
M1/BASE respectively where appropriate loans/commercial securities can be obtained. 
Timberlake’s point is that a gold standard and a prudent BASE/RES ratio places 
downward/upward limits to the reserves commercial banks wish to hold and so corrects 
excessive/inadequate lending. Sproul denies that this is required to prevent loans 
secured by a given money value of assets creating a self-perpetuating cycle of more 
money and more inflation. He argues that the initial issue of money, if on sufficient 
security, would not cause inflation. He may however have overlooked the possibility 
that fluctuations in the value of assets may arise from other than monetary sources, of 
which more in Chapter 6. 
Historical episodes of inflation attributed to the real bills principle are in fact 
usually due to the unconstrained monetisation of government debt (i.e.: the creation of 
money by the central bank in exchange for its holding of Treasury Bills). In the 1929-
32 period the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) did not conform to the RBD because it 
frequently refused to discount any bills from banks, real or otherwise. This was 
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probably an overreaction to the previous years in which the FRB violated the RBD in 
the opposite direction by discounting not just real bills but government debt also 
(Hortland 2006). 
Dynamic Instability of the Real Bills Doctrine 
Timberlake (2007) argues that if the basis for the creation of money were 
currency-denominated assets on the other side of the balance-sheet of banks then 
instability would be the result. Only gold (or some other commodity with constant real 
value) can be used as a standard. This sets the number of pounds/dollars for a quantity 
of fine gold in constant legal terms, whereas monetisation of real bills cannot be done 
on fixed terms and so depends critically on the optimism or pessimism of bankers. 
Over-optimism results in too much money in relation to real value; excessive 
pessimism results in too little. The inflation or deflation that results affects the value of 
the ‘real’ collateral. If so the likelihood is that the value of the money issued against 
collateral will fall/rise further. This situation is thus dynamically unstable with prices 
moving up or down unchecked.  
Timberlake’s argument is that some sort of anchor, such as the gold standard 
must be present. In this case, if bankers are unduly pessimistic and issue ‘too little 
money’ in exchange for collateral then bankers’ reserves of gold will be not be drawn 
upon and this will moderate their pessimism. In reverse, if bankers are excessively 
optimistic and issue ‘too much money’ in exchange for collateral then bankers’ reserves 
of gold will fall, reducing their ability to lend 
In fact, if more money enters circulation it is because more has been demanded 
to execute trades. Thus for the quantity equation MV = PT, both M and T have risen 
roughly proportionately, so as long as payment technology and thus velocity remains 
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unchanged P will be more or less constant. The dynamic instability critique, in that it 
has any viability, must then also apply to any system that has a degree of flexibility of 
money issue. The only monetary system to which it would not apply is one with a rigid, 
centrally controlled money.  
From the discussion of the RBD we are left with the impression that something 
of physical value is the most likely source of money’s value; that it need not be 
something that can immediately be brought to hand, but may be something that is 
promised if this can be given a reasonably reliable monetary value. In the next two 
sections we consider property and taxation in this role. 
4.4 Burdening and Encumbering 
The German economists Gunnar Heinsohn and Otto Steiger take the view that 
the creation of money is ‘property-induced’. Money is created by the holders of 
property - in issuing it, their property is ‘burdened’ and so in some sense loses part of 
its value, this loss being compensated for by the payment of interest. It is this property 
that provides the reliable value backing money. The burdening of the property allows 
the ‘creditor’ who uses the notes in a credit transaction to back the note issue and their 
circulation as insurance against un-repaid loans. 
Money’s capacity to finally settle contracts, i.e.: the 
transfer of property in sales or its redemption in dissolving 
credit is due to its being a claim to property of its issuer’ 
(Heinsohn and Steiger 2006, p492). 
 If we refer back to our hostage model in Chapter 2, the banker’s token is issued 
on the basis of the banker’s ability to enforce the production contract between A and B 
by ensuring the acceptance of tokens for labour and subsequently for goods. Only if his 
enforcement powers are in doubt would he need to offer a claim on property  
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The issuer’s property titles together with the debtor’s 
are the first to be denominated in the money of account, the 
standard set by the creditor (Heinsohn and Steiger 2006, p502). 
Heinsohn and Steiger do not make it clear why the liabilities of a bank 
(deposits) are money, whereas the liabilities of firms and households (loans) are not, 
even although both are issued against property (‘burdening’ in the case of a bank and 
‘encumbering’ in the case of the firm or household (Läufer 1998). This suggests that it 
is something other than property pledging that distinguishes between money and other 
financial liabilities. 
4.5 Money and the State  
An important argument for the acceptability and valuation of money is based on 
the role of the state. For Wray (2003) the state exerts its sovereignty by imposing a tax 
liability on the non-state sector and in this way it is different from any other agent that 
issues liabilities, because it uses its sovereign power to impose them. All modern states 
rely heavily on a monetary system, first imposing taxes to create a demand for the 
currency, then issuing the currency to buy desired resources. It is the sovereign power 
of governments that allows them to issue currency and reserves that are demanded 
domestically and abroad. Without the U.S. Treasury’s sovereign power to impose dollar 
taxes the world demand for dollars would ‘wither away’.  
In a nation that operates with a fiat money on a floating 
exchange rate, treasury debt is really nothing more than 
reserves that pay interest… This really cannot be called a 
borrowing operation – it makes no sense to argue that a 
government operating in such a system needs to ‘borrow’ its 
own liabilities in order to deficit spend (Wray 2003, p96). 
Goldberg’s (2008a, 2008b) conclusion too, is that it is the commitment of 
governments to accept in payment of taxes the currency they issue, that ensures its 
acceptability. However he also points out that there has to be a tax burden high enough 
and a collection system, with adequate penalties, efficient enough to match the quantity 
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of currency in circulation. These arguments do not directly address the issue of deposit 
money created by commercial banks. But since all “non-tangible” deposit money ‘is 
convertible… into currency it is sufficient to discuss the legal status of currency… and 
convertibility’ (Goldberg 2008b, p7). 
4.5.1 The State as Producer 
Wray does not accept that government is the producer of goods and services for 
which taxes are the payment, arguing instead that they are consistently very large net 
consumers of private sector output. He also argues that taxes are ‘not voluntary at the 
individual level’. This leads him to the rather circular statement that 
In all modern states, one eliminates one’s tax liability 
by delivering the state’s own liability – what we have been 
calling fiat money – at state pay offices. Why does one accept 
the state’s liability? Because one is indebted to the state as a 
result of imposition of tax liabilities, and the state agrees to 
accept its own liabilities in retirement of the tax liabilities it 
imposes as a result of its sovereignty (Wray 2003, p90). 
In our view though, although the unit of account is named by the state with tax 
liabilities imposed in it and liabilities denominated in it, money as purchasing power for 
commodities produced in the non-state sector is valued as a result of the ‘effort’ 
involved in obtaining it, in the form of the labour services or commodities provided in 
exchange for it. For the individual, there is no distinction between state and bank 
money, so the effort required depends more on the ‘effort’ required in the non-state 
sector. Of course the tax burden increases as income increases, but it seems improbable 
that the value of money should change according to the tax burden.  
Wray’s view leads him to argue to argue that government deficits do not require 
the Treasury to borrow by selling new issue, but these only require the central bank and 
Treasury to drain excess reserves to avoid downward pressure on overnight interest 
rates. In the short run the central bank provides reserves through open market 
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purchases; in the long run the Treasury retires outstanding debt. Running a sustained 
deficit creates excess reserves, which for the banks are more profitably converted into 
interest-paying treasury debt. This means that there is little problem selling the debt 
when the treasury desires to do so. The U.S. government can also purchase goods from 
abroad ‘for nothing’ by issuing dollar reserves that eventually find their way into the 
central bank of the foreign country. He believes that this is also true when a sovereign 
state imposes a tax liability and then it issues the currency used by those of tax 
liabilities to meet the obligation (Wray 2003). But in fact demand for US goods, 
services and assets would persist – and these all require to be paid for in dollars. 
In fact, if U.S. government purchases a good with money that it issues and does 
not use that good to increase its ‘value” to the U.S. taxpayer various things may happen 
1. The increased taxes with the same level of government services 
decreases satisfaction with this government in particular and 
government in general. 
2. An increased quantity of money in the economy for the same quantity 
of new goods ceteris paribus reduces the value of money.  If there is 
no change in taxation rates this may offset government expenditure. 
3. The government issues bonds to mop up extra money, so has to pay 
interest on this. 
So Wray’s view is true only if the government provides value to match the increased 
government expenditure. There is no ‘default risk’ because such a government will 
always be able to pay interest and retire principal by crediting banking system reserves 
(Wray 2003, p96). Yet this is in potential contradiction with the importance of the 
relative quantity of the tax burden to currency, and it suggests that money is primarily a 
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creature of the state where the team production/hostage model suggests a plausible 
private origin, and support, and could thus survive a zero-tax regime. Moreover, it is 
clear that otherwise the value of money becomes tied up the efficiency of tax collection 
and the penalties applied, since even a government cannot pay for its purchase of goods 
and services by simply letting its own IOUs circulate within the economy. The 
purchasing power of any money it issues can only result from economic activity. There 
must be a mechanism that associates the numerical token with the real sector’s 
production (Rossi 1999).  
This view that the government must back its money with something of value is 
to some extent supported by Mehrling (2000), who argues that state money is not a fiat 
outside money as Wray’s view would suggest, but an inside credit money that is a 
liability of the central bank. He accepts that the power to tax is important, but the extent 
to which governments may be able to expand their purchases with newly issued money 
depends on available ‘unused taxing authority’ arising from its legitimate authority 
passed to it from private civil society as part of the democratic process. Therefore the 
power to tax is not the source of money’s value. Moreover, while the state borrows at 
the lowest rate interest, because it has the lowest risk of default, its debt must still 
compete with privately issued debt, to which a risk premium has been added. What is 
more important is that the state is the one entity with which every economic agent does 
‘ongoing business’. It is this, rather than the power to tax, that makes the government 
ideally placed to be the issuer of the ultimate domestic money (Mehrling 2000, p403). 
We would argue that more than simply ongoing business is required to give state 
money value; something of value must lie on the other side of the balance sheet from 
the central bank’s money deposits. 
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We can identify the flaw in Wray’s argument as being that he ignores the 
relationship between central bank money reserves and circulating commercial bank 
money. Wray seems to envisage that the government could make additional 
expenditure without providing additional value recognized by its tax payers. To the 
extent the government did not wish to or could not increase taxation on political 
grounds and/or to avoid inflation the government could issue additional government 
securities to mop up the excess reserves - but this would have an effect simply on the 
asset side of the banks’ balance sheets, allowing them to exchange non-interest bearing 
central-bank money for interest bearing Treasury Bills, which they would of course 
willingly do. Yet there would be no change on the liability side of the balance sheets, 
the amount of deposits held by the public and firms would remain unchanged. To 
reduce the available purchasing power in the economy, the Treasury must sell securities 
directly to the public, almost certainly requiring an increased interest rate at a cost to 
the Treasury; so it would pay in this way.  
While autocratic regimes may enforce the use of their own currency by coercion 
with legal tender laws and penalties for non-payment of taxes, regimes based on greater 
or lesser degrees of consent must also induce their citizens to use their currency by 
providing services demanded by them. In this sense state money is in part supported by 
state production.2 
So none of legal tender laws, property encumbrance and taxation by the state 
appear to account for the valuation of money. We turn now to valuation that arises 
within the triangular production contract, essentially a generalisation of the ‘Real Bills’ 
concept to encompass any output for which a monetary value can be negotiated. This 
generalisation requires the introduction of the concept of a ‘Money of Account’. 
                                                 
2
 In a modern multi-bank economy state money is also demanded because of its role in the settlement of 
interbank transfers. 
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4.6 Money of Account  
4.6.1 Money of Account as ‘logically anterior’ 
The triangular relationship that creates money endogenously to the production 
process can, unlike pure exchange processes, produce an abstract measure of value to 
which any specific media of exchange must conform to. This is argued by Keynes in 
the Treatise on Money.  
Money of account, namely that in which debts and 
prices and general purchasing power are expressed, is the 
primary concept of a theory of money’, and such money 
‘comes into existence along with debts and price lists in the 
monetary theory of production (Keynes 1971[1930], p3).  
Ingham (2004, 2006) builds on Keynes’s arguments, stating that an abstract 
money of account must be logically anterior to money’s specific forms and functions. 
Indeed it is where the ‘quality of moneyness’ is to be found, and this quality is to be ‘a 
pure symbol of abstract value measured by its own scale’ (Ingham 2006, p275). Money 
of account has no single empirical object as medium of exchange; currency, bank 
deposits, and banker’s reserve deposits all fulfil this role in the modern monetary 
economy. 
4.6.2 Money of Account in exchange 
There is in fact no possibility that a multitude of barter exchanges driven by 
individual subjective preferences could produce an agreed set of single prices for all 
goods. The numeraire of money, supposedly arising in multilateral exchange, ‘is simply 
posited as the arbitrary assignment of a commodity with an already established value as 
a standard’ (Ingham 2004, p34). This false view of money arises from the neoclassical 
idea that money is a commodity and therefore accords to the rules of supply and 
demand; that its acquisition and disposal is determined by the marginal utility of 
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individuals and that there is a stock of money that circulates with a (theoretically) 
measurable velocity (Ingham 2004). 
The exchange prices for commodities will in fact differ according to the 
preferences of individuals. While it is true that when some goods are regularly traded as 
intermediate goods rather than goods for final consumption and there will be a tendency 
for these to be valued according to some average of the expected exchange ratios for 
desired goods, this does not come close to a single fixed price in a standard unit. Since 
100 goods could possibly yield 4,950 exchange rates, a genuine market in which 
demand and supply are equated must presuppose the existence of a money of account 
in which prices can be quoted (Ingham 2004). 
The value of money is thus not derived directly from a commodity or 
commodity standard, but is a claim against goods and is abstract purchasing power. 
‘[The] value of all money is its value as credit denominated in an abstract money of 
account’ (Ingham 2004, p88). This credit is ultimately discharged by payment of the 
claim in consumer goods. This does not mean that the value of money can be reduced 
to the value of goods, in any except the equilibrium end-state of orthodox economic 
theory. In fact its value at any particular time must result only from a temporary 
balance of economic power. 
Money is itself a social relation; that is to say, money is a claim or credit that is 
constituted by social relations. Regardless of form, money is a provisional promise to 
pay, and the possessor of money is owed goods. But money represents a claim or debt 
against the issuer, so must be capable of cancelling any debt against the issuer. An IOU 
in a bilateral transaction is not money because money as debt must be transferable and 
denominated in the abstract unit of account, and we have seen in Chapter 2 how the 
bundling of debt into generalised purchasing power makes this possible The origin of 
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the power of money is in the promise between the issuer and user of the money in an 
enforceable claim or credit. This enforceability requires an authority, which maintains 
the unit of account within its sphere of control (Ingham 2004, 2006). 
4.6.3 Logic and History 
There is a logical issue too, in teasing out the distinction between the money of 
account, and the objects that transmit actual value. Does the money of account as the 
measure of value have to be, itself, valuable? It seems common sense, perhaps, that it 
must. Yet the metre is not long (or short). Being an abstract idea, it has no dimensions. 
Neither do the pound sterling, the euro or the dollar as units of account have value in 
themselves. Only when they are units in the reckoning of a bundle of notes or a bank 
deposit, is there real value present because these can be exchanged for goods and 
services.3 
The historical record suggests that money arose initially as ‘money of account’, 
before it became materialized into forms such as notes and coin, and that even then 
there was often divergence between the units in which prices and contracts were 
delineated and commodities by which debts were discharged (Tymoigne and Wray 
2006, Ingham 2004). The authority backing all money issue, not just that issued by 
itself, by upholding debts contracted in the money of account, was usually the authority 
in the relevant geographical jurisdiction in the form of the local ruler. This might be 
expected. Power over the money of account of the region also gives the ability to 
acquire goods and services from the citizens at a return fair to the extent that protection, 
justice (including enforcement of contracts) and other services are provided by the 
state. How fair that return is depends on the prices offered by the state for the goods 
and services of its citizens in relation to the taxes it imposes in its currency. 
                                                 
3
 See the discussion in Ingham (2006). 
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4.6.4 Money of Account and the triangular contract 
Single Firm Case 
When the claim to goods that is money is issued, negotiations take place 
between the firm and the worker. Because the worker prefers to receive wages in the 
form of claims that are valid not just for his own firm’s output but for that of other 
firms as well, the issuing firm must produce these claims in a way that allow the 
workers to be able to asses their value against all available output. The issuing firm is 
not directly concerned with how much of other firms’ output they are issuing claims 
for, but they must anticipate the earnings of their own output. To break even the firm 
must pay out a nominal wage bill that it can anticipate receiving when it sells its output. 
Why are the claims to firms’ output not simply denominated in real goods (even 
if these are real goods yet to be produced)? Firstly, because general claims are more 
liquid, more acceptable and so have a lower cost for firms to issue (see section 2.4.3). 
Secondly, banks denominate loans in the money of account so as to determine what 
represents repayment of the loan, otherwise they would be faced with an endless list of 
quantitative claims which would have to take account of multiple different relative 
valuations of real goods. Since purchasing power is general, firms require value set 
against both inputs and output so that the firm can be sure that it can as a minimum 
repay its loan. This automatically provides a relative valuation of output and inputs and 
determines the firm’s share of output (Graziani 2003). 
For money valuations each transaction is one real good against a claim on an 
almost infinite number of other goods. It is impossible to see how an individual could 
calculate this. So what happens initially is that the bank issues a claim on goods in 
arbitrary units, but the price is set in advance so these arbitrary units represent a known 
quantity of real goods. When additional firms enter the monetary economy, it becomes 
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possible for workers to compare their wage numerically with that of others since they 
can claim other firms’ output goods and other firms’ workers can claim that of their 
firm. 
Multi- Firm Case 
When there are many firms the wage just becomes a number; there are so many 
possible purchase choices it can longer be directly compared with goods it can buy, but 
only with other wage numbers. This necessitates some form of price index to determine 
some ‘real’ value of money. How this price index is calculated introduces another layer 
of uncertainty into relative value calculations. The net effect is to put firms in charge; 
they can manipulate prices and wages (within limits) since there is always some 
uncertainty about what these prices really represent in terms of goods and labour. 
Money of account is the abstract measure of value and can provide in itself all 
of the important attributes of money such as price and debt contracts. Included in the 
debts that are created in production are money wages, which as indicated by the 
‘hostage’ model in chapter 2 are valued against the hours of labour supplied by the 
worker and the number of goods he/she expects to receive from his/her own firm and 
others in the future. Yet the ‘hostage’ is not a token representing first one and then the 
other, even although it could be denominated in one or the other. In fact the initial 
assignation of the monetary unit when it arises in this way is arbitrary but there must be 
some real value already involved for the acceptor of money in the contract to take part 
in the negotiations that give rise to it. 
 When all production contracts use the ‘money of account’ in which the 
‘hostage’ is denoted then it is easier for each agent to calculate the value of the 
‘hostage’ since only a single comparison with the price of each other good desired and 
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available for purchase is required instead of having to calculate its value in multiple 
barter ratios 
There are other important differences as the system evolves. The single firm 
triangular contract must cover: 
1. The quantity of money issued as wages/capital goods prices 
2. The quantity of labour/capital goods supplied 
3. The money price of output (and thus the real wage). 
The multi-firm contract must consider the first two of these, but the last becomes of 
much less relevance since the purchasing power of the money wage is barely influenced 
by the price of a single firm’s output among the output of many firms. So in a multi-
firm and multi-commodity economy, the money of account hostage gives power to the 
firms to set their prices; workers must generally accept prices as given (which when 
only goods from their own firm or from very few firms are available, would be 
negotiated in a triangular contract.) This tends to mean that in response to any feelings 
of injustice on the part of workers there will be upward pressure on wages rather than 
downward pressure on prices. 
4.6.5 Changes in Valuation Subsequent to the Triangular Contract 
Any loan denominated in money is at risk of being devalued in real terms. The 
value of money is initially determined in the triangular contract, but frustrated 
expectations may alter this value unless output falls short by exactly that quantity of 
money agents wish to add to their deposits. Since a stock measure of money does not 
distinguish between deposits in the process of transfer and those that are not, the stock 
of money is generally meaningless as a guide to inflationary pressure. 
The income velocity quantity equation:  
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MV = PY (4.1) 
confuses the issue by suggesting that an increase in velocity could produce inflation; 
that money circulating faster can raise the general price level. This would render our 
analysis of the price level according to the triangular contract invalid, since circulation 
of money outside this contract would have an influence on the price level. But in fact 
this is simply a confusion. The velocity of money can make no difference because any 
deposit that is involved in two successive transactions cannot compete with itself across 
these transactions. The source of the confusion becomes clear if we consider the 
relationship between the income velocity equation and the transactions velocity 
version: 
MV = PT. (4.2) 
The income velocity equation can only be a guide to inflationary trends if Y/T is 
constant; if the added value for each transaction is constant.4 There is no guarantee of 
this. What is guaranteed is that the velocity of money and the number of transactions is 
always directly related. Whatever the frequency of transactions and thus the velocity of 
money, the actual quantity of money is an upper limit to the demand for any good at 
any point in time, and so is part of the determinant of the price level. Of course this is 
then complicated by the choice of agents to hold their purchasing power inactive in 
deposits, which is further complicated in that any change in prices has ambiguous 
effects on this decision depending on expectations of the trend of future prices. So if 
prices are rising but anticipated to fall again soon, it makes sense to hold money; but if 
prices are rising and expected to continue rising, it makes sense to spend it before it 
loses more purchasing power. On average, failures of expectations should cancel each 
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 Added value in the sense of counting each additional entry of some resource (labour or material) into 
the monetary economy, while ignoring transactions in which these are subsequently transferred from one 
agent to another. 
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other out so that no higher money wage is demanded, but when there is a general failure 
of expectations then the type of inflationary (or deflationary) spiral identified by 
Timberlake for the real bills doctrine may come about since a higher money loan will 
then be required by firms. We will consider the further implications of this in Chapter 
6. 
4.7 Valuing Interest 
We have identified the value of money as being determined in the form of a 
money account that is value within the triangular production contract. But what 
determines the monetary value of interest paid from the firm to the banker, which must 
also be determined as part of the contract? 
Neither the neoclassical view that interest compensates for the loss of 
consumption of goods today, nor Keynes’s loss of liquidity involved in lending money, 
are adequate explanations for the payment of loan interest (Heinsohn and Steiger 2006). 
The former is incorrect because in the money-creating contract creditor and debtor 
retain their physical possessions and their material returns, so in fact there is no transfer 
of goods. Thus it is a monetary rate of interest that applies. However, Keynes is also 
wrong to argue that liquidity has been given up when such loan contracts take place, 
since liquidity is only created in the process of money issue, and does not exist for this 
money beforehand.5 But Heinsohn and Steiger argue that interest is compensation for 
loss of a property premium, because property has been ‘burdened’ to provide insurance 
that money issue is backed. 
                                                 
5
 This is different from the case where agents have a choice between holding deposits and other financial 
assets. Here ‘liquidity preference’ becomes a relevant factor in the interest rate demanded on these assets. 
(See chapters 3 and 6.) 
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In a sense it is true that commercial banks’ reserves are in part backing for bad 
loans, which might otherwise cause deterioration in the acceptance of their deposits, but 
it is also true that the loss of interest on these reserves is a small part of the cost 
expended by a bank in administering its loan issues and by the government in 
establishing an appropriate legal and enforcement framework. Thus it seems that the 
Heinsohn and Steiger property premium, if it exists, is only a small part of the overall 
cost of issuing and administering loans and it is this overall cost that provides a rational 
basis for the charging of interest. Läufer (1998) argues that in equilibrium, since money 
is the asset with a zero credit risk, the marginal value of its liquidity must be equal to 
the interest incurred in borrowing it. That is to say, if money holders could earn more 
interest by lending on their money than they valued it in terms of its liquidity, they 
would no longer hold it. And should the marginal liquidity premium of acquiring more 
money be greater than the interest they would pay on acquiring more money, they 
would take out further loans. For lending then, the pledging of collateral can reduce the 
risk to the creditor and so reduce the interest charged6. In equilibrium this reduction 
equals the conventional risk premium. This, claims Läufer, is the actual source of 
Heinsohn and Steiger’s ‘property premium’ that they claim accounts for the charging of 
interest.  
While the ‘encumbrance’ of property in its role of debtor’s collateral should 
reduce any risk premium, Läufer does not address the issue of what exactly interest is a 
payment for - yet this is precisely what Heinsohn and Steiger are purporting to do. He 
dismisses their explanation of interest as compensation for the need to restrict the 
transfer of the bank’s property to ensure that there is a reserve ready to meet demands 
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 There are two types of risk involved here: firstly the risk of default for the loan issuer; secondly the risk 
of failure to redeem for a subsidiary acceptor of a security. The first is not passed on in the case of 
money, whereas it is in the case of bonds and similar securities. 
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for settlement of deposit withdrawals. For doing this the bank is compensated by a 
negative risk premium on interest they pay to depositors, and so payment of interest by 
debtors on this basis would represent double compensation.  When deposits are 
withdrawn and settlement made, the debtor whose loan created them must still pay 
interest to the bank even though the risk of deposit default need no longer be covered 
by the issuing bank (Läufer 1998). In fact it must be that if a secure pledge of collateral 
is made by a debtor of the bank, all risk to the bank is limited, since the only risk of 
non-settlement of deposit withdrawal arises because of a default by bank debtors. With 
a secure and full pledge of property to compensate for default, this possibility is 
eliminated. If on the other hand, the debtor is unable to offer collateral, then in this case 
there will be a risk premium charged to the debtor, which in equilibrium will be equal 
to the cost to the bank of ensuring adequate reserves to meet outstanding depositor 
withdrawal settlements even in the case of default. 
The basic interest payment must therefore cover the costs of assessing, 
evaluating and recording credit requests and issues, as well as covering deposit 
withdrawal arising from defaulted loans.7 Were all these in fact to be costless the 
equilibrium interest charged in a competitive banking environment would be zero.   
4.8 Conclusion 
Having in the previous chapters identified the source of the acceptability of 
monetary tokens in a triangular production contract, where labour and resources are 
supplied in exchange for claims to output, in this chapter we have identified the same 
process providing the valuation of money through the formation of an abstract money 
of account that has its value defined in relation to the inputs and outputs of the 
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 In a multi-bank environment these costs include access to base money, either by direct borrowing from 
the central bank or by attracting the net transfer of deposits from other banks. 
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production contract. We have considered and rejected the views that money could have 
a value through convention, through market exchange, through state taxation demand or 
through property encumbering. Essentially the ‘real bills’ doctrine that money would 
retain its value as long as it was only issued in exchange for reliable promises of the 
supply of goods is correct, but we have generalised this to show that in a modern 
monetary economy the value of money depends on the features of production.  
We have also argued that since the relationships of the central bank, commercial 
banks and private sector agents can also be expressed as triangular contracts that give 
rise to valued money, we should look at these too as being some form of production 
contracts. In fact it turns out to be perfectly reasonable to see the state as producing 
services, the inputs for which are paid for in money and the outputs exchanged for 
money in the form of taxation. The non-excludability of state-provided services and the 
legally-enforced nature of taxes pushes the reaction to the valuation of state money into 
the political as much as the economic sphere, but in any case state and private 
production are aggregated against the value of money by the convention of a fixed one-
to-one exchange between state and private money. 
Finally in this chapter we concluded that the interest rate charged for production 
loans must also be determined within the triangular contract, and argued that this relates 
to the real costs of lending. In the next chapter we move on to the relationship between 










In the previous chapters we have generally considered money as a phenomenon 
in its own right, but ultimately flows and stocks of money are in themselves only 
significant in how they affect what happens in terms of goods and services that have 
real and direct effects on human welfare. In this chapter we now turn to consider the 
relationship between the nature of money and the real economy as a whole. 
In our model of endogenous money creation outlined in chapter 3 we have 
argued that money is a transferable token of a debt, taken on by a bank on the basis of 
the bank’s belief that the debtor has some plausible way of acquiring an income stream 
to repay that loan and allow recompense for the bank’s administrative and risk-
absorbing efforts in term of purchasing power over real goods and services. 
Where there is only one bank it is clear that the required income stream can only 
be achieved (typically by a firm) marketing a previously unmarketed good or service, 
because either it did not exist – new production, or because a pre-existing good or 
service is newly introduced into the monetary economy. By enabling the acquisition of 
capital goods and labour services before a firm’s production output is completed, the 
creation of money expands the possibilities for production. These possibilities for 
production are further expanded as the debt tokens issued can be exchanged for a wider 
range of goods and services, enhancing the scope of labour and firm specialisation. 
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Along with these developments, exchange between individual non-firm agents 
becomes simplified by the existence of widely accepted tokens with established 
exchange value for many different production goods. Furthermore, the usual durability, 
pre-assigned stable value (in terms of debt repayment) and acceptability of these debt 
tokens makes them ideal stores of wealth – to be held as deposits temporarily devoid of 
the purpose of purchasing goods. In chapter 4 we also considered how the expected 
value of money was determined in the contract giving rise to its issue and suggested 
that interest rates are also determined by factors in this contract.  
So how do we go about conceptually integrating money into the real economy? 
First we consider models that see the real economy as a general equilibrium construct, 
even though they may not, for the reasons given in Chapter 2, have an equilibrium view 
of the existence of money. We explain the reasoning behind the construction of these 
models within the neoclassical paradigm. It turns out that these models cannot provide 
an adequate basis for modelling money in the economy even if we accept the basis of 
their modelling of the real economy. 
In the following section we show why neoclassical general equilibrium models 
of the economy cannot in any case give us the hoped for insights into the real economy 
even if they could absorb a reasonable concept of money into their workings. We 
consider two models of the monetary economy that have more realistic concepts of 
money in the economy; that of Delli Gatti and Gallegati (1997) and of Palley (1991-2), 
but we find that their focus on aggregate market clearing, and over precise behavioural 
functions mean that they fail to capture the picture of money we are seeking. We turn 
finally to a Stock-Flow Consistent model of Godley and Lavoie (2006) that consists of 
strict asset and liability accounting within a sequence economy. This, we argue, can 
provide us with the sort of framework we need for analysing the way the working out 
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of the triangular production contract impacts upon the real economy, once we have 
established how money and pricing can work in such a model. 
5.2 Money and Equilibrium Economies 
5.2.1 The RBC/DSGE approach 
The ‘Lucas Critique’ pointed out the inconsistency of general equilibrium 
models that did not take account of likely changes in the economic behaviour of 
individuals as a direct response to knowledge of exogenous policy changes (Lucas 
1976). As a consequence models became based on generic microeconomic decisions 
that involve utility maximisation for individuals and households and profit 
maximisation for firms, all on the basis that future expectations conform to those 
predicted by the model itself. This ‘rational expectations’ behaviour is made subject to 
constraints, typically a budget constraint but also including constraints arising from the 
production function, incentives, information and the reactions of other agents. 
Intertemporal links were introduced to these ‘Real Business Cycle’ (RBC) 
models, usually in the form of assets originating from a budget-constrained government 
sector such as money and bonds.1 A role for money could be introduced via the 
existence of a cash-only good in the individual/household utility function, budget 
constraint or production function. The intertemporal links meant that 
individuals/households did not simply optimise within a single period, but must plot an 
optimal path of consumption (hours of labour, asset holding if present in the model) 
over time. Another form of link that could exist between time-periods in these models 
is the existence of an enduring capital stock, built up directly by household saving 
(consumption foregone). Stochastic parameters are introduced that impact upon 
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 The term ‘Real Business Cycle’ relates to the initial focus of these models on real (non-monetary) 
variables as the drivers of economic fluctuations. 
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production and other variables, so that these are deflected from what would otherwise 
be their optimal paths.  
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) modelling developed from 
Real Business Cycle (RBC) modelling, but incorporated ‘Keynesian’ insights: ‘sticky’ 
wages or prices, contracting or menu costs adjustment costs to coincide with empirical 
observations that not only real shocks to the economy were important, but expectational 
and monetary shocks too. The combined effect is to prevent smooth return to the 
optimal path. Despite these embellishments, however, there are mechanisms that 
always tend to match labour offered with that required, output supplied with 
consumption demanded and savings of households with addition to the capital stock, 
and so fulfil a unique long-term equilibrium. Therefore the persisting disequilibrium in 
the private sector necessary to explain the issue and holding of money is assumed away. 
Thus equilibrium models of the real economy frequently introduce money by 
appending to the core model a government sector that goes into debt with the 
counterpart of this debt being money (Graziani 2003, p15). Modern ‘microfounded’ 
models of the monetary macroeconomy optimise utility and/or profit functions which 
may contain money (money in the utility function, or MIU) subject to constraints that 
relate to the holding of various assets, including money, and/or a constraint that relates 
money received with consumption of one or more real goods (cash in advance, or CIA). 
In this way changes in the quantity of money demanded and/or supplied or its 
opportunity cost as the return on other assets alters will affect the quantity of money 
held in equilibrium. The introduction of money into the private-sector economy in these 
models is most commonly an exogenous process; taking the form of a lump-sum 
transfer to households that is linked to government expenditure.  
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5.2.2 Money in the Utility Function 
Unlike agents in the private sector, the government sector may have a current 
deficit in its budget in any period. In such models, the amount of government debt not 
financed by selling securities is equal to the quantity of money demanded by the 
market, so the government budget constraint for period t defines the money stock 
according to the general form of 
1 1 1( )t t t t t tM M G T B B i B− − −= + − − − − , (5.1) 
where Mt represents the money stock in period t; G is government expenditure; T is the 
the tax yield; Bt is the stock of government bonds at the end of period t and it the 
interest rate paid on government bonds. 
A representative of this sort of model is that of Buiter (2005). His model is of a 
closed competitive economy with a single one-period commodity. Households’ income 
consists of an exogenous endowment yt > 0. Households consume ct ≥ 0 and pay lump-
sum taxes τt. There are financial claims in the form of fiat base money, one-period 
nominal government bonds and one-period real government bonds. The amounts of 
these claims outstanding at the end of period t and carried into period t+1 are 
respectively, Mt, Bt and dt. Since there is no production, the problem of reaching 
equilibrium in the private sector is bypassed in the model. 










t t t t t t
t
M B Md i
P P P






+ + ≡ + +
 + + + + − − ≥  
, (5.2) 




ti +  is the risk-free nominal interest rate on money held from period t to t + 1; 1ti +  
is the risk-free nominal interest rate on nominal bonds and 1tr +  the risk-free real interest 
rate on real bonds. 0tP ≥  is the period t money price of the commodity. Arbitrage 
equates the risk-free rates of return on nominal and real debt. In each period, the 
household maximises the following utility function, subject to (5.2). 
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(5.3) 
where ρ is the households’ time discount factor and real balances /t t tm M P≡ . Each 
period felicity function is increasing in consumption and end-of-period real money 
balances. 
Maximisation of utility function (5.3) subject to the budget constraint (5.2) 
gives first order conditions for households’ optimal behaviour of a marginal utility 
trade-off between consumption in the present period and consumption in the next 
period. This trade-off depends on the return on real bonds held between periods and the 
time discount factor. There is also a marginal utility trade-off between money holdings 
and consumption within the present period. This latter trade-off depends on the 
difference between the relative returns on nominal bonds and money. These are 
standard results for this type of model.  
The government’s budget constraint in this model follows the pattern of Eq 5.1, 
and is given by 
1 1 1(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( )Mt t t t t t t t t t t t t tM B Pd i M i B P r d P g τ− − −+ + ≡ + + + + + + − , (5.4) 
where gt is government spending, and τt is net lump-sum taxation paid by households. 
Since base money need never be redeemed, the government receives real seignorage 
income.  Prices are flexible and the goods market clears each period. 
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Without specifically considering the results of such models, what can we say 
about this one in the light of our previous discussions about the origin and nature of 
money? Firstly and most obviously, this is a model without production; new 
consumption goods are apparently endowed from heaven. There is no explanation for 
the income that households receive, and so no linkage between income and the goods to 
be purchased with that income. No money can arise from the actions of private 
producers, as there is no such sector in the model. Even if we assumed that the income 
endowment were paid in money and all consumption paid for in money, the fact that 
both are stated in real terms means that unfulfilled (and overfulfilled) expectations in 
the goods market are ruled out by assumption.  
In this model money is held because it is in the utility function. When the 
marginal utility of holding money is greater than the marginal utility of consumption as 
specified by the function, then money will be held in preference to being spent on 
consumption. So why does money have a marginal utility in the model? The 
assumption underlying its inclusion in the utility function must be that it provides 
liquidity services, as it cannot be a factor in production since there is no production in 
the model. Yet as far as households are concerned, as long as they work within their 
budget constraint they can use any financial asset to exchange for consumption or to 
pay their taxes. Households will thus hold whatever financial asset bears the greatest 
return, and this will not necessarily be money. The Buiter model thus lacks any genuine 
explanation as to why anyone in the private sector should necessarily hold money, and 
this is surely devastating for any model that purports to predict the role of money in the 
behaviour of other economic variables. 
Moreover, even were money to offer a liquidity service, while this could 
account for the use of money within a period, given the absence of uncertainty in the 
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model it cannot account for the holding of money between periods. Any money 
required for transactions in the period would be acquired at the beginning of the period 
and wholly exchanged for consumption by the end of the period, since there are no 
expectation failures in the goods market or in the market for financial assets. In this 
model there is no real justification for treating money as any different from other 
financial assets, the holding of which depends wholly on their rates of return.  
5.2.3 Cash in Advance Models 
Another group of models, of which that of Cooley and Hansen (1995) is a 
representative example, introduce a subset of consumption goods into the household’s 
utility function and budget constraint that can only be purchased with previously 
accumulated cash balances. Their aim is to allow the ‘study of the features of an 
economy where money is valued in equilibrium’ (Cooley and Hansen 1995, p194). 
In Cooley and Hansen’s model aggregate output, Yt, for the economy is 
produced according to a function of the Cobb-Douglas form, with Kt and Ht the 
aggregate capital stock and labour input respectively, and zt a randomly generated 
technology shock:2 
1
, 0 1tzt t tY e K H
θ θ θ−= < < . (5.5) 
Such a function has constant returns to scale, and is justified on the basis that capital 
and labour shares of output have remained approximately constant despite changes in 
relative prices. The parameter θ represents the fraction of output accruing to capital 
                                                 
2
 It has been convincingly argued that empirical evidence that appears to support the ubiquitous 
neoclassical (Cobb-Douglas) production function is an artefact. Regressions run on deflated monetary 
values find a coefficient representing a 25% mark-up even when Cobb-Douglas production functions 
with constant output elasticity of capital equal to 0.75. If this is so, then econometric estimates of the 
production function are simply reproducing the national account identities, whatever the underlying 
shares of output (Godley and Lavoie 2007; Felipe and McCombie 2006). 
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when paid its marginal product, and 1-θ the fraction accruing to labour. The portion of 
aggregate output not consumed, Xt ,is invested in physical capital, so that 
1 (1 ) , 0 1t t tK K Xδ δ+ = − + < < . (5.6) 
Real saving and investment are thus conflated in the model and it is implicit that 
the investment decision is the outcome of decisions by households, not firms. Firms are 
assumed to ‘maximize’ profits (on the assumption of constant returns implicit in the 
production function, they can in fact do no more than eliminate losses and so make zero 
profits in equilibrium). The utility function for households is given by 
where c1 is a good that can only be purchased using previously accumulated cash 
balances; c2 a good exchangeable for any form of wealth and ht labour supplied by 
households. In each period, each household can purchase c1 goods according to 
where Pt is the price level in period t; mt is cash held over from the previous period; 
(1+Rt-1)bt is principal plus interest from government bond holdings bt; τt is a nominal 
lump sum transfer (or tax) paid at the beginning of the period and bt+1, are bonds 
acquired in the current period to be carried into the next.  
The overall budget constraint for households is 
1 1 1
1 2
(1 )t t t t t t
t t t t t t t
t t t t t
m b m R b
c c x w h r k
P P P P P
τ+ + −++ + + + ≤ + + + + , (5.9) 
indicating that household expenditures include purchases of the two consumption 
goods, investment xt, money carried over to the next period mt+1 and government-issued 
0 1 2
0
[ log (1 ) log ], 0 1 and 0 1t t t t
t
E c c hβ α α γ β α
∞
=
+ − − < < < <∑ , (5.7) 
1 1 1(1 )t t t t t t tPc m R b bτ− += + + + − , (5.8) 
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bonds. No household borrowing is permitted. The assumption of constant returns to 
scale of production, identical firms and identical households with no economic 
interaction between them allows aggregation from individual firm and household 
behaviour to the macro level. 
Firms’ and households’ behaviour must be consistent with that of the 
government, which has the following constraint: 
1 1 1(1 )t t t t t t t tPG T M M B R B+ + −+ = − + − + , (5.10) 
where Gt is real government consumption; Mt the stock of money, Tt is nominal 
transfers net of taxes and Bt nominal government debt.  
In this model, as in the Buiter model described in the previous section, money is 
again a liability of the government but money does not itself appear in the utility 
function. While this has the merit of attempting to introduce a limited availability of 
money as a factor in household decisions, it hardly captures the welfare-enhancing 
features of money, with agents simply having specific preferences over cash and credit 
goods. There is no increase in the consumption set available, and no increase in the 
volume of production from using money. Moreover, money remains a creature of the 
government, in that the total supply is part of the government’s budget constraint, and 
exogenous in the sense that it arises as a realisation of a stochastic process. 
5.2.4 Assessment of Equilibrium Models with Government Money 
To the extent that the two models above deal with a representative consumer 
and a representative firm, no general purchasing power is explicitly required for 
exchange transactions. We can assume that it is used, becoming visible when held or 
when used for the purchase of the cash goods of the CIA model, but there is no sign of 
the frictions or commitment problems that provided justification for the existence of 
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money in the debt models of section 2.3. Households automatically and costlessly 
adjust their real consumption and financial asset holdings and prices immediately adjust 
to ensure firms are not left with unsold goods, yet prices have no impact on income 
(endowment in the Buiter model, wages from production in the CIA model) since these 
are constant in real terms. Another feature of these models is that, with the exception of 
the CIA constraint on a subset of goods in the second model, there is no liquidity limit 
to transactions or consumption. We must conclude therefore, that neither of these 
models can illustrate the features of real economies that give rise to the use of money, 
nor additional features that are particular to monetary economies rather than ones that 
could proceed by barter. 
The idea that the only money in the economy is formed by government 
liabilities is in general problematic. If this were the case the central bank would have 
the impossible task of both ensuring government borrowing met the requirements of 
public expenditure and was also at the level required to introduce the appropriate 
amount of money into the economy.  
5.2.5 Money in the Production Function 
The model of King and Plosser (1984) claims to include money as an 
endogenous variable in a model that generates real business cycles. They do this to 
operationalise their view that the output of the financial and banking sector is an input 
into the production and purchase of final goods. Their model consists of two productive 
sectors with one intermediate and one final good. The output of the final goods industry 
is stochastic and serves as either a consumption good or as an input into future 
production. The output of the financial industry is an intermediate good referred to as 
‘transaction services’. These are used by firms in the final goods industry and by 
households to economise on the time and resources required for the exchange of goods.  
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The output of final product y is formed by a constant return to scale process that 
uses labour n, capital k and transactions services d as inputs: 
1 1( , , )y y yt t t t t ty f k n d φ ξ+ += , (5.11) 
where ytk  is the amount of capital in commodity units allocated to production at time t, 
y
tn  the amount of labour services in hours and 
y
td  the amount of transaction services 
(defined as the number of book-keeping entries made) used in the production of final 
goods. There are positive and diminishing marginal products to each factor of 
production. The process is subject to random shocks tφ  and 1tξ + .  
Productive firms are identical and operate competitively, selling goods at price 
pt and purchasing labour, capital and transaction services at rental prices wt, qt and ρt 
respectively. This gives each firm the profit maximisation problem 
1 ( , , )y y y y y yt t t t t t t t t tp f k n d w n q k dpi ρ+= − − − . (5.12) 
The production function for the financial sector is 
( , )d dt t td h n k= . (5.13) 
In contrast to the production function for goods, this function is instantaneous, 
indicating that the production of transaction services is a much faster process than that 
of the production of goods. Again this production function is assumed to give constant 
returns to scale. Households in the model consume, supply labour and purchase 
transaction services to minimise their transactions costs and select an optimal pattern of 
consumption, labour supply and asset allocations. 
King and Plosser claim that their model, by showing positive co-movement in 
equilibrium of real production and transaction services matches the empirical evidence 
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showing a positive correlation of output and measures of bank clearing. They suggest a 
link between the flows of transaction services in their model and observed stocks of 
deposits (or ‘inside money’ as they term this). To generate this link they assume that 
this stock of deposits is proportional to the flow of transaction services. Under this 
assumption they claim as an implication for their model that the volume of inside 
money is positively correlated with output more or less contemporaneously when there 
is an unexpected output event, as denoted in the model by tξ (Equation 5.11). A shock 
that shifts intertemporal decisions, as denoted in the model by tφ , produces an increase 
in transaction services prior to an increase in output. 
On the face of it, if we accept King and Plosser’s correlation of transactions 
services with deposit money, there are some features here that match what we are 
seeking in a model of the monetary economy. Money is produced in the private sector, 
and is produced in greater quantities in association with increased production or 
increased planned production. This is only superficial, however, and there are deep-
seated reasons why we cannot accept the King and Plosser model as an acceptable 
representation of a monetary economy. Firstly, there is no link between the issue of 
money to firms for production and its availability to consumers for spending and 
saving. Both firms and individuals can independently purchase transaction services up 
to the point at which there is zero marginal profit or utility respectively. Secondly, 
despite the authors’ identification of flows of transaction services with stocks of 
deposits, there is in fact no motivation whatsoever for transaction services to be ‘held’ 
from one period to the next since there are other assets that earn a positive return, and 
given the knowledge of the probability distribution for the shocks to the economy there 
is no benefit from acquiring transaction services before the instant they are required for 
transactions. Thus there can be no stock of money in this economy. Thirdly the 
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valuation of this ‘money’ bears no relation to any exchange value for goods; its value is 
simply its marginal contribution to profitability or to utility for firms or households 
respectively. Deposit ‘money’ in this model is not money in the sense that we have so 
far recognised it. 
Visser (1989) makes the further point, that in exact contradiction to King and 
Plosser’s model, where all inputs to production including transaction services see 
constant returns to scale, the existence of money in the real economy gives rise to scale 
economies. Increasing returns to scale mean that no pure competition and thus no 
welfare-optimising competitive equilibrium can exist. 
5.3 Assessing Equilibrium Macroeconomics 
5.3.1 The Reality of Models 
Apart from the specific issues with the models we have described, there are 
deeper problems. The bottom-up optimising models of the RBC and DSGE type rely on 
identically specified and endowed agents to ensure that the solution to the simultaneous 
equations describing the economy reach a single plausible equilibrium. But a system of 
simultaneous equations which is complex enough to capture a variety of heterogeneous 
agents will have multiple equilibria and complex dynamics (Colander 1996a). General 
equilibrium is neither unique nor stable for many plausible sets of consumer 
preferences and endowments. It has been shown that only infinite information can 
guarantee that a price adjustment process always converges to equilibrium (Ackerman 
1999). According to Kirman the problem of equilibrium economics arises from the 
standard economic habit ‘of treating individuals as acting independently of each other’ 
(Kirman 1989, p137). 
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When such microeconomic theory that describes economic relationships at the 
individual level is applied to aggregate data, this assumes that the relationship between 
elements of the structure will be preserved at higher levels. This arbitrarily assumes a 
homogenous system with a persisting linear hierarchical structure. More specifically it 
requires: 
1. Homothetic preferences that are linearly homogenous3  
2. Identical production functions for all firms  
3. Homogenous and infinitely divisible commodities and factors of 
production 
4. A common set of prices with a constant relative ratio 
5. A fixed distribution of income endowments over time 
Since these are not generally to be found in real economies, then rational 
choice-theoretic foundations have very few aggregative consequences and a 
neoclassical Walrasian micro model is consistent with a wide range of phenomena at 
the macro level. The presence of agents with diverse tastes, endowments and 
technologies, the presence of mediating institutions, macroeconomic externalities and 
feedback from macro events to micro behaviour all confound attempts to build up 
macroeconomic models from individuals’ microeconomic behaviour. 
As evidenced by the Buiter model in section 5.2.2, the common ‘solution’ to the 
problem of multiple equilibria is to model the behaviour of the whole economy as if it 
were a single agent (the ‘representative agent’). But there is no evidence that an 
aggregate of maximising individuals can ever be considered as a single maximising 
agent. The reaction of the representative may not be the same as the aggregate reaction 
                                                 
3
 So that the proportions of different goods consumed are uninfluenced by distributional considerations. 
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of the individuals represented and the preferences of the representative individual may 
be different from that of every individual. There is also evidence to show that well-
behaved aggregate demand functions can actually arise from the aggregation of non-
maximising agents, if their preferences are far enough spread out (Kirman 1992). The 
conclusion must be that the standard utility-maximising model used as the foundations 
for modern mainstream macroeconomic models is neither sufficient nor necessary for 
stability at the macroeconomic level. Moreover, the behaviour of consumers, workers 
and firms can be tested empirically. There is much evidence to suggest that consumers’ 
and workers’ behaviour is far from rational or consistent and that firms are unlikely to 
be pure profit maximisers (Camerer et al. 2004).  
Yet the real economy does not exhibit wholly chaotic results, so we must look 
for institutional arrangements that create the relative stability we observe (Colander 
1996b). Such arrangements constrain the behaviour of individuals, and include legal 
and social conventions and the creation of markets by the firms who wish to sell in 
them. The latter means that the acquisition of a consumption good does not require a 
random search among all humanity for someone in possession of that good and willing 
to part with it, but the seeking of a firm that can be trusted to have a variety of goods 
available for purchase on predictable terms. The existence of such firms, however, is 
not compatible with the direct barter equilibrium economy of equilibrium macro 
models (Clower and Howitt 1996).  
[B]efore there is hope of undertaking meaningful micro 
analysis, one must first determine the macro context within 
which that micro decision is made. It is that macro context that 
lets individuals choose among likely multiple equilibria and 
makes the choice theoretic foundation contextually relevant 
(Colander 1996b, p61. Italics in original). 
Even if perfectly competitive Walrasian markets existed, they would not be stable 
institutions. They would create an incentive to monopolise markets and would require 
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more rationality than individuals have (Colander 1996a). To make our actions 
predictable to each other and allow complex co-ordinated economic processes to take 
place we develop simplified behaviour patterns, routines and rules in the form of 
institutional structures and behavioural conventions. Thus there appear to be persisting 
features of the economy in terms of its institutions, levels of flow and stocks in 
particular regions. If we do not identify these features correctly then we have no chance 
of modelling the changes that take place from period to period. So we turn to the two 
most important organising features: monetary markets and firms’ need to ensure a 
monetary return that matches their outlays. 
5.3.2 Markets and Money 
Equilibrium requires markets to process goods and services offered and 
demanded and reach a stable outcome. Yet in reality, the ‘Walrasian auctioneer’ as a 
central neutral processor proffered by neoclassical economic theory and programmed to 
solve this problem by price adjustment does not exist, and no real market can exist 
independently of the incentives of those that set it up. And there are few markets set up 
by neutral unbiased parties. Even when this is arguably so, for a national stock market 
or even a local food market organised by the local authority, the sub-markets in 
particular categories of stock or of produce cannot be easily be separated from their 
promoters or producers. 
There is much more to the structure of markets than fully-informed, rational 
individuals adapting to all events at the margin. If this were not so, behaviour would 
probably be unpredictable and incomprehensible (Liefonhufvid 1996). The complex, 
co-ordinated processes that allow the coherence of the weekly family shop at the 
supermarket or the on-line booking of an airline ticket, quite apart from the markets that 
link producers (as Eichner (1987) is at pains to point out), requires simplified behaviour 
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patterns, routines and rules that make our actions predictable to each other. Market 
interactions actually involve acquiring information feedback from our imperfect 
decision-making; whether in terms of quantities and/or prices – so that no set of market 
processes can possibly represent an aggregate of mutually consistent optimal decisions. 
The most likely candidate for the organising principle of a modern developed 
economy seems to be the institutions involved in the creation, circulation and 
destruction of money. These are all-pervasive. 
Money is a social convention that makes the aggregate 
economy operate more efficiently. It affects the co-ordination 
of the entire system and reduces the number of calculations an 
individual must make…[M]oney is part of the 
macrofoundational structure of the economics 
system…(Colander 1996b, p62). 
As a consequence of the organisation and operation of markets by firms, the 
acquisition of consumption goods does not force us to search randomly among 
humanity for someone in possession of that good and willing to part with it in exchange 
for something we have and are willing to part with. Instead a firm that can be trusted to 
have a variety of goods on display and available for purchase on predictable terms may 
have access to enough of our trust that we will purchase the good at the price at which 
it is offered. 
 [T]he problem of accounting for monetary exchange is 
just the problem of explaining why the firms that make markets 
do not routinely deal in direct barter…(Clower and Howitt 
1996, p26) 
Our explanations of why firms use money would include the following:  
1. Firms introduce money into the economy in the process of acquiring 
loans to pay for wages or investment goods. 
2. They need to acquire money to repay debts. 
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3. They can dispose of their products more easily if they are willing to 
exchange them for money. 
a. It is easier for consumers to buy on impulse – what they are 
foregoing they do not yet have and so cannot value. 
b. They can facilitate (or even provide directly themselves) credit by 
consumers for purchases. 
Under the credit-based system of money whose creation, flow and destruction 
we described in Chapter 3 and whose valuation we accounted for in Chapter 4, an 
increase in the amount of money in circulation occurs as an endogenous response 
whenever one of the non-financial sectors uses loans to finance outlays. There is then a 
circular flow of these funds among the various sectors of the economy. This flow 
occurs alongside the flow of produced goods to consumption and a flow in the opposite 
direction of labour from households to firms. Eichner (1987) describes the significance 
of this in macroeoconomic terms. If there is a change in one sector’s financial position 
without an increase in the overall amount of funds in circulation, i.e.: its gross savings 
have increased relative to tangible investment, this can only be at the expense of some 
other sector. If there is a change in the overall amount of funds in circulation with the 
amount of those funds increasing as the sector’s financial investment increases 
subsequent to a payment made that has been financed by a loan from a bank, then a 
different picture emerges. The sector making the payment will have both increased its 
financial liabilities (in the form of the loan) and increased its financial assets (in the 
form of additional deposits). Following the payment some further physical or financial 
asset is acquired – it being on this basis that the loan was likely to have been made in 
the first instance. Thus no limitation on the amount of funds in circulation exists. This 
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is the critical link between the monetary sector and the real economy of production and 
exchange of goods and services. 
5.3.3 Price-clearing v. Price-setting 
The price-clearing market assumption of mainstream macroeconomic models is 
also widely challenged. Colander and van Ees (1996) go so far as to state that the 
modern economy is by no means ideally co-ordinated by the price mechanism, nor 
could it conceivably be so co-ordinated. Godley and Lavoie describe and reject the 
purported process as follows:  
Excess demand leads to higher prices, which is 
assumed to reduce excess demand. This mechanism is put into 
effect within the period, before transactions are made. When 
transactions occur, as reflected in the transactions-flow matrix, 
supply and demand have already been equated through the 
price-clearing mechanism. We believe that such a market 
clearing mechanism, based on price variations, is only 
appropriate in the case of financial markets. In the case of 
goods and services markets, and in the case of the so-called 
labour market, we believe that the hypothesis of market-
clearing equilibrium prices is wholly counterfactual, 
inappropriate and misleading (Godley and Lavoie 2007 p64). 
Price-clearing is the exception rather than a rule in an advanced economy 
because it is only in commodity markets where individual sellers are so numerous and 
so small that they are unable to exert any significant influence on the price (Eichner 
1987). In this case, when prices are given, the firm decides how much to produce and 
then puts all of its output on the market at this price. Any imbalance between demand 
and supply is then eliminated through an appropriate change in price. Eichner 
distinguishes the firms in such markets by their direct control by a small number of 
owner-entrepreneurs and the small number of plants which they control. As a 
consequence, and since the firms’ residual incomes are the sole source of compensation 
for these owner-entrepreneurs, it can be assumed that the goal of such firms is to 
maximise the amount of ‘profit’ earned by the firm in any period. Eichner also claims 
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that because such firms cannot easily expand operations beyond an initial small number 
of plants, the firm is subject to variable returns as production is expanded or contracted. 
Thus this sector faces the typical U-shaped cost curves of textbook analysis (Eichner 
1987, p393). 
By contrast, it is what Eichner terms ‘industrial markets’ that predominate in the 
modern economy. In such markets, sellers are sufficiently few in number and with a 
well-protected market position such that they can influence the market price directly. 
These firms, therefore, can decide on both the quantity they will produce and the price 
which buyers will have to pay. Under these conditions, the firm sets the price and then 
sells whatever quantity it can at that price. Thus, when there is an imbalance between 
demand and supply, the necessary adjustment occurs through the quantity variable 
rather than the price variable. A decline in demand is experienced as a decline in sales 
rather than as a weakening of the market leading to a fall in the industry price. 
Similarly, an increase in demand is experienced as an increase in sales rather than a rise 
in price. Here there are no neutrally organised markets for manufactured goods such as 
those that exist for shares or commodities. The predominance of price-setting behaviour 
by firms is supported by the empirical work of Godley, Coutts and Nordhaus (1978). 
Since firms manufacturing goods generally make their own markets, 
disequilibrium in a market leading to a decline in sales of some or all of their products 
leads not usually to reductions in prices, but to reductions in sales (Clower and Howitt 
1996). This suggests that rather than wage adjustments, labour force quantities will be 
susceptible to adjustment by firms, with resulting unemployment or labour-market 
pressure. 
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5.3.4 Macroeconomic Equivalences 
The main equivalences in equilibrium macroeconomics are automatic results 
from the fact that the value of commodities at cost that are produced in a period but not 
sold for consumption must be equal to the value of the income received by labour and 
the other factors involved in their production but not spent on consumption. The 
consequence for the models is that investment must equal saving. National accounting 
convention means that this equivalence occurs irrespective of the actual establishment 
of productive equipment which can increase the output of the economy over the long 
term. In fact, voluntary saving by consumers may inhibit production by preventing 
firms recouping the value of their output (Eichner 1987).4 
While it is true that with a constant positive level of non-consumption by 
households, the current level of income might match the current level of output if any 
addition/reduction to saved funds matches the withdrawal of these funds to purchase 
productive plant and the premises to house it, this is entirely contingent (Graziani 
2003). Thus the equality of income and output seen in national accounts or flow of 
funds tables is not evidence of a real ‘equilibrium’ between investment and non-
consumption or income and output, but almost always arises purely as a consequence of 
the definitions of profit and residual income; i.e.: any discrepancy between what is 
earned by individuals and what is spent by them becomes automatically matched by the 
gap between firms’ revenue and what they must pay out (overwhelmingly, ultimately, 
as labour costs). The importance of interest rates then, is not that they mediate an 
equilibrium between the supply and demand of investment funds, but that on the one 
hand they represent the costs to be covered by banks’ issue of loans, and on the other 
                                                 
4
 See discussion of  deposit holding in Chapter 3. 
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they play a part in the liquidity preference of households as they decide between 
holding financial wealth as money or as firms’ securities.5 
Investment decisions are critical to how the economy develops because 
investment does not take place automatically following on from earlier decisions as 
income and consumption generally do, but is postponable and it can be entered into 
even if there is no surplus from the firm’s activities by means of external financing. 
This involves both the (limited) redistribution of the gross saving of other sectors and 
the creation of new funds by the banking sector. Both Eichner (1987) and Godley and 
Lavoie (2007) share the conviction that this discretion (enabled especially by money) 
means that the flow of income may intermittently fail to match the flow of output – and 
that it is the level of aggregate demand that feeds back to the subsequent level of 
aggregate supply through reduction in sales of output, increased inventories and a 
reduction in output. Let us now turn to some rather different models. 
5.4 Macroeconomic Models that Take Money Seriously 
5.4.1 Delli Gatti and Gallegati 
This very complex rational expectations equilibrium model introduces money 
into the economy in part through a wage bill loan. Production is very basically 
modelled as being  
y = n, (5.14) 
where y is output and n employment. Firms do not, however, wholly finance the wage-
bill from borrowing however, since  
Wy A B= + , (5.15) 
                                                 
5
 This issue we have already discussed at some length in Chapters 3 and 4. 
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where W is the nominal wage, B is firms’ borrowing and A is the ‘equity base’ of firms. 
The way the model is determined means that the size of the equity base (and therefore 
the relationship between firms’ borrowing and the wage bill) is influenced by 
unexpected price rises and the interest rate. Delli Gatti and Gallegati introduce an 
aggregate demand function 
M Py= , (5.16) 
where M is the money supply, and P the expected price level. The money supply is the 
sum of high-powered money and corporate borrowing: 
M = H + B. (5.17) 
This is a one period model, so monetary flow consistency must exist within the model. 
We can rearrange equations 5.15 - 5.17 to show that  
Wy Py A H= + − . (5.18) 
Given that the model does not allow the persistence of debt, or the holding of balances, 
our balance sheet analysis of Chapter 3 tells us that monetary consistency is only 
achieved if Wy = Py, which implies that A = H. Given that A and H are determined by 
separate mechanisms and are both negatively related to the interest rate, these equalities 
are entirely contingent. The model is therefore not consistent in monetary terms. Other 
features of this model are also unsatisfactory. It is assumed in the model that firms 
always repay all of their debts, even although firms have a non-negative risk of 
becoming bankrupt. Although there is a dividend flow from the equity base, there is no 
recipient for this flow. 
5.4.2 Palley  
An alternative one period model, constructed by Palley (1991-2), introduces the 
possibility of unemployment that arises because firms’ production is ‘for sale’, rather 
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than ‘for own consumption’. Because of this, unsold output is not demanded by the 
firms. Firms thus have the problem that they ‘need to generate in advance demand to 
purchase output equal to the level of profit income’ (Palley 1991-92, p188). In this 
model aggregate demand is given by  
d
k Wy C C I= + + , (5.19) 
where Ck is the consumption of capitalists; CW the consumption of workers and I the 
exogenous level of investment expenditures. Capitalists consume out of current 
dividend income and deposits acquired in previous periods. Their propensity to 
consume is less than unity. Consumers consume their wages and new borrowing in the 
period net of interest payments on outstanding loans. Their marginal propensity to 
consume is always equal to unity. Since output is produced according to  
( )sy f N= , (5.20) 
where N is the level of employment, the goods market clearing condition is given as 
1 1 1 1 1 , 1 1 , 1 1 , 1 , 1 1
2 , 1
( ) [ ( ) ] ( / / )
(1 ) ( ) .
F F W k k
W W
pf N b p f N w N r L i L b D p D p
b wN i r L pI
− − − − − − − − − −
−
= − − + + −
+ + − + +
 
(5.21) 
We can summarise the meaning of equation 5.21 as being that nominal output sales 
must equal the proportion consumed of capitalist’s dividend income (earned on the 
basis of the previous period’s profit) and any increase in the nominal value of 
capitalists deposits arising from an increase in the price level plus households’ wage 
income and borrowing net of interest and outstanding loan repayments plus nominal 
value of investment expenditure. While this is perhaps closer to monetary consistency 
than the Delli Gatti and Gallegati model, there remain significant deficiencies. Firstly 
there is no link between the capitalists’ failure to consume all of their income and the 
level of deposits (the latter being an exogenous and constant real parameter). Thus there 
is no independent role for fluctuations in money holding to impact upon effective 
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demand. Secondly the model provides no source for the investment expenditure. In 
monetary terms it appears from nowhere. The final major problem with this model is 
that, although borrowing plays an important part in the outcomes derived from it, the 
constant and increasing relationship between household wage income and borrowing is 
far too rigid to make analyses under changing economic conditions. While the marginal 
propensity to consume of one for households doesn’t perhaps affect the model very 
much as it stands, it clearly adds to the general unreality of it. 
To find macroeconomic models that truly respect the constraints of a monetary 
economy we will now turn to so-called Stock-Flow Consistent (SFC) models. 
5.5 The Stock Flow Consistent Approach 
5.5.1 The Relationship Between Households and Firms 
In an extension to the accounting approach we have followed in our analysis of 
money in Chapter 3, we now turn to the Stock Flow Consistent (SFC) approach 
originated by Godley and Cripps (1983) and developed by Godley (2004), Dos Santos 
and Zezza (2006) and Godley and Lavoie (2004, 2007) among others. The SFC 
approach completely rejects the framework of general equilibrium modelling, arguing 
that individual welfare maximisation is not consistent with firms having an independent 
existence with distinct motivations such as growing the firm, because optimum prices, 
output and employment in these models are decided for them by the location of 
aggregate demand and supply schedules. As we have seen, in some such models these 
problems are assumed away altogether by amalgamation of households and firms into a 
single sector, so that no co-ordination is required. In any case, the fact that there is no 
time element to production in the previous models, and no excess demand or supply, 
means that there is no place for loans or credit money, and thus no role for banks. In the 
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real world, since firms generally operate under imperfect competition and increasing 
returns, they must decide for themselves how much to produce and how many workers 
to employ, what prices to charge, how much to invest and how to obtain finance. It is 
then the pricing decision of firms rather than the marginal productivity of capital and 
labour that determines the distribution of the national income between wages and 
profits (Godley and Lavoie 2007, p2). Credit comes into the picture since production is 
a time-consuming process and expectations are frequently falsified with persistent 
excess demands and supplies. 
An important further point that Godley and Lavoie raise is that sales of 
investment goods give rise to receipts in the business sector, which receipts must 
themselves arise from the business sector – which is itself doing the investing. Thus 
they implicitly recognise the flow of profits issue that we discussed in Chapter 3.  
For SFC modelling, any equilibrium or steady state is simply a theoretical 
construct which would be achieved if all parameters and functions the economy were 
given. Since in the real world they are not given, it is not clear what purpose such 
constructs serve. The only thing we can be certain of is that the individual items of 
economic expenditure and receipts must always and everywhere add up appropriately 
according to the accounting rules governing the monetary economy. As well as the 
coherence of different stocks and different flows there is also an important role for 
‘stock-flow’ norms – ratios of stocks to flows that tend to be maintained over time. 
Firms are modelled as determining prices based on unit costs, and thus by tying 
together labour costs, interest costs and normal profits, income distribution is 
determined. 
Like the circuit theorists, SFC theorists recognise that production is only made 
possible by bank advances as firms must go into debt before they can recover monetary 
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proceeds. The introduction of financial assets into the economy that are separate from 
real assets means that households can hold property rights to companies in the form of 
equities, over which they make portfolio decisions that are not necessarily made on the 
basis of the profit rate generated by capital goods. This is in contrast to neoclassically-
based models, which if they do nominally separate households and firms, re-integrate 
them again by distributing all profits instantaneously to households and distributing all 
unconsumed household income instantaneously to the capital stock of firms. In the SFC 
approach, seriously involving the monetary side of production means that banks, their 
balance sheets and interest flows must be taken into account explicitly, along with the 
creation, circulation and destruction of money. 
5.5.2 Features of SFC Models 
The role of prices is in fact to distribute national income between wages, profits 
and creditors. There is no assumption of a production function with diminishing returns 
to labour and capital or of the existence of determinate profit-maximising levels of 
prices, wages or employment. On empirical grounds SFC models anticipate roughly 
constant returns to labour in the long run and increasing returns in the short-run. 
Demand for labour affects the wage-bill, but prices charged are insensitive to 
fluctuations in aggregate demand. 
The basic principle of these models is that they use a current-price accounting 
framework, so that there are consistent balance sheets for each sector of the economy. 
Every financial asset has a counterpart liability and the balance between flows of 
expenditure, factor incomes and transfers is made explicit. It is these balances of stocks 
and flows and the consistent relationships between them that provides the stability to 
the economy that is absent in aggregated neoclassical models. In this way information 
can be presented about the flows of financial assets and liabilities by which savings 
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move through the financial system into investment, information that is completely 
absent from RBC and DSGE models. 
5.5.3 Godley and Lavoie’s Bank-Money World (BMW) Model 
Although Godley and Lavoie’s models subsequently become more complex, as 
an example we present a very simple model, but one that does introduce a commercial 
bank with firms requiring to borrow fixed capital (Godley and Lavoie 2007, chapter 7). 
This model conforms to the general principles described above, consisting of 
households, production firms and banks, but no government sector. There is a single 
financial asset, money deposits held by households, and only fixed capital expenditures 
are considered. Godley and Lavoie define a balance sheet for their model as shown in 
Table 5.1, and a transaction matrix for their model as shown in Table 5.2.  
Components of the National Income and Product Accounts are arranged as 
transactions between sectors. Below this are the changes in financial assets and 
liabilities that correspond to the Flow of Funds Account. All columns and rows sum to 
zero, since all transactions must have an issuer and a receiver. In this model Godley and 
Lavoie assume an instantaneous quantity adjustment process, so that the matrix 
variables C for consumption, I for investment, N for employment and ∆L for the 
addition to the loan stock represents both quantities supplied and those demanded. The 
transaction matrix implies the following: the income identity 
Y C I= + , (5.22) 
where Y is output, C consumption and I investment, and the firms budget constraint 
, 1 1 1. .lY WB r L Kδ− − −= + + , (5.23) 
where WB is the wage bill, L the stock of debt, rl the interest rate on loans and K the 
capital stock. The subscript -1 denotes a value from the previous period. The surplus 
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income generated by the firms’ sector in each period is exactly equal to that required to 
replace current capital stock depreciation, and forms an amortization fund AF, so that 
1.AF Kδ −= . (5.24) 
The firms’ capital account constraint is  
L I AF∆ = − , (5.25) 
implying that all new capital stock is financed by an increase in the stock of loans. 
Households’ disposable income is given by  
, 1 1.mYD WB r M− −= + , (5.26) 
where M is the stock of money deposits and rm the interest earned on these deposits. 
This implies that deposits increase according to 
1M M M YD C−∆ = − = − . (5.27) 
Because l mr r r= =  in the model, equations 5.23 – 5.27 imply that the outstanding stock 
of bank loans must be equal to the supply of bank deposits: 
M L∆ = ∆ . (5.28) 
Godley and Lavoie close their model with behavioural assumptions, including a 
consumption function for households: 
0 1 2 1. .C YD Mα α α −= + +  (5.29) 
and an investment function for firms 
1.( )TI K K AFγ −= − + ’ (5.30) 




= , (5.31) 
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and α0, α1, α2, γ and κ are all given behavioural parameters. Godley and Lavoie run 
computer simulations to show the consequences of varying some of their model 
parameters.  
Analysing the transactions matrix, it is important to realize that to the extent that 
firms can pay out the quantity AF without borrowing, depends on a transfer of 
investment funds from the capital account to current expenditure. This leaves open the 
question of where these funds come from. Godley and Lavoie’s model does not start 
from the zero position and so cannot account for any increase in investment of the sort 
Eichner believes to be essential for survival (see Eichner 1987, p360). 
Godley and Lavoie claim that their transactions flow matrix ‘sets the monetary 
circuit…within a comprehensive accounting framework’ (2006, p47), but this is not 
strictly correct. The general assumption of the monetary circuit approach is that initial 
finance for firms comes in the form of a loan for the wage bill (see e.g.: Graziani 2003, 
p27). The flow of money arising from this loan must then be specifically traced through 
the series of transactions that follow until it is back in the hands of firms allowing the 
initial loan to be repaid. The model described here does not do this. 
In SFC models there are behavioural equations for the household and firms 
sectors, which are very general and do not make any General Equilibrium (GE) 
assumptions. They must therefore ultimately be confirmed empirically, and so specific 
parameterizations are in theory open to the Lucas Critique (see section 5.2.1). Contrary 
to GE macroeconomic models there is no explicit intertemporal maximisation by 
households – it is an empirical matter as to whether the parameters governing 
consumption in stock-flow models result in any degree of consumption smoothing. 
There is no marginal utility/product equilibrium assumed in the relationship between 
households and firms – instead there is a conflict between firms’ power in the goods 
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market to set a mark-up and workers’ power to demand a share of any productivity 
growth. How this is resolved is imposed by setting the parameters and how they evolve, 
and an inflationary wage-price spiral is certainly not ruled out. There is no overarching 
coherence to the firms’ aims in investing. It is difficult not to see Godley and Lavoie’s 
parameterisation of their model as somewhat arbitrary. 
5.5.4 Money in the Stock-flow model 
Money in Godley and Lavoie’s model is a residual that arises endogenously 
from loans and is available as an asset for households. Digging deeper, we find that 
money is still not fully specified. Money is simply an alternative asset to be held by 
households as a consequence of misaligned expectations; there is no whiff of its 
essentiality as in a true monetary economy. Money is actually more essential for 
transactions in some neoclassical models through the cash-in-advance (CIA) constraints 
as discussed earlier in this chapter. As far as firms are concerned bank loans are simply 
another source of funding investment building, one which they can substitute at small 
relative costs.  
While Godley and Lavoie clam that their matrices represent monetary 
transactions and they explicitly acknowledge the circuitist insight that loans are 
required for production, they do not specify the source of money for each transaction. 
The consequence of this is that they do not recognise the problem that our previous 
analysis of the monetary circuit uncovered. This problem is the need to account for the 
accumulation of monetary profits for the purchase of capital goods. The presence of a 
bank balance sheet in Godley and Lavoie’s model does mean that both money holding 
and borrowing have consequences for the adjustment of assets, but this can take place 
through capital markets in a straightforward way. Nowhere do we see the true 
constraints and complications for the purchase and sale of consumption and investment 
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goods that must arise as a consequence of operating in an economy that 
overwhelmingly demands the use of money in its transactions. The quantity of money 
held may vary according to incorrect expectations, but uncertainty is not a motivation 
for holding money in way that the circuit view accounts for. The problem is that money 
is treated as a stock, whereas a major part of its importance is as a flow. Opening and 
closing balances must be modelled if the true role of money in the production and 
exchange of real goods and services is to be properly understood. 
5.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have surveyed a selection of macroeconomic models that 
attempt to introduce money and determine how monetary factors influence the 
workings of the real economy. We found that general equilibrium models could not 
handle money adequately or even consistently. In any case it is clear that modelling of 
the real economy as an equilibrium arrived at by the construction of a representative 
agent have been revealed as a dead end in macroeoconomic theory. Models that eschew 
the axioms of these model seem more promising, but still flawed. We found that of 
these, the Stock Flow Consistent class of models might provide a better framework, 
since they use a strict balance sheet and flow matrix structure that fits with our analysis 
of monetary flows in Chapter 3. Their behavioural closures, however, still mean that 
they are not flexible enough as they stand to explore the different mechanisms by which 
failed expectations within the triangular production contract are propagated through a 
monetary economy.  
In the next chapter we will adapt the SFC model analysed in this chapter, 
making it less determined and with a better representation of money flows and then use 
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it to present our view of how the interactions within and between triangular production 
















Households Production Firms Banks ∑ 
Money Deposits +M  -M 0 
Loans  -L +L 0 




Balance (net worth) -Vh 0 0 - Vh 
∑ 0 0 0 0 




Money and Production – A Pluralist Approach 
 
174 
Table 5.2  Transactions-flow matrix of Model BMW 
 
  Production Firms Banks  
 Households Current Capital Current Capital ∑ 
Consumption -C +C    0 
Investment 
 +I -I   0 
[Production] 
 [Y]    0 
Wages +WB -WB    0 
Depreciation allowances 
 -AF +AF   0 
Interest on loans  -rl-1.L-1  + rl-1.L-1  0 
Interest on deposits +rm-1.M-1   - rm-1.M-1  0 
Change in loans   +∆L  -∆L 0 
Change in deposits -∆M    +∆M 0 
∑ 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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The previous chapters of this thesis have attempted to outline a picture of the 
monetary system that will allow us to use it as an organising framework for viewing the 
economy. We justify this on the basis that the monetary system is the overarching 
socially determined institution that governs the activities of a modern economy, and 
thus can be relied on to provide consistent landmarks in any reasoning about it. The 
features of this monetary system are firstly; triangular relationships between banks, 
firms and households that create credit-money, and secondly; an accounting system that 
ensures that financial assets and liabilities are always matched in aggregate. The 
triangular relationships also provide the grounds for acceptance and the expected 
valuation of the issued money. The accounting system gives the monetary economy 
structural landmarks. Our argument in the previous chapter has been that there are no 
other such landmarks available. The discussion there emphasised that axiomatic 
behavioural assumptions such as utility maximisation by consumers and profit-
maximisation by firms cannot provide us with a consistent modelling framework. The 
arbitrary assumptions of neoclassical economics about production technology 
(homogeneity of capital, diminishing returns to capital and labour) and exchange 
technology (efficient markets clearing on price) are so far from everyday reality that 
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even pedagogical models with these characteristics should be rejected as worthless. 
Empirical economic relationships that do not rely on institutional permanence are 
always open to the ‘Lucas Critique’: that any observable (and thus known to some 
participants) change in economic circumstances may be known to any of them, and thus 
induce compensating direct action that confounds any predictions based on previous 
behaviour (Lucas 1976). 
Yet we observe in the developed economies a considerable degree of order and 
predictability in the production of firms, the incomes of individuals and the purchasing 
of commodities. Where fluctuations occur they are generally around discernable trends. 
This can largely be put down to the flexibility of the monetary system that has 
developed since medieval times in the producing, marketing economies of the world, 
and in the way that it allows production and exchange efficiencies. Yet this flexibility is 
not without costs, and the balance between the gains and the costs of the monetary 
system must constantly be re-evaluated as the environmental and technological 
conditions of the world change. 
In this final chapter, having regard to the picture of the money and banking 
system we have built up in previous chapters, we discuss how we can understand and 
weigh the gains and costs associated with our modern monetary system. Using these 
insights we then set the triangular production contract we have analysed in Chapters 3 
and 4 in the context of a strict accounting of monetary assets and liabilities. We use this 
to analyse the consequences of failed expectations within the contract and consider how 
policy measures might influence these consequences. 
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6.2 The Gains from Money 
The modern world is built on the harnessing of human ingenuity, along with the 
natural resources of our planet. We do this with ever increasing scale and scope in 
terms of the number and variety respectively of different resources and combinations of 
resources used and the number and variety of differently skilled individuals involved. 
There are two primary co-ordination problems inherent in this system: technological  
co-ordination and incentive co-ordination. 
6.2.1 Technological Co-ordination 
The first co-ordination problem is that of determining how, where and when 
each resource (natural and human) must be employed to produce the ‘optimum’ 
efficiency of production. In fact even on this purely technological basis it is difficult to 
imagine how such a complex problem with so many unknown variables could have a 
determinate optimum, and indeed the pattern has been for powerful individuals (their 
power emanating perhaps from resource wealth, perhaps from power over individuals, 
perhaps from some insight of genius) to envisage a desired outcome of such production 
and by skill or by luck to hit upon a successful arrangement by which this can be 
achieved. As the scale and scope of production has expanded, the organizations these 
individuals have controlled have changed the way they are constructed (although the 
reality of control by individuals or small groups of individuals has not changed). This 
has occurred as the importance of these organisations to the external relationships of 
human life has become more prominent and more widely recognized by the general 
population through their governing institutions. This relationship between the local 
monopoly of force (the state, whether democratic or otherwise) and the individuals 
and/or groups of individuals organizing production has been formalized by the granting 
of limited liability, patent rights and other recognitions in exchange for the right of the 
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state to a share in production in the form of taxation, eventually giving rise to the 
modern entity of the firm.  
The firm is the organisation responsible for the determination of the 
technological aspects of production. By encompassing the resources and individuals 
appropriate to a particular production aim within its aegis it can explore the technical 
possibilities in a directed and consistent way. Because the attributes of declining 
marginal productivity of labour and capital are frequently absent from the technological 
processes chosen, and because the market into which production output is offered is 
rarely of the perfectly competitive type envisaged in neoclassical models, the firm must 
itself determine for what its output is to be exchanged. Clearly the minimum return on 
the offering of its output should enable it to produce again; otherwise the firm has no 
long-term utility. The maximal return will in all probability be non-computable, 
depending on the complex adjustment of needs and desires among potential customers 
and the nature of technologies actually used and those potentially usable by the firm, 
although the firm itself is surely the entity best placed to reach an approximation. In 
any case whether the firm attempts to maximise its current return, its longer-term 
return, or indeed neither will depend on the subsidiary goals of its controllers (Eichner 
1987). 
6.2.2 Incentive Co-ordination 
The second co-ordination problem faced by those wishing to combine resources 
and human skills in production of new goods and services, is that of incentive co-
ordination. Assuming the existence of firms (although this too is subject to incentive 
issues), they do not in the modern world have automatic rights to resources and human 
labour. If they are not to seize these by force, then they must have something to offer in 
exchange. If the firm has been set up for the primary purpose of production, then before 
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the production process starts, it may have no output and so nothing to offer potential 
suppliers of capital goods or of labour. As the complexity of technology (and therefore 
the subjective uncertainty as regards to the value of output) and the time-scale of 
production increases, this becomes more of a problematic issue. Under these conditions 
the technologies that can be utilised by firms become limited, even when the resource 
co-ordination problems have been solved. 
The problem of resource acquisition before production may well be an easier 
one to solve, than that of labour acquisition. The controllers of firms may well enjoy 
social relations with the controllers of natural resources good enough to be able to 
convince them that their investment in the firm is a prudent one (thus the existence of 
‘trade credit’). The problem of convincing individuals to give up some of their labour 
power to produce an output whose existence may appear to them uncertain (and 
possibly its utility more so) and some way off in the future, is likely to be much more 
difficult. Otherwise they can direct all of their labour power to maintaining the needs of 
themselves and of their families. Tokens that firms themselves might issue, 
guaranteeing to their labour providers a fixed quantity of the output that their labour is 
responsible for producing may help to convince them, but there are two limiting issues. 
Firstly the willingness of workers to accept these tokens depends on the trust these 
workers have in the firm, and since this is one of the issues in question this is not a 
secure ground for providing that guarantee. Secondly, the process of production is 
critically limited by the desire of workers for the output of production either for their 
own consumption, or for barter within their own milieu. 
The issues described in the previous paragraph resulted in the rejection of the 
exchange-based explanations of money discussed in Chapter 2. It is not enough to have 
paper backed by individuals because even when the debt is multilateral in the sense that 
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the final creditor is not specified, it is not multilateral on the other side. It still depends 
on the ability of a particular individual to produce a saleable output. The nature of 
modern money is quite different from this, because the backing of modern money is 
divorced from any particular output or any particular demand for that output. This is 
what separates it from being simply a sophisticated form of barter. This is both its 
triumph, and we shall argue, its potential disaster. 
6.2.3 Summarising What Money Is 
The analysis of money cannot reveal any insight unless it is clear that we are 
conceptually separating the flow of money and the flow of real goods and services that 
themselves, without any other intermediation, produce utility to individuals, enhance 
utility to individuals, contribute to the production or consumption of goods and services 
or make the production of goods and services more efficient or effective. The most 
important feature of money that we must remember is its unreality and the fact that it 
has no tangible existence or intrinsic value, despite the presence of tangible money 
tokens. Without this feature of unreality money has no special power or significance; it 
would just be another commodity. Money itself provides no utility, makes no 
technology more efficient; it simply indicates a credit of goods to its receivers and a 
debit of goods to its issuers; credits and debits that are administered by the social 
institution of a bank. This is the definition of money that makes it uniquely important in 
terms of the effective demand present in the economy. The quantity in existence in 
deposits at any time is less important than the rate of flow, and where it is flowing. As 
Keynes makes clear, velocity is not a helpful concept because it lumps all flows and all 
static collections of money together (Keynes 1971[1930]).  
It should also be apparent that a good of durability, portability, value and 
widespread demand such as gold may be a highly liquid asset, but it is very distinct 
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from the money of our study here. Gold’s value is always linked to its intrinsic beauty 
and relative scarcity. These may often be difficult to justify rationally, but they are 
psychological phenomena linked to the substance itself. The famous POW camp 
cigarette economy existed because there were enough smokers who desired the 
cigarettes for themselves, and because the camp community was small enough for the 
calculation of an average demand (addicts tend to have a fairly stable need for the 
object of their addiction) (Radford 1945, Ingham 2004). Non-smokers could therefore 
know in advance what they could expect to barter them for. As Goldberg’s research 
emphasises, and our discussion of the exchange models in Chapter 2 reveals, 
meaningful money cannot exist as a token valued only by convention (Goldberg 2005).1  
Neither are other financial assets money. Bonds are not money; stock 
derivatives are not money; credit cards are not money. Bonds and derivatives may be 
exchanged in transactions, but the transactions do not involve the central tallying of 
generalised debits and credits. A bond is a specific debt that can only be repaid by the 
success of a particular commercial or state enterprise; its value stands or falls on the 
doings of that enterprise or that state. It is always tied to some observable aspect of the 
real economy. Financial assets always represent inactive purchasing power that cannot 
influence the real economy directly without being first converted into active purchasing 
power in the form of money.2 By observing the flow of money into and out of such 
assets we have all the information we require. 
Derivatives are tied in the same way – at one remove in time may be, but the 
area of the economy they are tied to is always specified. Credit cards are simply an 
                                                 
1
 There might appear to be a counter-argument based on ‘rational bubbles’ and conventional valuations, 
but these see great fluctuations, are only in small segments of the economy and always have a finite 
lifespan. These mechanisms cannot therefore explain a stable monetary system.  
2
 Fluctuations in the subjective valuation of financial assets can of course have real economic 
consequences, through balance-sheet effects, but this just emphasises the distinction between them and 
money. Money held as an asset is never revalued.    
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extended authority to create credit on behalf of the holder. When the purchasing power 
created is matched by a debit with the card provider, they are simply a delegated and 
limited authority to create more money. 3 
6.2.4 Money and Mediation  
We have argued that money is not simply some common good or token for a 
specific output that is exchanged because there is enough demand for the good to create 
a steady flow of the good or its token into and out of the economy. Money is a token 
which can be redeemed in any good and is issued by a third party whose role is to 
mediate between debtors and creditors, without being directly involved in production 
him or herself. The third party must therefore have two essential features. Firstly they 
must be able to record both the debts of the producers as assets and the credits of the 
suppliers of capital goods and labour as liabilities and to match them in aggregate. That 
is to say that they must perform some system of double-entry book-keeping (even if it 
is in the primitive form of tally-sticks and stubs (Wray 2003). And, secondly, they must 
wield some power over the debtors, whether this is through the peer pressure of a 
merchants’ guild, the power of a local ruler or the enforcement processes of financial 
and contract law in the modern state. If such a third party exists (let’s now call it a 
bank), then the chances of a contract developing between a firm and its suppliers of 
goods and labour may be much enhanced. These suppliers know that the enforcement 
powers behind the bank will ensure that they receive a portion of the firm’s output and 
the bank’s book-keeping means that all parties know exactly what that portion will be. 
The great positive and negative powers of money and banking lie also in the 
generality of banks and money. Since the guarantees and trust are transferred away 
from the producers themselves, and the bank produces no specific real objects, the 
                                                 
3
 See also discussion of Features of Money in Chapter 1. 
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banking process need not distinguish between any output or any mode of production. 
Any firm may use the same bank, and since the essence of money is not in the 
particular output that it guarantees in a specific credit issue, but in the enforcement and 
information retaining power that the bank has access to, the money liabilities issued are 
not tied to any specific output. These liabilities are tied to all of the output produced by 
any of the firms who have debts with the bank. As a consequence the credits issued to 
firms’ suppliers are credits to the output to any of the firms who have debits with that 
particular bank. In this way, the monetary issue of the banks allows the capital goods 
and labour suppliers of the various firms direct access to the output of all of the firms 
with debits to that bank, without the need to exchange their own labour or output 
directly in barter. The beneficial effect of money and banking is thus to vastly expand 
the scope of demand for possible new combinations of labour and resources, and so in 
turn to make their production and supply viable where it was not before. 
6.3 The Costs of Money 
6.3.1 Money and Information Loss 
What makes money unique is the separation it creates between its holders (the 
creditors of the system) from the banks’ borrowers (the debtors of the system). There 
need be no direct communication or information transfer between the borrowers and the 
creditors. The link that would otherwise exist between a firm and capital goods or 
labour supplier in a pre-monetary economy is therefore broken. To the extent that this 
link is limiting in the ways described above, this is a benefit. No one need know who 
the bank has originally lent specfic money to, or who is expected to return that money 
to the borrower. But surely the absence of information and communication cannot be 
wholly beneficial? Indeed it is not, and now we explain why it is not in the case of 
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money. Let us start by considering what suppliers of goods and labour will know about 
the firm they are supplying to, before the advent of multi-firm banking. They and the 
firm are relying on the direct utility value of the output to determine the benefit or 
otherwise of the production process (see the ‘hostage’ model in chapter 2). There is 
thus a strong incentive for all parties to calculate the real effects, positive and negative, 
of the output and the processes required to achieve it. At this stage decisions are not 
made on monetary values alone. 
When the money economy is limited in scale, there remain alternatives to 
supplying labour to firms. Individuals have the option of applying their labour power to 
their own immediate desires, if the calculation of benefit from engaging in a monetary 
production process does not exceed this. As the monetary economy encompasses more 
and more of production and of the resources required for it, and the skills required for 
any degree of self-sufficiency become lost, this option is eroded so that the alternative 
too is lost. Individuals are no longer in a position to calculate the benefits of entering 
the production process, and indeed the necessity to so calculate appears to have been 
removed by the generality of money’s purchasing power. The ubiquity of money’s 
acceptance, in token form or in the direct manipulation of the banks’ books by way of 
cheque, debit and credit card, means that for the individual and for the most of the time 
this is true. But while the link between the individual creditor and debtor can be 
dissolved in the mass of monetary transactions, the significant effects of the monetary 
system depend on its effect on the final real world of production and consumption, and 
the link between these in aggregate cannot be broken. What is produced has an effect 
when it is consumed, on humans and on the rest of the natural world, and if it is not 
consumed this has feedback effects on production. The process of production has an 
effect on the natural and human resources used to produce. Where these decisions, in a 
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non-monetary economy, are taken by individuals about their own inputs and processes 
contemporaneously, in a monetary economy the ‘black box’ of banking and money 
renders these and their effects largely invisible at their time of application. These 
effects may be revealed only when irreversible consequences have resulted. As we have 
shown in Chapter 5, contrary to the assumptions of Walrasian models the economy and 
society are not in a timeless equilibrium, but are path-dependent. If we do not pay close 
attention to the path we desire to follow, we may stray off it perhaps never to find it 
again. 
6.3.2 Money and Risk 
The use of money appears to play an important part in reducing the exposure of 
individual transactions to risk. In the case of money issued in a credit contract, the risk 
to suppliers of capital goods and labour that they may not get their promised share of 
the output of the firm to which they supply is apparently removed by their acceptance 
of general purchasing power. In the event of the firm failing to produce the planned 
output, because their money holdings are ‘bundled’ liabilities, they still have value in 
the form of their validity for the purchase of goods and services produced by other 
firms within the monetary economy. There is also a reduction in risk for pure exchange 
transactions.  
It is important however, to be clear that the real world risk that existed before 
these monetary operations remains. The point of impact of this risk has simply been 
adjusted. We must not assume that because individuals perceive a local improvement in 
their risk profile as a result of the translation of economic operations into monetary 
transactions, that this benefit is a real one to hold at all times. The Keynesian analysis 
of uncertainty shows us that risk is not so easily eliminated. As the benefits of 
insurance depend on the risk-aversion of the insured, the benefits of monetary 
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transactions depend on the attitude to adverse events of those involved. And this 
attitude may or not be appropriate depending on the information available to 
transactors. A severe enough event will sweep away the insurance company too, 
resulting in the loss of premiums and with no benefits payable to the insured. In this 
case the insured are worse off than they would have been with no insurance. Ignorance 
of the possibility of such a catastrophe will result in a false assessment of the risks and 
benefits of insurance. Given that we have argued in the previous section that a 
monetary economy involves the existence of a loss of information and communication 
between debtors and creditors, the very existence of a monetary economy may distort 
the perceived risk-benefit profile of transactions and create risks that exceed the 
generally calculable ones dealt with by insurance. 
What are the new risks present in a monetary economy that are not present in a 
non-monetary system? As we have made clear in Chapter 4 the purchasing power of 
money is issued by banks in the expectation of either the purchase of goods and 
services yet to be produced (production loans), labour that is yet to be expended 
(household loans) or efficiency/information gains from change of asset ownership 
(speculative loans). All of these gains are to be made at the margin: for production 
loans the difference between the value of inputs and their combination; for household 
loans the difference between the utility of consumption now and the utility of 
consumption later and for speculative loans the difference between asset performance 
in one set of hands and that in another. The cost-benefit differential in each case is 
therefore sensitive to relatively small changes in value of the anticipated end-point of 
each triangular contract. Failures of expectation may come about because of 
unexpected ‘external’ events – events that affect the production or utilisation of the 
‘final good’ or unexpected ‘internal’ events – events producing a change in demand 
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from the prospective consumer. As long as these cancel out, there is no systemic 
problem, but the tendency to conventional behaviour can lead to aggregate swings. We 
model and analyse this problem in the next section. 
6.4 Expectations Failure in a Stock-Flow Consistent 
Model  
We shall set up a Stock Flow Consistent Framework and analyse the effects of 
failed expectations within the triangular contract. Since the purchasing power issued in 
a production contract has been assigned a fixed value in the money of account, the 
effects of a failure of expectations will be reflected in a mismatch between real value 
and monetary value. We will distinguish between a reduced quantity of output and 
reduced quality of output. Both represent a reduction in benefit in relation to 
expectations but a reduced quantity of otherwise satisfactory output is usually obvious 
and needs an explicit price rise by the firm to recoup revenue.4 A reduced quality of 
output may well be less obvious to consumers; to the extent that it is it will not 
command the expected price per unit of output, or will not be sold at all.  
The model is based on the ‘Simple Model with Private Bank Money’ that we 
analysed in the last chapter (Godley and Lavoie 2007, pp217-249) with the innovation 
of the division of production firms into three sectors, two consumer goods firms sectors 
and an investment goods sector. The firms’ counterpart in the transactions flow matrix 
to the consumption of households is explicitly a function of the price and quantity of 
output sold. This allows us to trace the effects mediated through other firms and their 
output when one sector suffers from unfulfilled expectations. Table 6.1 is the Balance 
Sheet for this economy and Table 6.2 is the Transaction Flow Matrix.  
                                                 
4
 See discussion of production in Chapter 1. 
Money and Production – A Pluralist Analysis 
188 
6.4.1 Households 
Wage-earning households are distinguished between those that are employed by 
sector 1 or sector 2 consumer goods firms, by investment goods firms or by banks. We 
have assumed that households have the option of consuming their wage income or of 
saving it either in the form of bonds they can purchase from consumer goods firms or in 
the form of money deposits held with the banks. In this model there is no explicit 
household borrowing although we will discuss the importance of this later. The general 
household budget constraint for each discrete period we analyse in the model is derived 
from the transactions matrix and is 
wE C BH M= + ∆ + ∆ , (6.1) 
where w is a standard wage, E the level of employment in terms of an effort and skill 
adjusted unit of labour, C is consumption, BH the monetary value of bond holdings and 
M nominal money holdings. This budget constraint always holds in each period, both in 
aggregate and for each employment sector, with the subscript 1 indicating households 
employed by consumption goods sector 1, the subscript 2 indicating households 
employed by consumption goods sector 2, subscript K indicating households employed 
by the investment goods sector and subscript B households employed by the banking 
sector. 
6.4.2 Firms 
The production process is assumed to start with a bank loan for the process of 
meeting the wage bill, or that part of it that must be met before a revenue flow is 
established. Both consumer goods and investment goods firms must borrow before 
production starts. This must be true in aggregate since loans are the source of all money 
in the model, and therefore any retained money by one firm must represent outstanding 
debt for another. 
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Profit and investment in the model can be interpreted either as revenue over 
costs that is spent in the same period, which implies that the period in the model 
represents an investment cycle or in the Kaleckian sense that investment expenditure is 
returned as profit. In any case profit investment and investment are equivalent flows in 
each period (Kalecki 1971).  
Consumer Goods Sector 
For the consumer goods firms sector, revenue comes from sales to households, 
and costs consist of the wage bill of the relevant sector and interest payments on loans 
incurred in this period and those outstanding from previous periods. The difference 
between revenue and costs shows up as profit or loss for that period. If a profit is made, 
this is assumed either to offset any outstanding loan and/or used to purchase investment 
goods from the investment goods sector. If a loss is made, this can in part be offset by 
the sale of bonds to households of all sectors, so that the addition to the loan is limited. 
To avoid complications it has been assumed in the model that these bonds do not earn 
any return for their holders, but clearly in the real world there must be a positive 
incentive to hold them on the part of households and some cost to firms in issuing them. 
If despite the sale of bonds firms still fail to earn enough revenue to repay their current 
production loans, then the difference is added to their total outstanding loans. Thus the 
period budget constraint for consumer goods firms in sector 1 is 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1. . . . .LF p Q w E R L r w E= − − − . (6.2) 
where p1 is the price charged for each unit of their output, Q1 the number of output units 
sold, R1 the aggregated interest liability on outstanding loans L1, rL the current loan 
interest charged by the banks and F1 the current profit for the period. The current 
budget constraint for firms in sector 2 is then simply 
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 2 2 2 2 2 2 2. . . . .LF p Q w E R L r w E= − − − . (6.3) 
The changes in loan position at the end of the period for consumer goods sectors 
1 and 2 are respectively given by 
 1 1 1 1KL p K F B∆ = − −∆ , (6.4) 
and 
2 2 2 2KL p K F B∆ = − −∆ , (6.5) 
where if F1 ≤ 0, then pKK1 = 0; and if F2 ≤ 0, then pKK2 = 0. K1 and K2 are the purchases 
of investment goods and ∆B1 and ∆B2 are the new Bond issues for consumer goods 
sectors 1 and 2 respectively. The price of investment goods is pK. Ignoring asset price 
fluctuations, investment spending builds up fixed capital in the consumer goods sectors 
according to 
1 1KFK p K∆ = , (6.6) 
and 
2 2KFK p K∆ = . (6.7) 
Investment Goods Sector 
To simplify the model we have assumed that the Investment Goods sector pays 
no interest on its production loans and always breaks even, making neither profit nor 
loss. Thus its budget constraint is simply 
K KwE p K= , (6.8) 
where K is the total sales of investment goods to the consumer goods sector. 
Banking Sector 
Finally we model the banking sector as having the current budget constraint  
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1 1 2 2 1 2. . . . . .B L LwE R L R L r w E r w E= + + + , (6.9) 
and a balance sheet constraint 
M L∆ = ∆ . (6.10) 
The only other consistent assumptions we make in the model are that the level 
of employment in each sector does not react perversely to a change in the wage level, 
so that 
( ), ( ) 0E E w E w′= ≥ , for all E; 
and that the sale of goods in each sector does not react perversely to a change in price, 
so that 
( ), ( ) 0Q Q p Q p′= ≤ , for all Q and all p, 
and  
( ), ( ) 0K K p K p′= ≤ . 
6.4.3 Quantitative Failure of Output Expectations 
We can easily show the effects of realised output sales that are less than that 
expected when sector 1’s triangular production contract is made. Sales may be lower 
than expected either because the output technology was not as efficient as expected, or 
because the good was not as desirable as expected. It is our claim that the nature of the 
information deficit that arises in a monetary economy makes this more likely. We 








wE BH M p QQ
p
−∆ −∆ −= , (6.11) 
and actual (realised) output by 








wE BH M p QQ
p
−∆ −∆ −= . (6.12) 
The wage rate w, skill-adjusted effort E, and Sector 2 output Q2 are given and constant; 
but aggregate bond holding BH, aggregate deposits M and the prices of Sector 1 and 
sector 2 output, p1 and p2 respectively may adjust so that equation 6.12 holds.  
If realised output is less than expected output, then 
1 1
R EQ Q<   
which implies either 
1 1
R Ep p> ; or 
2 2
R Ep p> ; or 
R EM M∆ > ∆ ; or 
R EBH BH∆ > ∆  
or some combination of these. 
The overall price level is determined by a weighted consumer price index 
calculated according to 
1 1 2 2
1 2
i





which implies that the price level will rise if there is a proportional increase in total 
revenue greater than the proportional increase in total output.   
We will analyse each possible adjustment route in turn. 
A rise in the price of Sector 1 goods ( 1 1R Ep p> ) 
If the demand for Sector 1 goods is price inelastic, then the sector may be able to 
recoup most of its needed revenue by increasing the price of its output. If the sector can 
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increase its price to the level at which expected revenue is still received, then there need 
be no change in any of the other variables. Thus Sector 2 prices and revenue are 
unchanged. Sector 1 firms can earn their expected profits (if any) and repay their loans 
as anticipated. The banks earn their interest and see no loan defaults.  
Since the wage bill of Sector 1 firms was anticipated to be (at least) wholly 
recouped in sales, and the value of output 1
EQ  and its anticipated price 1Ep  set in the 
production contract will price wages in line with the expected return from wages of 
goods already produced, no effective rise in the weighted price index (Eq 6.11) was 
expected.5 In the situation where 1 1
R Ep p> , even if 1
Rp  is high enough to result in the 
Sector 1 revenue being what was anticipated, Q1 is still lower than it would have been if 
expectations had been fulfilled, and so there is a rise in the weighted price index. Under 
this scenario, then, the failed expectations have been overtly inflationary. The real wage 
iw p  falls.  
A rise in the price of Sector 2 Goods ( 2 2R Ep p> ) 
In reality it is unlikely that Sector 1 firms can push the price of their output up 
to the level required to wholly recoup their expected revenue. If they could maintain the 
quantity demanded at this new higher price, it is likely that the original price set in the 
production contract would have been higher. Thus the effect of attempting to recoup 
revenue by raising p1 is likely to be the substitution by households of goods and 
services produced by sector 2. The increased demand for these goods is likely to see an 
increased price for these goods. The increase in p2 is also reflected in a rise in the price 
index pi and a resultant fall in the real wage iw p . To the extent that Sector 1 firms fail 
to realise their anticipated revenue they may fall short of the final finance to repay their 
bank debts. Given the sector 1 budget constraint (Eq 6.2) they would then be dependent 
                                                 
5
 This is the effect predicted by the Real Bills Doctrine (see Chapter 4).  
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on increasing their issue of bonds to households or increasing their level of bank loans. 
The former would be likely to require an increase in the return offered on securities. 
The latter assume the ability to repay these loans in the future. In other words the firm 
must now anticipate future revenue in excess of expectations to repay its debts. For 
sector 2 firms nominal profits would rise, and these firms may interpret this as evidence 
of expectations on their part that had been too low, rather than failed expectations in 
sector 1.  
If firms of sector 1 are unable to maintain their position by cutting their losses in 
exchange for persistent debt in this way, they must default on loans. As we have 
described in chapter 3 the consequence of a loan default should be the writing off of the 
equivalent quantity of capital from the bank’s assets. As a consequence of this, the 
quantity of money available in the economy should eventually come to match the 
quantity of goods and services available for purchase at the prices expected at the time 
of the production contract. Direct inflationary pressures are then relieved. In this case it 
is the bank that is punished for the failure to anticipate demand correctly. We have not 
explicitly shown this in the transactions flow matrix but a negative value for ∆L in the 
banks capital column represents a balance sheet anomaly that the banks must correct. 
An Increase in the Money holdings of Households ( R EM M∆ > ∆ ) 
If sector 1 goods are in short supply or are not demanded as anticipated, but the 
goods of sector 2 are not adequate substitutes, then households may opt to hold part of 
their wage income as money deposits, for better expenditure options in future periods. 
sector 1 income held in this way does not play any part in changing prices, and 
therefore does not have inflationary effects. The firms of sector 1 are however impaired 
in their ability to earn profits for investment or to repay their production loans at the 
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end of this period and as in the above scenario may become dependent on attracting 
securities holdings from households or increasing their loans with the banks.  
An Increase in Bond Holdings ( R EBH BH∆ > ∆ ) 
Where households see no immediately attractive option for expenditure, and do 
not feel the need to add to their immediately available money deposits, they may be 
willing to purchase long-term securities issued by firms whose failed expectations have 
left them short of ‘final finance’ (Graziani 2003). This has no effect on prices and is a 
non-inflationary result of failed expectations. Moreover it protects firms from being 
unable to repay their bank loans. 
6.4.4 Qualitative Failure of Output Expectations 
By qualitative expectations failure we mean that although the quantity of goods 
produced by the firms in consumer goods sector 1 is as expected and sales are as 
expected, their actual real benefits are for some reason less than anticipated. This is less 
amenable to analysis than the quantitative story, but is still important. Households 
might find themselves suffering from these expectation failures after purchasing goods, 
because they did not have adequate information before doing so, or because after the 
triangular contract is completed they do not have a satisfactory alternative use of their 
purchasing power. The consequence is that there has been a real reduction in the value 
of this purchasing power and in their real wage that does not show up in the current 
price index or in firms’ current loan defaults. However it may well have effects that are 
propagated into subsequent production contracts. Again, we argue that the separation 
between the creation of money in one production contract and its destruction almost 
always in a different production contract leads to information deficits that make 
qualitative expectations failure very likely. 
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6.4.5 Cost-push Inflation 
When the demand for commodities increases in relation to their supply their 
prices rise. These price rises filter through to the prices of manufactured goods to the 
extent that these commodities are required capital goods in production. By combining 
equations 6.1 and 6.2 we obtain an expression relating the price of Sector 1 consumer 
goods to Sector 1 firms’ costs: 
1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1
. . .wE R L r w E Fp Q
+ + +
= . (6.14) 
The important difference between this equation and the realised quantity 
equation 6.12 is that this equation is one that should be apparent before expectations are 
realised. In other words it is known at the time that the production contract is created. If 
Sector 1 firms suffer from reduced productivity of their capital from one period to the 
next, (which can be represented in an increase in the amount of labour E1 they need to 
hire to produce output Q1) then their wage bill must increase to produce the same 
output. Assuming fixed interest rates, to maintain their current budget constraint Sector 
1 firms must either reduce their anticipated profit or increase the price they plan to 
charge for their output. Their choice is likely to depend on the relative elasticities of the 
labour market. An inelastic labour market may allow a reduction in the wage rate; 
otherwise workers may seek employment with firms in the other sectors. An inelastic 
product market may allow an increase in prices to raise revenue toward that required to 
match the new level of costs. To the extent that either are possible there is a fall in the 
value of the real wage, but only an increase in prices will bring about an overt increase 
in inflation. Note that there is an incentive for workers to collude with firms in 
preferring a price rise to a fall in wages, since the real wage fall that results is 
distributed throughout the whole of the economy rather than being concentrated in 
Sector 1. 
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When inflation occurs as a result of recognised rises in costs, there is no 
unexpected mismatch between money and real output. Any loss of value of money is 
built into a production contract with the recognition that the rise in production costs is 
responsible for a fall in the real wage. It is therefore important to distinguish between 
these phenomena. Cost-driven price rises can be anticipated and often offset at an early 
stage. They are therefore much less likely to give rise to the problems seen as a result of 
failed expectations.  
6.4.6 Propagated Expectation Effects 
The process of new production contracts is a constant, indeed more or less 
seamless one, and so the outcome of one production cycle leads into the next one and 
overlaps with many others. How to define an individual ‘contract’ is clearly an 
impossible task, but it is clear that over time there is a connection between the 
realisation or otherwise of expectations and subsequent expectation formation. 
Depending on the expected marginal benefit from the labour or capital goods 
contract, households may lose out from inflationary changes in price levels that result 
from quantitative expectations failures, or from qualitative expectations failures, both 
of which reduce the real wage w/p. If so the effects of this will be felt in the next cycle 
when these individuals may demand a higher money wage to enter into a new 
production contract. How much more cautious they will be may depend on the degree 
of net loss and psychological factors and so will in general be unquantifiable until the 
effect manifests itself in the next round of production contracts. There may be a 
positive feedback effect in the upward repricing of wages and goods. 
When firms’ revenue expectations are disappointed because output is less than 
expected or they cannot get the anticipated price for their goods, they may have reduced 
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profit for investment, problems in repaying their bank debts, and may even have 
problems in paying interest on their debts. The consequence may be that firms’ plan a 
more conservative approach for the next period. This may take the form of cutting back 
on production (lowering E1), reducing investment (lowering K1) and/or attempting to 
squeeze workers or investment goods suppliers to reduce costs for the same level of 
output (lowering w or pK).  
If a failed revenue expectation results in a firm defaulting on a loan, the issuing 
bank’s assets are reduced and interest payments fail to materialise. The bank must lose 
some of its capital to re-order its balance sheet.  
6.4.7 Inflationary Lags 
With a quantitative expectational failure, demand for a firms’ output does not 
materialise after money has been borrowed and paid out to capital goods suppliers and 
workers. Since it takes a non-negligible amount of time to realise and to accept that 
such an expectation failure has materialised, the mismatch between effective demand in 
the form of money consumers wish to spend and the quantity of goods and services 
available to purchase may persist at a high level for some time. 
In other words it may be some time before firms are willing to accept that they 
are not going to sell their goods at the price they had expected to do so to achieve their 
projected revenue. While these goods and services remain unsold, alternative goods and 
services are being purchased at higher than anticipated prices and so the general price 
level rises. The longer it takes Sector 1 firms to reduce their prices the higher prices of 
Sector 2 goods may rise. This general rise in prices may well mean that Sector 1 firms 
can recoup more of its anticipated revenue than might otherwise have been the case as a 
result of confusion between general and relative price rises. In the case where a 
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proportion of a firm’s output remains persistently unsaleable to the extent that the firm 
must default on its loan, there is greater inflationary pressure – resulting in even greater 
labour devaluation. 
6.4.8 Aggregate Effects 
Were economic agents atomistic and unconnected there is no reason to suppose 
that expectations should be disappointed more often than they are exceeded, so that 
over any period the effects of disappointed and exceeded expectations would cancel 
each other out. It is clear that in practice there are cycles of aggregate increasing and 
reducing prices and of aggregate increasing and reducing activity encompassed by the 
monetary economy, on a background trend of increase in both. We can explain the 
tendency to cycles by the way the results of expectations impact upon successive 
periods, and the tendency for expectations to be ‘conventional’ (Keynes 1964[1936], 
Dow 2003). The secular trend in both monetary economic activity and in prices 
suggests, moreover, that there is a tendency to spend on other goods when households 
expectations are disappointed rather than to hold onto money in the hope of seeing the 
price of unsold stocks fall. 
The tendency for consumers to spend when their expectations are disappointed, 
and thus ‘collude’ in the devaluation of their labour, may be as a result of needing to 
spend on essential goods, excessive positive time discounting or due to lack of 
foresight. The first relates to the extent that the monetary economy has encompassed 
the production of necessities such as food, energy and housing, the second and third 
may well relate to the problem that individuals have in linking their inputs with the 
outputs of firms. They may be aware that the goods they hoped for at the prices they 
anticipated are not available or do not match up to their expectations, but in the 
multilateral web of credits and debts hidden by the monetary economy, there is little 
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chance of understanding why this has arisen. Their only chance of rectifying their 
situation is to attempt to increase their monetary wage in the next production contract. 
Yet the reality may be that the firm was guilty of miscalculating the efficiency of its 
technology, or of overselling its output. The divorced relationship allowed by the 
monetary economy means that it is unlikely that workers have the motivation or the 
ability to check this within their own firm before output is produced. Yet, unless it is 
the miscalculating firm that bears the brunt of the expectational failure, the incentive to 
correct expectations may remain absent for the next cycle.  
The market power of firms means that when workers seek to rectify a temporary 
devaluing of their labour resulting from failed expectations in the monetary economy 
by demanding a higher monetary recompense, firms can often anticipate raising the 
monetary price of their output to bring their anticipated revenue in line with their costs. 
If the miscalculation is so great that the firm has to default on its debt, then the bank 
that advanced the production loan has failed in its contract with the suppliers of labour 
and capital goods, and it is efficient that the bank is incentivised by the loss of part of 
its capital base to reappraise its lending strategy.  
6.4.9 Distributional Effects 
In summary, there is no reason why the existence of money should in itself 
result in the failure of the economy to adjust appropriately to incorrect or changed 
expectations. The problems of the monetary economy lie in the information and 
communication gap that results from the devolving of credit and debit matching to the 
banking system. The monetary system evolved as a system to provide reassurance to 
the parties entering a ‘production’ contract. The superb qualities of money as a medium 
of exchange, once created in the production contract, had a positive feedback effect on 
the development of the monetary system, to the extent that we have become blinded to 
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the problems that the system sweeps so effectively under the carpet. These problems do 
not go away however – they resurface away from the level of the individual and at the 
systemic level, to produce problems that do not exist in a non-monetary economy. The 
ability to act on expectations on a large scale that the monetary system allows means 
that when those are unrealised, this failure is on a large scale. Such large-scale failures 
can have large-scale consequences. There are the problems of firm failure and bank 
failure. These are intrinsic to any monetary system and must be managed. There is also 
the problem of inflation. As we have argued in Chapter 4, inflation is not intrinsic to a 
monetary system but it is a regularly observed feature of monetary economies. When 
inflation is overtly expressed in the price level, and affects all participants in the 
economy to a greater or lesser extent, collective action is not generally in dispute.  
Our analysis has indicated that when there are qualitative expectational failures, 
inflation need not be overt in that the real value that money wages can purchase may 
fall even if the price level is stable. The section of the economy that is responsible for 
expectational failure may not bear the brunt of it. If the economy is to adjust efficiently 
and effectively it is critical that the cost of expectational failure falls on those actors in 
the economy whose expectations were at fault and must be corrected. Here there are 
very clear sectional interests, and the scope for collective agreement is much more 
troublesome. 
6.5 Consequences and Remedies 
6.5.1 Money and Utility 
We have argued in the previous sections that when we set up the relations 
between the monetary and the real economy in this way, the separation between debtors 
and creditors in the modern money and banking system results in a tendency to the 
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mismatch of the issue of credit-money and real output as a result of failed expectations. 
In particular, the parties to production processes, whether controllers of firms, 
employees of the firms or suppliers of capital goods to the firms do not see their 
welfare in terms of the real utility value of the output of the firm but in their anticipated 
share of the monetary revenue of the firm. And since the firm can back up its 
expectations (on condition of convincing a bank that it can repay any loan) with 
purchasing power in the form of money, no further guarantee is looked for. Once 
expectations have failed, the production process is irreversible and all parties suffer to 
varying extents that are frequently not related to the part they have played in failing to 
anticipate outcomes correctly. Aggregate human psychology frequently plays a part in 
waves of negative and positive expectation mismatches, and the consequent waves of 
inflation and reduced economic activity that have little or any relationship with the 
current state of human technology or the organisational ability to harness it fruitfully. 
As we write this we are seeing the outcome of a major episode of the 
mismatching of money issued in the form of credit to purchase financial assets (assets 
based on the ability of someone else to provide an income stream or a higher sum of 
money some time in the future) of unascertained (frequently close to zero) real value.  
The problem seems to be that it has been ignored that the only final way to recoup 
money that has been borrowed and then spent is to produce something that somebody 
wants to buy for the purpose of enhancing their welfare. It seems that too few of the 
complicated financial transactions of recent decades have managed to produce this. 
Securitised mortgage contracts have not enhanced the welfare of those unable to obtain 
the earning power ever to repay them, complicated debt insurance arrangements have 
failed to ensure the assets of pension funds maintain their value because the riskiness of 
these assets could not just be made to disappear. Such problems have been exacerbated 
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by the process of financialisation we referred to in Chapter 1 (Stockhammer 2007, 
Palley 2007). What options for monetary policy are suggested by our analysis of the 
systemic problems of a modern economy?  
6.5.2 The Current State of Monetary Policy 
Day to day economic policy for many developed countries consists of specific 
inflation targeting; for those where it does not, it seems that that the rate of inflation 
remains the over-riding target for policy (Rochon and Rossi 2006). Generally the main 
instrument of policy is limited to a short-term interest rate. Despite apparent success in 
keeping inflation at low and stable levels in those countries where inflation targeting is 
the policy of choice (explicitly or implicitly), there is little evidence that the anticipated 
benefits in terms of increased growth and a more even distribution of income has been 
seen.6 There has been slow growth, poor employment generation and little evidence in a 
reduction in the sacrifice ratio (the unemployment cost of reducing inflation). The main 
consequence seems to have been wealth accruing to rentiers as a result of high real 
interest rates (Epstein 2003). 
As we have argued in Chapter 4, interest rates are neither the cost of capital nor 
recompense for purchasing power foregone. In a competitive lending environment 
interest rates are determined by the costs of issuing loans. These costs are primarily 
enforcement, administrative, and default costs. For commercial banks, much of the 
enforcement costs are passed on to the state and are paid for by the banks in the form of 
the interest they must pay to acquire the base money they require for their day-to-day 
operations. By adjusting their part of the costs of commercial banks the state therefore 
has some leverage over the cost-benefit calculations they make in their lending 
                                                 
6
 In fact even the role of inflation targeting in reducing inflation can be questioned (Rochon and Rossi  
2006) 
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decisions. If the state increases the costs of commercial banks lending activities by 
raising the lending rate of its central bank, then ceteris paribus such activities can be 
expected to decrease, and if the state decreases these costs ceteris paribus they can be 
expected to increase.  
It is important to begin by noting a conflict between the desire of the state to use 
the interest rate of the central bank to influence the level of commercial bank loans 
offered, and the degree to which the price charged by the state to the banking sector for 
its role in the enforcement of lending contracts is a fair one. If the price of loans is too 
high, marginally profitable economic activity is reduced. If the price is too low then 
ultimately tax payments or a running down of the state must compensate, and there is a 
moral hazard effect. If the cost to the commercial banks of lending is set too low, then 
this need not in itself lead to excessive loans with resultant increased level of failed 
expectations and the consequences described above, but the moral hazard is that the 
higher mark-up made possible by lower-than-warranted costs will lead banks to 
discount the possibility of failed expectations to a greater than desirable extent. Thus 
the importance, given that governments are attempting to use interest rates to offset 
some of the inevitable consequences of the existence of money and banking, of 
attempting to find the right central bank rate of interest. But of course the monetary 
economy is opaque for the state also, and they too, even if they know where the 
problems of failed expectations have arisen are unable to do anything other than bring 
about a blanket increase in costs for the banking sector that will be transferred to other 
sectors depending on their market power in various areas of the economy. Central bank 
interest rates are thus a very blunt, inaccurate and often poorly-timed corrective for 
excessive (or indeed excessively weak) expectations. In the next section we shall 
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consider some alternative interventions for addressing the shifted problems of the 
monetary economy. 
Using our SFC model in this chapter we can trace the possible effects of interest 
rate policy, using the sector budget constraints (Equations 6.2 and 6.3). Under 
circumstances where expectations failure leads to an inflationary outcome – Sector 1 
and or Sector 2 prices rise and effective Sector 1 output falls, so that the price index (Eq 
6.13) increases - the monetary authority will raise the interest rate for the acquisition of 
base money by the banks. Although this is not specifically modelled, we assume that 
the current interest rate r charged to consumer goods firms increases. This means that 
all firms (irrespective of the outcome of their expectations in the previous period) face a 
higher interest rate burden in the next. For Sector 1 firms, whose revenue was less than 
anticipated, this comes on top of an increased outstanding loan and interest burden. 
Depending on the nature of their production function and the anticipated elasticity of 
their demand all firms may seek to reduce their investment K1, their labour force E1 or 
raise the price of their output p1 or some or all of these. The rise in loan interest rates 
may lead to a rise in the returns to deposits and securities (not modelled explicitly 
here), that further inhibits economic activity by reducing households’ propensity to 
consume. Again this will reduce the revenue of firms in both Sector 1, whose 
expectations in the last period were not achieved and that of firms in Sector 2, whose 
were. Moreover, the adjustment of interest rates does nothing to affect the pre-existing 
money to demanded output mismatch that led to the rise in prices. Only future over-
expectation by firms (made less likely by the higher rates) can achieve this. 
In the case where failed output expectations do not lead to a rise in the price 
index, because money not spent on Sector 1 output is held as deposits, then prices do 
not rise but firms fall short of the revenue required to meet their profit or debt targets. 
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In some cases they may default, damaging banks balance sheets. The likely 
consequence is an unwillingness to plan future output with subsequent reduced 
employment levels. The only remedy for the monetary authority is to reduce interest 
rates in the hope that the subsequent reduction in costs will encourage firms to make 
positive plans ahead once more. A concomitant fall in the rates of return paid to deposit 
and bond-holders may increase the propensity to consume, with a subsequent rise in the 
price index. Again the interest rate does nothing to actually correct the money-output 
mismatch. 
In conclusion, interest rate policy is a clumsy after-the-fact instrument that can 
do nothing to improve the success of expectations, and is likely to cause as much 
worsening as amelioration of the consequences of their failure. 
6.5.3 Alternative Monetary Policy Options 
The problem with a monetary and banking system of the type we have in 
modern economies is that meaningful links between the suppliers of resources, in 
particular suppliers of labour, the firms that they supply to and the ultimate consumers 
of the goods and services that these firms produce are absent. The link is lost across the 
balance sheets of banks as debtors and creditors are ‘matched’ in ever more complex 
ways. In fact it has recently become clear that as financial institutions attempt to escape 
from the limitations of the credit-money circuit, which insist that money lent must 
ultimately return to the lender of issue if the system is to sustain itself, that much of this 
matching on their balance sheets has been little more than fantasy. While their 
liabilities have been real enough, the valuation of assets has far exceeded the 
purchasing power that will ever be employed to purchase them. As long as these assets 
were purchased for selling, as their prices spiralled upwards, the process continued. As 
soon as anyone wondered what they might really be worth if they were left holding 
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them when the music stopped, their value collapsed and the balance sheets of the 
institutions holding them developed gaping holes where collateral for further liquidity 
used to be (Wray 2008, Tymoigne and Wray 2008). 
If manipulation of the interest rate at which commercial banks can obtain the 
reserves they require for their day to day operations, and targeting this manipulation on 
a price index inflation target can neither produce stable behaviour of the economy, nor 
maintain the desired level of growth and employment it is clearly time to look 
elsewhere for economic policy levers. The aim of policy should be to shift incentives to 
minimise expectational failures and improve the transparency of the debt-credit nexus. 
One option might be a ‘Real Targeting Framework’ which instead of aiming for 
a monetary variable such as the inflation rate would be targeted on selected economic 
variables more directly associated with social welfare This might include tools such as 
credit allocation policies, support for development banks and development lending, 
price-based regulatory incentives. Perhaps the most crucial proposal, in the light of our 
analysis of the problems of a monetary system that hides debtors from creditors, is that 
to institutionalise citizens and labour groups into central bank decision making. An 
important role of the latter would be to provide some public education as to what 
actually goes on in the ‘black box’ of money and banking, and how it can be influenced 
(Epstein 2003). 
Price-based regulatory incentives could have the merit of pushing production 
contracts toward more welfare-producing output while allowing those making 
production contracts (in the broad definition) to follow their own information and 
incentives in determining the details of these contracts. One important suggestion in 
this area is that of Asset-Based Reserve Requirements (Palley 2003, 2004, 2006). The 
primary motivation for such a form of regulation is that in the present era, the primary 
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risk to financial institutions is not on their liability side but on their asset side. The 
presence of state deposit insurance and liquidity support for commercial banks means 
that mass withdrawals of deposits is now far less of a risk than that of the collapse in 
value of assets. While this has been addressed in part in recent times by the imposition 
of capital requirements for banks based on the riskiness of their assets, these 
requirements may have markedly procyclical effects.  
Banks are forced to look for additional capital in 
recessions when loan quality deteriorates and default risk 
increases, yet this is exactly when bank capital is hardest to 
raise (Palley 2004, p47). 
By tailoring reserve requirements to particular types of loans and securities that 
banks hold on the asset side of their balance sheets monetary authorities can influence 
both the riskiness and the contribution to welfare of loans and other debt assets 
acquired by institutions, without themselves directing their activities.7 And when loans 
deteriorate or default, as their asset value decreases, the reserves required to be held 
against these loans actually decreases, freeing up these reserves for new (and hopefully 
more successful) lending. The injection of reserves by the central bank can have a more 
direct stimulant effect under such rules. By applying these rules to all intermediaries, 
whether they are nominally banks, insurance companies or mutual funds, the focus is 
shifted to the legal definition of the type of business, but to the functional form of the 
asset held. There is thus no benefit for category-shifting of businesses (Palley 2004).  
6.6 Conclusion 
In this final chapter we have summarised our picture of monetary flows as 
arising from triangular relationships between banks (commercial and central), firms and 
households in the process of creating additional value from inputs, when time and 
                                                 
7
 Clearly, for this to work will require much tightening of what is allowed to be off the balance-sheets of 
financial institutions. 
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uncertainty are a potential barrier.  By analysing these flows according to strict double-
entry book-keeping, rigorously matching monetary assets and liabilities, we identify a 
structure to the monetary economy far more robust than those of economic models that 
rely either on behavioural axioms or empirical behavioural relationships. 
Using this structure we analyse the unique problems that a monetary economy 
raises, because of the evolution of the triangular relationship of money creation from 
the simple team-production/hostage contracting of a single firm in Chapter 2, to the 
creation, acceptance and valuation of money on a systemic basis that is analysed in 
Chapters 3-5. The consequent dispersion of information means that monetary flows and 
the benefits of production are frequently mismatched, with the result that expectations 
formed within the multiple triangular relationships of the modern economy are 
frequently unrealised. 
Finally, we briefly discussed the role of policy in minimising the problems of a 
monetary economic system, using our monetary flow structure to assess both current 
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Table 6.1 Balance Sheet 




Sector 1 Sector 2 
Investment 
Goods Firms Banks ∑ 
Money 
Deposits +M    -M 0 
Loans  -L1 -L2  +L 0 
Bonds +BH -B1 -B2   0 
Fixed Capital  +FK1 +FK2   +FK 
Balance 
 (Net worth) -Vh -V1 -V2 0 0 -FK 
∑ 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 6.2 Transactions Flow Matrix 
 
 Employed Households Firms Banks  
Cons Gds Fs Cons Gds Fs 






Current Capital Current Capital 
Inv Gds 
Fs Current Capital 0 




   0 
Wages +wE1 +wE2 +wEK +wEB -wE1  -wE2  -wEK -wEB  0 
Interest on 
Loans     -(R1L1 + rL.W1)   -(R2L2 + rL.W2)   
+R1L1 + rL.W1  
+ R2L2 + rL.W2  0 
Issue of Bonds -∆BH1 -∆BH2 -∆BHK -∆BHB 
 
+∆B1  +∆B2    0 




-pKK2 +pKK   0 
Profit/Loss     -F1 +F1 -F2 -F2    0 
∆ in loans      +∆L1  +∆L2    +∆L 0 
∆ in deposits -∆M1 -∆M2 -∆MK -∆MB       +∆M 0 
∑ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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